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1 Introduction
The brain never sleeps – every moment, information is perceived, analysed, and classified
regarding its value for the current state of oneself. The estimation of events and the
resulting behaviour are strongly related to the memories of past experiences. It is a circle
that memories shape current behaviour, and that new information also affects old memo-
ries. Thus, it is impossible to disentangle past experiences and present behaviour. In this
study, the phenomenon of false memories, i.e. memories of events that never happened or
happened in a different way, are investigated. False memories can influence ones attitude
towards life, to common and specific situations, and towards other people.
In chapter 2 theory about memory in general and false memories in particular are
presented. The first section (2.1) introduces the theoretical background to ‘normal’ mem-
ory to facilitate the understanding of false memories’ theories, explanations, and para-
digms. This includes classification of memory regarding processes, time, content, and the
neural substrate. The second section (2.2) of the theoretical background gives up-to-
date knowledge regarding false memories. This includes the introduction of theories and
classifications of false memories as well as task paradigms. Subsequently, the results of
previous neuroimaging studies are reported.
Chapter 3 presents questions and hypotheses. A number of questions were formu-
lated from the survey of the theoretical background. These questions lead to four hy-
potheses being developed that form the basis of this study. The first hypothesis expounds
that a film, which mirrors everyday life, will provoke false recognitions. The second hy-
pothesis states that two different causes of false recognitions can be distinguished. The
third hypothesis says that longer response times indicate false and shorter response times
correct recognitions. The fourth hypothesis deals with the underlying neural patterns of
correct and false recognitions and states that these two recognition forms can be discrim-
inated in the brain.
In chapter 4 the applied methods, the subjects, and the procedures are introduced.
The first section (4.1) describes the development of a film paradigm, with which the hy-
potheses were tested. The film paradigm consists of a learning phase and a recognition
task. During the learning phase the subjects view a film containing everyday scenes. The
recognition task presents pictures directly from the film (one set) as well as closely related
ones (two sets). The demographical data of two investigated groups of healthy subjects
of the study is given (4.2). In addition, similarities and differences of the film paradigm
procedure between these two groups are presented (4.3). Furthermore, the event-related
functional magnetic resonance imagining (fMRI) procedure, which was used to detect
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changes in neural activity in the brain of the subjects of the second group during their
recognition task (4.4) and the statistical method ‘signal detection theory’ (4.5) are briefly
explained. The latter one is a procedure to investigate the degree of uncertainty whilst
making a forced ‘known/unknown’ or ‘yes/no’ decision.
The results sections, which are given in chapter 5, are structured regarding behav-
ioural and neuroimaging data. The behavioural data is separately presented for the two
groups and further organised after the given hypotheses (5.1). The neuroimaging results
are introduced with respect to four analysis steps, starting with correct and false recogni-
tions across all investigated stimuli, followed by contrasts between studied and unstudied
stimulus sets, contrasts between the three sets, and ending with contrasting single stim-
ulus sets with baseline condition (5.2).
In chapter 6 the discussion of the formulated hypotheses is given by considering
behavioural and neuroimaging results. The behavioural results of the two investigated
groups are discussed. At the beginning, the film paradigm is discussed regarding the hy-
pothesis if this paradigm caused false recognitions (6.1). It follows the discussion of the
results of the two unstudied stimulus sets, which represented the two different causes of
false recognitions (6.2). The third section deals with the revealed response times (6.3).
The section of the neuroimaging results (6.4) is divided in two different parts. In the
first part, correct and false recognitions across all three picture sets are discussed. In the
second part, the results of the other three analysis steps are interpreted. The revealed in-
creases in neural activity in the brain are sorted and discussed regarding their anatomical
affiliation. At the end of this section, a summary of the neuroimaging data is given with
a special attention to correct and false recognitions and findings of previous studies.
Finally, in chapter 7 the conclusions of this study are presented by evaluating the
film paradigm. Moreover, possible future directions for this work are discussed.
The appendices show all used pictures of the recognition task (A), additional sta-
tistical analyses to demonstrate that the behavioural results of the first group can be
discussed along with the ones of the second group (B), and a map, which shows the
Brodmann areas of the human brain (C).
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2 Theoretical background
In this study, the phenomenon of false memories, more specifically the occurrence of false
recognitions, is investigated. False memories are defined as memories of events that did
not happen or were distorted, caused by additional information, internally or externally
generated. During the last decades, most of the research of false memories focussed on
episodic memories. These are memories for personally experienced events. More recently
studies have also investigated false memories for semantic information, which contains
general knowledge. To understand the occurrence of false memories, it is necessary to
gain an overview of the processes of ‘normal’ or true memories.
The first part of this chapter will present the different classifications of true memory
regarding processes, time, content, and neural correlates. The second part will shed light
on the phenomenon of false memories. This includes definitions of the different forms of
false memories, theoretical explanations, Schacter’s seven sins of memory, paradigms for
investigation, and at the end also neural correlates.
2.1 Memory
“In neural network models, there are no specific locations with unique addresses for mem-
ory records. Rather, memories are captured by patterns of activation spread over many
neuron-like units and links between them.” (Haberlandt, 1999, p. 167)
Memory is the most fascinating development of evolution. The ability to learn new infor-
mation and to adapt to behaving in new (environmental) situations is a basic requirement
for life. Memory is introduced here with the focus on human memory, even though some
animal studies are also discussed for a better grasp of some of the conclusions. Memory
is classified with regards to different aspects. Firstly, the sequence of processes during
the memorisation of new information is examined. Then, the distinction along the time
axis during the acquisition of information is introduced, followed by a description of the
different memory stores that last from a few milliseconds till almost infinity. The content
of memories is a further aspect, along which memories are classified into different systems.
The further development of neuroimaging techniques concentrated the focus more on the
underlying neural correlates of memory, which are explained in the final section (2.1.4).
2.1.1 Memory processes
New information is registered via the sensory systems. It is then encoded, over the time
consolidated, stored, and can be retrieved later on (Fig. 1). These cognitive operations
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are not fixed. For example, during the process of retrieval, information is also re-encoded
and re-consolidated, respectively.
Registration Encoding Consolidation Storage Retrieval
Figure 1: Illustration of the main processes from registration of information till memory
retrieval (modified from Markowitsch, 2003a)
During the registration process of new information via the five sensory channels
(visual, auditory, somatosensory, olfactory, and gustatory), selective processes take place.
An initial filtering of the huge amount of miscellaneous data enables discrimination be-
tween relevant and non-relevant information regarding the actual situation. For example,
when a person attends a lecture the most important information is what the lecturer says
and not what other students may say nearby. A selection at this early stage allows effec-
tive handling of an abundance of information. Former experiences can help to distinguish
between important and unimportant details in a complex environment.
After the registration, information is transferred through the encoding process into
a specific internal code. A new memory trace is created for the information in the brain.
This memory trace is also named engram. Encoding processes are further differentiated
into intentional and incidental encoding processes (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik &
Tulving, 1975).
Intentional encoding occurs when new information is consciously processed. For ex-
ample, someone studies for an exam and aims actively to understand complex issues. On
the other hand, incidental encoding happens without our direct awareness of the infor-
mation. A good example was given by a study where subjects were asked to distinguish
words in a list considering whether they represent a living or a non-living object (Kapur
et al., 1994). Later, during an unheralded recognition task subjects recognised 75% of
the words correctly. This result indicates that the subjects incidentally encoded most of
the words during the decision task. The phenomenon of incidental encoding is further
known from commercials. For example, when we see an advertising spot that shows a
specific product and simultaneously a catchy melody is playing in the background. Even
though the product is what watchers should encode the melody is incidentally encoded.
Later on, the melody, which should only enhance the encoding of the product, might be
remembered even more easily than the specific product.
How well information is encoded depends on the ‘depth of processing’ effect, formu-
lated by Craik and Lockhart (1972). If information is processed in a way that the meaning
of it is encoded, it is called ‘deep’ or semantic encoding. For example, when subjects are
instructed to decide if a presented word is abstract (e.g. love) or concrete (e.g. book)
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(Demb et al., 1995). If only the general characteristics of the information is processed
the encoding is ‘shallow’. For example, when subjects are instructed to distinguish if two
underlined letters in a word are in a alphabetically order or not (Fletcher, Stephenson,
Carpenter, Donovan, & Bullmore, 2003).
Consolidation describes the process of linking newly registered and encoded infor-
mation with older reactivated memories (Tronel, Milekic, & Alberini, 2005). This process
enhances the stability of the new memory formation. The process of consolidation can
take place over a period of minutes to hours, even years (McGaugh, 2000) and connects
several steps, including stabilisation, enhancement, and integration. The process of con-
solidation is further distinguished in synaptic and system consolidation (Dudai, 2004).
Synaptic consolidation describes changes that take place within the first minutes and
hours after the registration of information. The system consolidation, which follows af-
ter the first synaptic changes, influences old memories by connecting these with the new
information. Consolidation is suggested to be mainly processed while sleeping (Stickgold
& Walker, 2005; Stickgold, 2005; Spencer, Sunm, & Ivry, 2006; Walker & Stickgold, 2006).
Storing of memories in form of the introduced engrams is processed by a broad
neural network. Memories are not stored self-contained but simultaneously, at different
places within the associative cortices (Mesulam, 1994). For example, the last lecture that
someone attended, which combines a multitude of information. The specific knowledge of
the lecture is stored as semantic memory, but perhaps besides that something special was
witnessed like a lecturer’s funny joke. The information is stored as a complex episodic
event. The same event is stored within different memory systems, but the single elements
of the event are still connected with each other. This also happens with the different
modalities of an event, the visual information is stored in the visual cortex, the auditory
information in the auditory cortex, and so on.
Retrieval of memories can be initiated by a ‘trigger’, which reactivates memory
traces. A trigger can be any information, which initiates a recall of a specific memory.
For example, when someone sees a travel agency it initiates memories of recent holidays.
A cue stands for a specific stimulus that activates the specific memory. For example,
an advertisement for a vacation in Mexico activates memories of a trip to this country
including specific episodes and details, i.e. cued recall. In this example the trigger, as
well as the cue, were externally perceived. However, they can also be produced internally,
for example, when someone takes a walk and muses about the last year, that triggers the
memory of vacations, which brings forth specific memories of one holiday. A trigger can
also be the instruction of an experimenter to a subject to recall words of a previously
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studied list, i.e. free recall. A further form of retrieval is the recognition of information.
For example, recognising previously studied words out of a sample containing also new
words.
Retrieval is often strongly associated with a feeling of familiarity that stimulates the
retrieval process. Besides the judgement of the familiarity of an item (e.g. a word), a sec-
ond process is needed for the correct retrieval of specific information. The event/context,
during which the information was encoded, also has to be recollected. Both processes,
familiarity and recollection (cf. dual-process model, Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1994), have to
merge for a successful retrieval of memories (Yonelinas, 2002). A method to distinguish
between these two processes is the ‘remember/know paradigm’, introduced by Tulving
(1985). Subjects are instructed to respond with ‘remember’ when they can truly recollect
the context of learning the stimulus. For example, they not only remember the word but
also the ones before and after. If they are unable to remember the context of learning the
stimulus but are still sure to have learnt it they are instructed to respond with ‘know’.
This paradigm can be used to analyse similarities and differences between familiarity and
recollection processes (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995; Giovanello, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2006).
These two processes also activate different regions in the brain, which will be presented
later in section 2.1.4.3.
Two further important elements of the retrieval process have to be distinguished,
namely ‘ecphory’ and ‘retrieval mode’ (REMO). Ecphory was introduced by Tulving
(1983) as the interaction between retrieval cues and stored information, which leads to a
successful retrieval of a memory (Steinvorth, Corkina, & Halgren, 2006). REMO describes
an ‘online’ holding of older memories that enables the evaluation of new information as
‘retrieval cues’ and finally yields a conscious recollection of an event (Lepage, Ghaffar,
Nyberg, & Tulving, 2000).
During the retrieval of memories the processes of re-encoding or re-consolidation can
take place (Buckner, Wheeler, & Sheridan, 2001; Stickgold & Walker, 2005). By retriev-
ing old information, this information is also newly encoded and thereby strengthened.
Current information, which is perceived during the retrieval process, can be linked with
the older memories. Afterwards, a modified version of the old memory is (re-)encoded
and stored (Tulving, 2001). Furthermore, prior memories can be interlinked with each
other during the processes and can at this point be changed. Unfortunately, it is nearly
impossible to distinguish between an original memory and a later transformed one. The
implications of these memory deformations will be explained in detail in the section False
memory (2.2).
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2.1.2 Relation between memory and time
The classification of memory along the time axis demonstrates a hierarchical system of
three main stores (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). The first one is referred to as the ultra-
short-term memory or the sensory store. The second one is called short-term memory,
which is strongly linked with the working memory system. The third store is the long-
term memory. Figure 2 shows this multi-store model of memory with the processes among
and the dependencies between them.
Decay Forgetting
#auditory
#somatosensory
#olfactory
#gustatory
Ultra-short-term
memory/sensory
store
#rehearsal
#coding
#decisions
#retrieval strategies
Short-term memory
(temporary working
memory)
Control processes#visual
Response
output
Long-term
memory
Environmental
input
Lost information Forgetting
Figure 2: Multi-store model connecting the serial information processing along the time
(modified from Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968)
2.1.2.1 Ultra-short-term, short-term and working memory
Information is ‘stored’ and pre-processed in the ultra-short-term memory. The ultra-short-
term memory is also referred to as the sensory store because of the modality-specificity of
it. It processes information that were perceived via the visual, auditory, somatosensory,
olfactory, and gustatory sensory channel. Most of the research focuses on the iconic
(visual) (Sperling, 1960) and echoic (auditory) (Treisman, 1964) stores because of their
easier accessibility, contrary to the somatosensory, olfactory, and gustatory stores.
The information persists briefly (several milliseconds) in the ultra-short-term mem-
ory (e.g. G. R. Loftus, Duncan, & Gehrig, 1992). The processed information passes then
to the short-term memory, which lasts longer than the ultra-short-term memory, by up
to several seconds (Waugh & Norman, 1965). The short-term memory is limited by the
amount of information it can process in parallel. The capacity of the mental storage
ranges between four and eight chunks, earlier research stated, on average, seven chunks
(G. A. Miller, 1956), more recent studies narrowed it down to four chunks (Cowan, 2001).
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A chunk decodes a word, a number or any other single perceived information. During free
recall tasks, it was found that the first and the last few items of a list are usually more
easily and better recalled than the remaining items in the middle (e.g. Demaree, Shenal,
Everhart, & Robinson, 2004). This outcome was named the primacy and recency effect,
respectively. A further limitation of the short-term memory is the length of the single
chunks (Baddeley, Thomson, & Buchanan, 1975). Baddeley and colleagues named this
the ‘word length effect’, which says that short words are accessible for a longer time than
longer words. A recent study confirmed the influence of both factors for the short-term
memory capacity (Chen & Cowan, 2005).
As a special form of the short-term memory system, Baddeley and Hitch (1974)
introduced the working memory system. Working memory is an active system, which
analyses and evaluates information over a restricted period of time. It interlinks the per-
ception of information with the long-term memory and the resulting actions (output). The
working memory consists originally of the central executive and two temporary storage
systems: the phonological loop and the visuospatial sketchpad. More recently, a fourth
component of the working memory was proposed, the episodic buffer (Baddeley, 2000).
Figure 3 shows the revised multi-component working memory system (Baddeley, 2003b).
Visuospatial
sketchpad
Phonological
loop
Episodic
buffer
Visual
semantics
LanguageEpisodic
LTM
Central
executive
Figure 3: The multi-component working memory system (modified from Baddeley, 2003b);
LTM = long-term memory
The visuospatial sketchpad processes visual data, holds transitional images and
manipulates the information. These operations enable the production of a designated
action. An example is driving a car that combines a flow of visual information that
has to be quickly interpreted. The visuospatial sketchpad is also a possible measure to
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acquire non-verbal intelligence, which is important in several scientific fields, for example
architecture (Verstijnen, van Leeuwen, Goldschmidt, Hamel, & Hennessey, 1998). The
visuospatial sketchpad is restricted in capacity, which normally ranges between three and
four chunks.
The phonological loop processes auditory information and language. One component
of the loop is the phonological store that allows an upholding of information traces for
a few seconds before they vanish. An example is reading a telephone number, which
has to be rehearsed before it can actually by typed in a phone. The second component
of the phonological loop is an articulatory rehearsal process that takes place within the
phonological store. The articulatory rehearsal process is comparable to subvocal speech,
which describes the finding that only thinking about speaking without the production
of any sounds is connected with slight movements of the speech muscles (Paulesu, Frith,
& Frackowiak, 1993). The phonological loop is therefore of high relevance for language
learning (Baddeley, 2003a). New words are temporarily represented in the phonological
store whereas the rehearsing process in the articulatory system facilitates the production
of unfamiliar syllables. The phonological loop is similar to the visuospatial sketchpad
limited in capacity to three to four chunks.
The third component, the episodic buffer, is analogous to the episodic long-term
memory but contrary to it with a temporary bounding. It is able to integrate information
from the central executive and the episodic long-term memory, and via these components
further information from the phonological loop and the visuospatial sketchpad. There-
fore, it buffers between those systems and provides a unitary representation of episodes
(Baddeley, 2000).
The central executive, as the main structure of the multi-component working mem-
ory system, describes a limited attentional relay station. Though it is the main component
of working memory, the central executive system is the least understood. One important
part of the central executive is the supervisory attentional system (SAS) developed by
Norman and Shallice (1986). The SAS functions as a controller with limited attentional
capacity between routine sequences and situational adequate action beyond the routine.
For example, when the same route to work is driven every day but one day a stop is nec-
essary at a pharmacy, which is located slightly aside, the SAS has to override the routine
sequence of the usual route to enable the adequate action.
In conclusion, the control processes within the short-term memory system are not
only responsible for the forwarding of information from the ultra-short-term memory store
to the long-term memory store. They are also actively involved in retrieval processes and
mediation of information from the long-term memory to the response output.
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2.1.2.2 Long-term memory
The long-term memory store absorbs all information that traversed the short-term mem-
ory. It seemed to be limitless regarding the amount of information that can be stored.
The time span also appeared to be infinite. The long-term memory integrates separate
memory systems, which will be explained thoroughly in the next section (2.1.3).
A further classification regarding the time is mainly used for amnesic patients and
refers to their ability to store new, or retrieve old memories from the long-term memory
store (Fig. 4). Patients who are unable to remember their pasts are referred to as ret-
rograde amnesic. On the other hand, anterograde amnesia, describes patients who are
unable to memorise any new event. They are literally stuck in time.
retrograde (= old)
memories
anterograde (= new)
memories
arbitrary time point or point of
critical event
Figure 4: Classification of retrograde and anterograde memory corresponding to an ar-
bitrary time point in life; analogous classification between retrograde and anterograde
amnesia in patients caused by an organic or psychic trauma (modified from Brand &
Markowitsch, 2003)
It is further shown in Figure 4 that this classification in retrograde and anterograde
memory is not only used for patients but also for healthy subjects. For healthy subjects,
the terms are used to distinguish between older and recent memories. An arbitrary time
point in life is fixed and memories before are classified as retrograde memories and memo-
ries after as anterograde. More recently, researchers have focussed increasingly on patients
suffering from psychogenic amnesia (Kopelman, 2002). Factors for a psychogenic amnesia
are stress or a mental trauma. Today, a vivid discussion addresses the question to which
extent amnesia caused by an organic trauma and amnesia resulting from psychogenic
factors can be distinguished (Markowitsch, 2002, 2003b; Reinhold, Kuehnel, Brand, &
Markowitsch, 2006).
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2.1.3 Classification by content
There are two most influential theories regarding the classification of the content of mem-
ories. One was formulated by Squire (1987) differentiating between non-declarative and
declarative memory. The second one, introduced by Tulving (1972), originally distin-
guished between four long-term memory systems: procedural memory, priming, semantic
memory, and episodic memory. More recently a fifth system was integrated, the percep-
tual memory system (Tulving, 2005).
The classification of Squire (1987) draws an intrinsic picture of the long-term mem-
ory systems, from the simplest one, like reflexes, up to memory for facts and events. By
integrating results from animal studies (e.g. Mishkin, 1982) as well as from work with
patients, Squire (2004) developed a taxonomy of mammalian long-term memory. Regard-
ing the level of consciousness during retrieval, he distinguished two main branches: the
declarative (or explicit) and the non-declarative (or implicit) memory system (Fig. 5).
Declarative memory can be consciously retrieved, whereas non-declarative memory works
without our awareness of it.
Memory
Non-declarative Declarative
EventsFactsNon-associative
learning
Associative
learning
Procedural
(skills &
habits)
Priming &
Perceptual
learning
Figure 5: Squires taxonomy of long-term memory (modified from Squire, 2004)
Declarative memory contains knowledge that can be accessed consciously. It includes
general knowledge (semantic memory) and memory for personal experiences (episodic
memory). Squire (2004) stated: “Declarative memory is representational. It provides a
way to model the external world, and as a model of the world it is either true or false.
In contrast, non-declarative memory is neither true nor false.” Non-declarative memory
is used as an umbrella term for heterogeneous, mainly unconsciously processed memory
systems. It contains non-associative learning (e.g. habituation), associative learning (e.g.
simple classical conditioning), procedural learning (e.g. skill learning), priming, and per-
ceptual learning (Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1988).
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Tulving’s classification mainly developed from results of observation of amnesic pa-
tients. Unlike Squire’ model, it does not define two distinct subsystems (declarative and
non-declarative memory) (e.g. Tulving, 1972, 1995). Tulving subdivided human long-
term memory into five, hierarchically organised, interacting, but also parallel working,
memory systems: procedural (e.g. skills), priming, perceptual, semantic, and episodic
memory. Figure 6 presents these five memory systems together with small examples.
Procedural
memory
Priming
!
?
Perceptual
memory
Brandenburg
Gate?in
Berlin.
Semantic
memory
My holiday
in Mexico.
Episodic
memory
Figure 6: The five memory systems together with examples for each one (Tulving and
Markowitsch, in preparation)
The most basic system is the procedural memory system that contains motor-related
memories, cognitive skills, and routines. An example is the knowledge to walk or drive
a car. Priming describes the ability to recognise a stimulus easier and faster because of
a previous (unconscious) exposure to this stimulus or a related one. Priming can be di-
vided into repetition (repeated exposure to the same stimulus), semantic (related words,
like Mercedes, BMW, VW, which enhance the generation of ‘car’), and new association
priming (stands for association between unrelated stimuli by presenting them together)
(Wagner & Koutstaal, 2002). The perceptual memory system refers to the recognition
of stimuli because of the familiarity of them. The semantic memory describes all infor-
mation for common knowledge, for which it is impossible to recall the time and event of
encoding. Finally, the episodic memory system contains all information of our personal
autobiography. For these memories we can recollect specific, sensory information. It is
highly interrelated with the view of our self and allows us to travel mentally back in time
(Tulving, 2002). A special classification has to be made for autobiographical facts, like
dates of special events (e.g. birthdays, wedding). These memories are important for our
own biography and therefore strongly connected to episodic memories but nevertheless, we
are often unable to recall when the facts were learnt or what the exact circumstances were.
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A special relationship was characterised between episodic, semantic and perceptual
memory system, named the serial–parallel–independent (SPI) model (Tulving, 1995). SPI
stands for serial encoding followed by parallel storage of information and a subsequent
independent retrieval. It is assumed that information attains episodic memory through
the perceptual and the semantic memory systems (Fig. 7).
episodic
input
remember
the past
indentify
objects
know the
present
output
output
output
encoding retrieval
PRS
semantic
Figure 7: Representation of the serial–parallel–independent (SPI) model embodying the
processes of episodic memory (modified from Tulving, 2001)
According to the SPI model, new perceptual information is first encoded, prepared,
and momentarily stored in the perceptual system, which is also called perceptual repre-
senting system (PRS) (Tulving & Schacter, 1990). The next step in the serial encoding
of new information is the semantic memory system. Here, general information about an
event is processed and stored. Finally, in the episodic memory system, the new informa-
tion is processed regarding its value for oneself and the subjective information is stored.
Because the information was encoded serially, but stored in parallel, it is possible to re-
trieve only a part of the information relative to a given cue. For example, when we hear
the first notes of a melody, which we heard during a holiday years ago, this perceptual
information acts as a cue to remember parts of this special holiday. However, we are also
able to retrieve the memory by recalling all the last holidays and remembering, in which
year we went where. Thus, we depend strongly on the semantically stored information.
When we talk with friends about events that happened in different holidays, we possibly
retrieve an episode of this holiday, recalling it with all the experienced richness. For ex-
ample, how warm the weather was, how relaxed we were, lying there on the beach. It
is important to note, that not all perceived information has to reach the semantic and
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the episodic memory system. Factors like the novelty of information can influence the
processing (Tulving, Kapur, Craik, Moscovitch, & Houle, 1994) as well as the ‘level of
processing’, meaning that information can be processed in a shallow or in a deep way
(Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 1975).
2.1.4 Neural correlates
Most of the knowledge of memory and the corresponding brain structures was acquired by
examination of patients who had suffered from brain damage. The development of neu-
roimaging techniques like electroencephalography (EEG), positron emission tomography
(PET), magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), and functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) allowed deeper insights into the underlying brain structures of memory in pa-
tients, but also in healthy subjects. Recently, the number of publications that deal with
the results of memory studies using neuroimaging techniques has increased constantly.
In the following sections, first a brief outline of changes on the neuronal level is given,
followed by the description of the involvement of brain regions in short-term and working
memory. The final section illustrates long-term memory processes and their associated
areas in the brain.
2.1.4.1 Cellular basis of memory
Independent of the content of new information, learning requires synaptic changes (Martin
& Morris, 2002). Kandel and colleagues (2001) investigated simple learning of habitu-
ation, sensitisation, and classical conditioning in the sea slug (Aplysia). They showed
that even these simple forms of learning manifest themselves in synaptic changes. The
cellular plasticity in neurons is separated into two distinct forms: long-term potentiation
(LTP) and long-term depression (LTD) (cf. Hebb, 1949). Long-term potentiation was
first reported by Bliss and Lømo (1973) and describes the lasting enhancement of synap-
tic transmission between neurons due to repetitive presynaptic activation. This results
in a continuous flow of neurotransmitters and a lasting connection of pre- and postsy-
naptic neurons (e.g. Kushner et al., 2005; Shinoe, Matsue, Taketo, & Manabe, 2005).
Long-term depression on the other hand illustrates the reverse development, when the
synaptic efficiency between neurons is reduced (e.g. Teskey et al., 2006). Furthermore,
long-term potentiation and long-term depression can result in evolving (exocytosis) or re-
ducing (endocytosis) the conjunctions (receptors) between pre- and postsynaptic neurons
(Pe´rez-Otan˜o & Ehlers, 2005).
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2.1.4.2 Neural correlates of short-term and working memory
The posterior parietal cortex was found activated for visual short-term memory tasks
(Todd & Marois, 2004). Todd and Marois (2005) also found that individual differences
of the visual short-term memory capacity can be correlated with activity in the poste-
rior parietal as well as the visual occipital cortex. Most research regarding short-term
memory focussed more specifically on the components of the working memory system. In
general, working memory tasks activated brain regions in the premotor and parietal cor-
tex (Nyberg, Forkstam, Petersson, Cabeza, & Ingvar, 2002). Patients with lesions in the
left temporo-parietal area showed deficits in the phonological loop but still had language
abilities mainly intact (Vallar & Baddeley, 1984; Vallar, DiBetta, & Silveri, 1997). The
left temporo-parietal area was confirmed as the storage component of the phonological
loop (Paulesu et al., 1993). For the rehearsing process of the phonological loop Broca’s
area was found activated (Jonides et al., 1996). Patient studies also showed that the visu-
ospatial sketchpad is associated with the right frontal cortex (Della Salla, Gray, Baddeley,
Allamano, & Wilson, 1999; Henson, 2001). More specifically, activations were found in
the right inferior parietal cortex, the right premotor cortex, the right inferior frontal cor-
tex and the right anterior extrastriate occipital cortex. The right anterior extrastriate
occipital cortex is also associated with visual imagery (Kosslyn et al., 1993). Anatomi-
cally the central executive seems not to be localised in one region only, but activates a
more widespread network involving the frontal regions (Baddeley, 2003b). The long-term
memory system comprises the different memory systems, therefore, the neural correlates
are explained in the next section.
2.1.4.3 Neural correlates of long-term memory
Encoding
The encoding of newly acquired information of semantic and episodic memories mainly
requires two brain circuits. They are located mainly within the limbic lobe (cf. Markow-
itsch, 2000b) and called the Papez circuit and the basolateral limbic circuit.
The Papez circuit was originally introduced by Papez (1937). He assumed that it
connects the responsible brain regions for processing of emotional memories. Nowadays,
the Papez circuit is proposed to be predominantly involved in the transfer of new informa-
tion in general, episodic and semantic, into the long-term memory systems. In the Papez
circuit, information is first processed in the hippocampal formation, which is connected
via the fornix with the mammillary bodies, which are connected via the mammillothala-
mic tract (or tract of Vicq d’Azyr) with the anterior thalamus, which is further connected
via the thalamo-cortical pedunculi with the cingulate gyrus, and this is connected via the
cingulum with the hippocampal formation.
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The basolateral limbic circuit is known today to be responsible for the processing
of emotionally relevant information (Markowitsch, 2000a). It connects the amygdala via
the ventral amygdalofugal projection with the mediodorsal nucleus of the thalamus, from
there via the anterior thalamic pedunculi with the subcallosal region within the basal
forebrain, and via the bandeletta diagonalis back again with the amygdala. Because of
their high importance for information processing some of these structures are also named
‘bottleneck structures’ (Brand & Markowitsch, 2003). Damage to these structures, even
to a single one, have intrinsic implications on memory functions (cf. Calabrese, Haupts,
Markowitsch, & Gehlen, 1993; Markowitsch, von Cramon, & Schuri, 1993; Markowitsch
et al., 1994; Kopelman, Stanhope, & Kingsley, 1999).
The importance of the medial temporal lobe for encoding processes of episodic and
semantic memories was exemplified by patient H.M. After a bilateral medial temporal
lobectomy, conducted because of a severe case of epilepsy, H.M. suffered from anterograde
amnesia for the rest of his life. Among others, Milner (1965) showed that, even though
H.M. was able to learn new skills, like mirror drawing, he was unaware of doing it. H.M
had no memories of performing repeatedly this task and had no knowledge about his own
improvement. This result further suggested the division of long-term memory into several
separate systems (e.g. Sherry & Schacter, 1987).
The amygdala plays a special role in encoding of affective information. Together
with the thalamus and the basal forebrain the amygdala allows a faster and more efficient
encoding of emotional memories (LeDoux, 2000; Piefke, Weiss, Zilles, Markowitsch, &
Fink, 2003). The hippocampal formation, especially the hippocampus, is known from
animal studies to be involved in processing of spatial information (Morris, 1981; Holland
& Bouton, 1999). In a recent review Burgess, Maguire, and O’Keefe summarised the
relevance of the hippocampus for human (2002). The right hippocampus in humans is
associated with encoding processes of spatial relationships in the environment. The left
hippocampus is engaged in processing verbal information and context-dependent infor-
mation of episodic memories. Both hippocampi are connected to the frontal lobe and are
provided from there with temporal information. Thus, they create the basis for developing
spatial-temporal episodic memories.
The two circuits are not only interconnected with each other through some of the
structures but also connected with further regions, most prominently the prefrontal re-
gions. The left prefrontal region was found to be activated during incidental (Demb et
al., 1995; Wagner, Schacter, et al., 1998) as well as intentional encoding processes (Kapur
et al., 1996; Kelley et al., 1998). These studies showed that even though these two forms
of encoding are distinguishable on behavioural level (Craik & Lockhart, 1972), they still
share almost equal neural correlates. Interestingly, this result was anticipated earlier by
Craik and Tulving due to plain behavioural studies (1975). It was found, nevertheless,
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that deep encoding, which is connected to intentional encoding, activates a significantly
larger region in the left prefrontal area than shallow encoding (Demb et al., 1995; Gabrieli
et al., 1996). Kapur et al. (1994) found activation in the left inferior prefrontal cortex
for deep encoding, though the subjects did not know during the learning phase that they
would be tested later on. Shallow encoding on the other hand is associated with activa-
tion in the right prefrontal cortex (Fletcher et al., 2003). Encoding of verbal material is
associated with areas in the left inferior and dorsal prefrontal regions together with the
anterior cingulate and the right-lateral cerebellum (Buckner & Koutstaal, 1998; Tulving
et al., 1994). Activations in the left prefrontal region are also related to face learning in
younger and older adults, additionally in younger adults regions in the left medial tem-
poral lobe are activated (Daselaar, Veltman, Rombouts, Raaijmakers, & Jonker, 2003).
In addition to the importance of the prefrontal cortex and the hippocampal formation
for memorisation processes, activation was found for encoding of episodic and semantic
information in the anterior thalamus (von Zerssen, Mecklinger, Opitz, & von Cramon,
2001) and the cingulate gyrus (Heun et al., 2000).
Consolidation
The process of consolidation is still the most challenging one of memory formation. It
is difficult to undertake studies to investigate how memories are consolidated. One of
the assumed key structures is the amygdala (McGaugh, 2002), which is also one of the
key structures of the basolateral thalamic circuit. The medial temporal lobe formation,
containing the hippocampus, entorhinal, perirhinal, and parahippocampal cortices, was
found to be involved in temporarily storing new information (Squire & Zola-Morgan,
1991). The structures of the medial temporal lobe are connected further to neocortical
areas. The information, which is for a time stored in the medial temporal lobe, guides the
longer lasting changes into the neocortex where the information is then permanently stored
(Alvarez & Squire, 1994). Over time, information retrieval results in decreased activation
in the medial temporal lobe regions but in increases in regions of the neocortex (Takashima
et al., 2006). This is also consistent with findings in amnesic patients, who suffered from
damage in the medial temporal lobe and were unable to encode new primarily episodic
information (Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997). Even though these patients were still able to
retrieve old memories.
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Storage
The storage of memories depends on their modality, which further results in a wide net-
work throughout the brain for each event. For example, the last birthday party contains
semantic information (when, where, who, etc.), visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and
somatosensory information as well as episodic data (e.g. feelings). Combining all this
information, we can describe how we experienced the night. We are able to form a rich
episodic autobiographical memory. The single details are stored separately; the visual
information is stored in the visual cortex (occipital lobe), the auditory information in the
auditory cortex, and so on. Evidence of the different modalities of one experience comes
from studies on patients who suffered from brain damage (e.g. Markowitsch, Fink, Tho¨ne,
Kessler, & Heiss, 1997).
Retrieval
As mentioned earlier in the section Memory processes (2.1.1), retrieval processes can
be distinguished regarding ecphory and retrieval mode (REMO).
Ecphory of old memories is assumed to be strongly related to the region of the
right lateral temporo-frontal junction area, as damage to this area together, with minor
damage in the left hemisphere, causes severe retrograde amnesia (Calabrese et al., 1996;
Kroll, Markowitsch, Knight, & von Cramon, 1997). In a recent study, it was found that
ecphory of autobiographical memories activates a broad neural network (Steinvorth et al.,
2006). Beyond that of the medial temporal lobe, the following structures are associated:
the temporo-parieto-occipital-junction, the dorsal prefrontal cortex, the medial frontal
cortex, and the retrosplenial cortex together with surrounding areas. The right prefrontal
cortex (mainly anterior frontal, orbitofrontal, and dorsolateral frontal) is involved in the
retrieval mode for retrieval of episodic memories, corresponding to findings of Fletcher
and Henson (2001).
In general, it can be stated that retrieval attempt and monitoring of the retrieval
process is associated with frontal regions (Wagner, 2002). Whereas the restoring of in-
formation and the retrieval success engages neocortical regions and medial temporal lobe
structures (Bayley, Gold, Hopkins, & Squire, 2005). Parietal together with frontal regions
produce a signal that indicates that truly an old memory is retrieved and processed, and
not a new information (Buckner et al., 2001). To be more specific, activations in both
lateral inferior parietal cortices, often stronger in the left than in the right hemisphere,
and the left anterior prefrontal region indicate retrieval success.
Stronger activation in the medial temporal lobe is assumed to be related to the
retrieval of stored patterns (Nyberg, McIntosh, Houle, Nilsson, & Tulving, 1996). Using
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a shallow versus deep encoding task, neural differences between retrieval attempt and re-
trieval success were investigated (Buckner, Koutstaal, Schacter, Wagner, & Rosen, 1998).
After shallow encoding, a high retrieval attempt was found to have only minor retrieval
success. Here, the anterior insular regions were activated bilaterally and the left dorsal
prefrontal region. On the other hand, high retrieval success, which was connected with
lesser retrieval attempt, was distinguished after a deep encoding task and was found to
be associated with activation in the right anterior prefrontal cortex (Buckner et al., 1998).
Overlapping structures
Further studies showed that encoding and retrieval processes of semantic and episodic
memories use partly overlapping neural networks (e.g. Schacter & Wagner, 1999).
Tulving (1994) introduced one of the models, which pointed these overlaps out,
calling it hemispheric encoding/retrieval asymmetry model (HERA). He illustrated that
during episodic encoding and semantic retrieval the left prefrontal region was activated,
whereas the right prefrontal region was associated with episodic retrieval processes (cf.
Nyberg, Cabeza, & Tulving, 1996; Nyberg, 2002; Habib, Nyberg, & Tulving, 2003). This
asymmetrical involvement of brain regions was also found in other studies investigating
differences of brain activation for heterogeneous stimuli. Encoding of verbal material
engaged the left frontal region, whereas the right frontal region was found to be more
involved in processing of nonverbal material (Kelley et al., 1998; Wagner, Poldrack, et
al., 1998; Golby et al., 2001). A study of Rossi et al. (2001) showed that encoding of
pictures activated the left dorsolateral prefrontal region, and retrieval of this information,
the right dorsolateral cortex. The left prefrontal region was further found activated during
encoding of faces, whereas the right hemispheric prefrontal region was activated during
recognition of the same material (Haxby et al., 1996).
The other model deals specifically with the involvement of the hippocampus in
memory processes and is named HIPER (hippocampal encoding/retrieval model) (Lepage,
Habib, & Tulving, 1998). Lepage and colleagues found that for visuospatial material, the
anterior part of the hippocampal formation was involved in successful encoding of episodic
memories, whereas the posterior part was activated during successful retrieval of semantic
information. A recent study of Bernard et al. (2004), which used pictures of faces,
confirmed the HIPER model. Contrary to the study of Lepage (1998), a study reported
for verbal material only slightly more activations during encoding and retrieval processes
within the middle and posterior part of the hippocampus than within the anterior part
(Greicius et al., 2003).
Importantly, these controversial results show again the impact of the availed stimulus
material. Activation in the brain shows the differences in the processing of unequal
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material. Even when only visual stimuli are used, it was shown that different regions
activated specifically for the context of faces, locations, and objects (Polyn, Natu, Cohen,
& Norman, 2005).
The overlapping of brain regions during encoding and retrieval processes can be ex-
plained by the engagement of encoding of new episodic information during the retrieval of
old semantic memories. Additionally, encoding of new episodic memories can involve old
semantic information to achieve a deeper encoding of the information (Cabeza & Nyberg,
2000).
2.1.4.4 Content-specific neural correlates
The medial temporal lobes as well as parts of the diencephalon are important for the
declarative memory system (Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991; McKee & Squire, 1992; Schacter
& Wagner, 1999). Squire (2004) does not differentiate, like Tulving (1998), between
semantic and episodic memory. However, he reports neuroanatomical differences between
these two systems, for example for the frontal lobes, which were additionally found to be
associated during episodic memory tasks (Shimamura & Squire, 1987).
The learning of motor skills, procedural memory, activates the basal ganglia (Lehericy
et al., 2006) as well as the cerebellum. Additionally, activations were found in the motor
areas of the frontal lobes, especially in the premotor and supplementary areas of the mo-
tor cortex, parts of the parietal lobes and fronto-parietal interactions (Cabeza & Nyberg,
2000).
Encoding and retrieval during priming and perceptual memory tasks activates uni-
and polymodal cortical regions (Schacter & Buckner, 1998; Wagner & Koutstaal, 2002).
It depends on the stimulus material and of the way it is processed, which brain regions
are mainly engaged in priming (Henson, 2003). For example, visual stimulus material
is related to activation in the lateral occipital complex (Grill-Spector et al., 1999). Neu-
roimaging studies also showed that priming processes are correlated with reduced neuronal
activation (Demb et al., 1995; Wagner, Desmond, Demb, Glover, & Gabrieli, 1997).
Semantic and episodic memories acquire several brain structures during the processes
of memory formation. These are mainly the prefrontal cortex (Buckner, 2000), the me-
dial temporal lobes, and further parts of the limbic system during encoding process. The
storage of semantic and episodic memories is correlated to neocortical structures (Eichen-
baum, 1997; Fuster, 1997). During retrieval of semantic and episodic memories, the
temporo-frontal cortex is activated (e.g. Markowitsch, 1998).
In Table 1 an overview is given of the memory processes and the relevant brain
structures regarding the content of the treated information.
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Table 1: Memory processes as well as contents and the relevant brain regions (modified
from Pritzel et al., 2003
procedural
memory
priming perceptual
memory
semantic
memory
episodic
memory
encoding basal
ganglia,
cerebellum,
premotor
areas
cerebral
cortex
(uni- and
polymodal
regions)
cerebral
cortex
(uni- and
polymodal
regions)
limbic
system,
prefrontal
cortex
limbic
system
(strong),
prefrontal
cortex
consolidation
and storage
basal
ganglia,
cerebellum,
premotor
areas
cerebral
cortex
(uni- and
polymodal
regions)
cerebral
cortex
(uni- and
polymodal
regions)
limbic
structures,
cerebral
cortex
limbic
structures,
cerebral
cortex
retrieval basal
ganglia,
premotor
areas
cerebral
cortex
(uni- and
polymodal
regions)
cerebral
cortex
(uni- and
polymodal
regions)
temporo-
frontal
cortex (left)
temporo-
frontal
cortex
(right),
limbic
structures
In summary, these sections showed the multifaceted aspects of memory. The differ-
ent neural structures were introduced and assembled regarding their affiliation to memory
processes and content. The different theories and explanations showed that researchers
came up with different classifications of memory depending strongly on their own area
of interest. For example, the classification after Squire is widely used among biologists,
whereas that of Tulving is the more common taxonomy among psychologists. The in-
vestigations of the neural correlates of memory urge researchers to be careful with the
interpretation of neuroimaging results. The way memory displays itself everyday is as
complex as the connections and relationships of the involved brain regions. One process
can engage different structures, and one structure can be involved in several processes.
In the next section, the theory of false memories is introduced. The necessity of the last
section will be clarified and links between approaches regarding true and false memories
will be elaborated.
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2.2 False memory
“There is in general no guarantee of the correctness of our memory; and yet we yield to
the compulsion to attach belief to its data far more often than is objectively justified.”
(Freud, 1901, p. 193)
The earlier described processes of encoding, storage, consolidation, and retrieval are com-
plex and thus also error-prone. This can be manifested in the distortion of memories, also
referred to as false memories. The term false memories endorses the phenomenon that
someone remembers an event that was never experienced or was experienced in a different
way (Schacter & Curran, 2000). One of the pioneers in the research of false memories
was F.C. Bartlett (1932) who carried out a series of studies investigating the memory
abilities of undergraduate students. The students heard a story and later attended recall
tests on several proximate time points. Several changes to the story were recorded and
also numerous omissions, especially with regards to those parts of the story that did not
match the students own view of the world. Therefore, this study showed quite nicely that
our own attitude towards life can influence our memories of prior and of recent events.
In psychology, the term ‘schema’ or ‘script’ describes an established model of the world
on the basis of past experiences. Schemata are very useful from the economic perspec-
tive. As the amount of stored information is reduced, one schema can be used for several
occasions. On the other hand, a schema can be at odds with a new experience and, as
illustrated above by Bartlett’s study, can therefore create false memories.
During the 1990s several investigations were conducted into recovered memories of
childhood sexual abuse (e.g. Dale & Allen, 1998; E. F. Loftus, Polonsky, & Fullilove,
1993; Porter, Yuille, & Lehman, 1999). While many of these recovered memories could
be confirmed, there were also cases that seemed to be inaccurate and some of them even
appeared to be entirely false (e.g. E. F. Loftus, 1996). The ensuing controversy resulted
in an increase of false memory research. Recent years have witnessed the development
of diverse paradigms for investigating this phenomenon under controlled circumstances.
The most popular method to induce and hence investigate false memories is the word-list
or Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. It was originally developed by Deese
(1959) and later re-introduced and refined by Roediger and McDermott (1995). First,
subjects hear several word-lists each containing 12 words. The words of each list are
related to each other (e.g. butter, food, eat, sandwich, etc.) and associated with one
critical word (e.g. bread). Subjects performed afterwards a recognition test, in which
the studied words were randomly presented and mixed with non-studied words, so-called
lures. The lures were divided into words derived from lists that were not studied earlier
and critical lures like the aforementioned ‘bread’. This paradigm is used widely for the
investigation of the different aspects of false recognitions (e.g. Gallo, Roediger, H. L.
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III, & McDermott, 2001; Marsh & Hicks, 2001; Neuschatz, Payne, Lampinen, & Toglia,
2001). In the next sections, first a characterisation is given of the three frequently used
forms of false memories: confabulation, intrusion, and false recognition. Then, different
theoretical explanations for the occurrence of false memory are presented. This is followed
by Schacter’s classification of false memories regarding their cause, namely ‘The seven sins
of memory’. In addition, the different research paradigms are briefly introduced alongside
up-to-date knowledge about the neural nature of false memories.
2.2.1 Forms of false memories
In the literature, three forms of false memories are mostly described and investigated:
confabulation, intrusion, and false recognition (Schacter, Norman, & Koutstaal, 1998).
Figure 8 shows the three forms, together with a short explanation and the main area, in
which they were found and studied.
confabulation intrusion false recognition
FALSE MEMORIES
Patients Eyewitnesses
Experimental
designs
A new item is
claimed as an
old/studied one
Creation of a
new/imagined
part of an
experienced
event
Narrative story
of an event that
has not been
experienced
Figure 8: Taxonomy of the three forms of false memories with examples for the main
research areas
When someone invents a completely new and therefore not experienced event, often
with a narrative character, it is called a confabulation. A person claims, for example, that
he was abducted by aliens. Probably he describes the event in-depth, how it happened,
what he saw and felt. Confabulations are a form of false memories that can often be
detected in stories of patients, like people who are suffering from Korsakoff’s syndrome
(Dalla Barba, Cipolotti, & Denes, 1990). Confabulations of patients often include possible
personal events, like a detailed description of a birthday party several years ago that could
2.2 False memory 24
have occurred in that way. Only a conversation with relatives or friends can show if this
event was truly experienced or not.
Intrusions refer to a part of an event that was not experienced, but was inserted
into a truly experienced event. Intrusions can be found, for example, in a report from a
witness of a crime. An eyewitness describes the progression of an event and unconsciously
intrudes details, which possibly have not been witnessed at all (Lindsay, Allen, Chan, &
Dahl, 2004). Apart from such serious situations, intrusions can also occur in everyday
life, by agitating a real event with something only imagined.
False recognitions describe instances when a new item (e.g. word, picture) is incor-
rectly classified during a recognition test as a known one from an earlier studied list. A
prominent example for such a paradigm is the aforementioned Deese-Roediger-McDermott
(DRM) paradigm or word-list paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger, H. L. III & McDermott,
1995). With this paradigm it was possible to induce an astonishingly high value of falsely
recognised lures as previously studied words. These word-lists can also be used to provoke
false recall of critical lures (Melo, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 1999; McDermott & Watson,
2001). Despite the fact that these three forms of false memories are the best investigated
ones, there are more varieties of false memories. Quite often it depends on the used para-
digm and also on the scientific area of the experimenter, what kind of false memories are
explored. An accurate discrimination between true and false memories is in many cases
difficult, as can be seen in the following sections.
2.2.2 Theoretical approaches to false memories
Different theories were developed to explain the occurrence of false memories. All theories
for false memories are strongly connected to findings and theories considering true mem-
ories. Early explanations include constructivism, schema theory, and source-monitoring
framework. More recent theories realign themselves to the dual-process explanation, which
was developed primarily as an explanation for true memories. According to two-process
accounts of recognition memory, a familiarity-based process is followed by a slower, more
accurate, recollection process. Three different theories based on this dual-process expla-
nation are: fuzzy-trace theory, activation/monitoring theory, and distinctiveness heuristic
theory.
Constructivism describes the creation of an idea for the overall meaning of one
or more presented stimuli, which contain more information than the original stimu-
lus/stimuli. Constructivism is based on work from Bransford and Franks (1971). They
created sets of short sentences, which were studied by subjects. Afterwards, the subjects
attended a surprised recognition test containing studied sentences (targets), meaning-
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Table 2: Example sentences for each of the four levels of the semantic-integration method
(Bransford & Franks, 1971).
propositions sentences type
level 1 The ants were in the kitchen. target, untested
The jelly was on the table. target, untested
The jelly was sweet. distractor 1
The ants ate the jelly. distractor 1
level 2 The ants in the kitchen ate the jelly. target, untested
The ants ate the sweet jelly. target, tested
The sweet jelly was on the table. distractor 1
The ants ate the jelly which was on the table. distractor 1
level 3 The ants ate the sweet jelly which was on the table. target, untested
The ants in the kitchen ate the jelly target, untested
which was on the table.
The ants in the kitchen ate the sweet jelly. distractor 1
level 4 The ants in the kitchen ate the sweet jelly distractor 1
which was in the table.
preserving new sentences (distractor 1), and meaning-violating new sentences (distractor
2). Table 2 shows examples for one set containing four possible propositions (levels):
eat, ants, jelly, past; sweet, jelly; on, jelly, table, past; in, ants, kitchen, past. Examples
for meaning-violating sentences (distractor 2) are not presented in the table. These are
sentences that combine information from different presented sets. One example sentence
for a meaning-violating sentence would be “The ants ate the jelly beside the woods.”.
It was found that subjects were able to discriminate accurately between target sen-
tences and meaning-violating sentences, but they had problems to correctly differentiate
between targets and meaning-preserving sentences. The interpretation from Bransford
and Franks was that subjects formed an interpretation (overall meaning) of the studied
propositions and integrated them into semantic structures (Bransford & Franks, 1971).
From this it follows that during the recognition task subjects mainly decided by relying
on the integrated interpretations and not on the original content (surface form) of the
studied sentences. Notably is further that Bransford and Franks thought that the surface
form is only stored in the short-term memory and vanishes after the integration process.
Following studies showed, however, that the surface form can be stored for a longer period
of time (e.g. Hintzman, Block, & Inskeep, 1973; Kintsch, Welsch, Schmalhofer, & Zimny,
1990), but is then harder to access than the overall meaning of the sentences (Murphy &
Shapiro, 1994).
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Routine sequences exemplify a similar acting in comparable situation with reference
to a previously developed schema. A schema represents a learnt concept or action in a
common situation (Minsky, 1975; W. F. Brewer & Treyens, 1981). The schema theory
went back to the early work of Bartlett (1932). It separates four key principles: selec-
tion, abstraction, interpretation, and integration. Selection means that only a part of the
available information of an event is encoded (Brown, Smiley, Day, Townsend, & Lawton,
1977). After the selection, objects are encoded in an abstract way. For example, a red cup
with white points is encoded simply as the schema ‘cup’. Like the surface form proposed
in constructivism, which vanishes after a short time, the abstraction principle describes
the situation where only the meaning of an item is encoded, and not the exact content.
The third principle, interpretation, is also the one during which memories are most likely
to be distorted. The simplified encoded information is compared with existing memories,
thus the new information is enhanced. In the example of the cup it could mean that even
though the handle of it is broken, someone later remembers holding the cup at the handle
because this would be the common procedure. As long as the attention is not explicitly
drawn to the fact that the cup is incomplete, the memory can be changed in cause of the
general schema of this object. During integration, the stored information is consolidated
and thus connected with similar memories to one consistent schema. At this point, true
and false memories can be connected to one holistic memory. Based on the schema theory,
paradigms were developed that clearly showed that subjects are vulnerable to schema-
induced memory distortions (e.g. Graesser, Woll, Kowalski, & Smith, 1979; Lampinen,
Farias, Neuschatz, & Toglia, 2000).
Any information that is encoded contains a source. This source, for example, can
be a place where an event happened, a person, a television programme, a book, or a
conversation. During the encoding process, the source of an event has to be encoded to-
gether with the content of it. It can happen that the true source of a memory is confused
with another source (e.g. thinking you have seen something on TV, when you actually
read it in a paper). When a person makes such an error, it is called a source-monitoring
error, which is defined in the source-monitoring framework by Johnson and colleagues
(M. K. Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Lindsay & Johnson, 2000). The ulterior
motive of the framework is the fact that even memories of a single event are complex
and contain different information like facts, feelings, and sensory perceptions. Reasons
for confusions are manifold, for example, vivid imaginations of an event that come into
conflict with the true event (‘Have I switched off the cooker or have I only imagined it?’).
The degree of attention during an experience can increase or decrease the possibility for
source-monitoring errors. Subjects can use a source-monitoring criterion to distinguish
more accurate, which source is the true one (Martell & Evans, 2005). This can be sup-
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ported, for example, by giving explicit instructions to a subject to focus consciously on
a source and thus develop the criterion. There are two reasons why a source-monitoring
failure can occur. One is when a subject has built a source-monitoring criterion during
encoding but still fails to distinguish the true from the false source. The second one is
when a subject is unsuccessful to create a criterion in the first place (Gordon, Franklin,
& Beck, 2005).
The fuzzy-trace theory was introduced by Brainerd and Reyna (1990a, 1990b) orig-
inally as a model for reasoning and decision making later refined to explain the formation
of false memories (Brainerd & Reyna, 2001). The fuzzy-trace theory depends on the five
principles presented in Figure 9.
Fuzzy-trace theory
Different time
courses of
verbatim and
gist memory
Parallel storage
of verbatim and
gist traces
Developmental
variability
Dissociated
retrieval of
verbatim and
gist traces
Opposing
judgements
about false-
memory items
Figure 9: The five core principles of the fuzzy-trace theory developed by Brainerd and
Reyna (2001)
The first principle says that verbatim and gist traces are stored in parallel (Reyna
& Brainerd, 1992). Studies showed that the gist traces are processed and stored like
the verbatim traces within the first second after the presented stimulus (Seamon, Luo,
& Gallo, 1998; Abrams & Greenwald, 2002). Verbatim traces are integrations of various
surface features, which were combined during the retrieval. Here, the whole surface form
is remembered and creates a similar mental re-enactment of the encoded event. If the
verbatim traces vanish, a disintegration of the features takes place (Reyna & Titcomb,
1997). Gist traces on the other hand represent the interpretation of the content, their
meaning, relation, and pattern. Regarding false memories this means that subjects maybe
are unable to remember the detailed verbatim trace (e.g. studied word-list contained cat,
bee, lion, pig, pigeon, cheetah, etc.) but are still able to name the gist information of the
stimuli (e.g. animals, house animals, African animals). From one event many gist traces
can be processed and stored together with one verbatim trace. The gist traces can vary
in their specificity, like being of a global (animals) or of a specific type (African animals).
Though the verbatim and gist traces are stored in parallel the retrieval of them
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seemed to be more or less independent from each other. This is stated in the second
principle, which says that verbatim and gist traces are dissociated retrieved. By varying
cue items and instructions, subjects can be influenced to retrieve verbatim or gist traces.
When target probes are used as retrieval cues, subjects rely mainly on their verbatim
traces. The same was found for hits during recognition tasks and target recalls during
recall tasks (Reyna, Holliday, & Marche, 2002). By using semantically related items as
cue items, it can be ensured that subjects use predominantly their gist traces. These
are also related to the production of false alarms during recognition tasks and intrusions
during recall tasks (Reyna, 1998).
The third principle, opposing judgements about false-memory items, explains the
different nature of verbatim and gist traces during the processes of true memories and
false memories. During the former, verbatim and gist traces work together to form a true
memory. Verbatim traces are used for the recollection of a memory. First an identity
judgement between the retrieved information and a ‘to-be recognised’ or ‘to-be recalled’
item is made. Then, a direct access of the memory is endorsed. The second part of the
dual-process theory, familiarity, is initiated by the gist traces. The retrieval of the gist
traces implies a similarity judgement of a ‘to-be recognised’ or ‘to-be recalled’ item and
if this is verified, a reconstruction of it. However, in the case of false memories, these two
processes are assumed to work in opposition to one another. Verbatim traces suppress the
production of false memories, whereas gist traces support them (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005).
For example, a subject studies a word-list of several animal species. The verbatim traces
would support the true recognition of the studied words, whereas the gist information
could interfere with it by retrieving names of species that were related but not learnt.
Different time courses of verbatim and gist memory is the fourth principle. Several
studies showed that verbatim traces decline faster over time than gist traces (e.g. Murphy
& Shapiro, 1994). This implies that over the time the rate to produce false memories
increases and they are also be strengthen by time.
The fifth and last principle mentioned, developmental variability, illustrates the dif-
ferent susceptibility to false memories of younger and older adults. The difference results
from the temporally shifted development of verbatim and gist memory. Children of the
age five to eight years perform highly in a recognition task showing different cats, whereas
older children and adults do poorly (Fisher & Sloutsky, 2005). The ability to store verba-
tim traces seemed to be developed earlier in life than the one for gist traces. That older
children and adults performed more poorly than the younger children indicates that the
younger have not established a category for cats yet, but have truly learnt the various
distinct forms. A further result of the study of Fisher and Sloutsky (2005) confirms this
interpretation. In a second experiment they showed pictures of imaginary animals; in
this case, younger and older subjects performed alike. Younger children only have better
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verbatim memory when the gist of the material is in general graspable for them (Reyna,
Mills, Estrada, & Brainerd, 2005). In conclusion, fuzzy-trace theory explains false memo-
ries with the two processes verbatim and gist memory that act in concert to support true
memories but generate false memories when they act in a dissociated way.
Another dual-process explanation for false memories depends on results of the word-
list or DRM-paradigm and was named activation/monitoring framework (McDermott &
Watson, 2001). It describes the concept that memories are semantically linked. For ex-
ample, the word canary also activates the information bird, yellow, sings; activation of
one piece of information can result in a spreading activation of the network (Collins &
Loftus, 1975). This process operates fast after a trigger was perceived and is compulsory
and intangible by our consciousness (Posner & Snyder, 1975). The spreading activation
facilitates the accessibility of semantically related words, considering the DRM-paradigm,
and this may result in false recall and false recognition (Roediger, H. L. III, Balota, &
Watson, 2001). During encoding processes, monitoring controls the attention toward the
environment as well as the thoughts towards the external information. During retrieval
processes, the activated information is compared with the earlier encoded one. When
subjects are instructed about the false recall/recognition effect before the encoding phase
they are able to decrease this effect significantly (Gallo, Roberts, & Seamon, 1997).
The distinctiveness heuristic theory (Schacter, Israel, & Racine, 1999) relies, like
the activation/monitoring framework, mostly on results of the DRM-paradigm. In the
study of Schacter et al. subjects studied word-lists, in which each word was followed by
an adequate picture. The false memory rate sunk drastically in the following recognition
task. Schacter et al. interpreted their findings, concluding that the subjects encoded
distinct feature details from the pictures and used this information during the recogni-
tion task. Similar findings were observed in a recent study where subjects studied black
words either with a picture, the same word in red font, or with both (Gallo, Weiss, &
Schacter, 2004). Again the best results were accomplished for the picture condition. The
distinctiveness heuristic was also verified by the results of another study, in which during
the study phase subjects spoke the words aloud, which also decreased the false memory
rate supposedly because of the encoded distinct information during speaking the words
(Dodson & Schacter, 2001). The distinctiveness heuristic is therefore a theory that ex-
plains how false memories can be reduced in general by dismissing all items for which no
supplementary distinct memory is available.
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2.2.3 Schacter’s seven sins of memory
Daniel Schacter suggested that memory failures can be differentiated regarding their cause
into seven sins of memory: transience, absent-mindedness, blocking, misattribution, sug-
gestibility, bias, and persistence (Schacter, 1999, 2001). The first three sins describe
different variations of loosing information/memories, the second three endorse deforma-
tion of memories, whereas the last one stands for memories, which sometimes want to be
forgotten but which are stuck. Schacter connected these seven types of false memories
with known research results of studies throughout the broad field of false memories.
The sin ‘transience’ combines short-term and long-term forgetting and includes the
roles of encoding and retrieval failures, respectively. A well-known example for transience
is the forgetting of the name of someone. It is very awkward to meet someone, an assumed
stranger, who smiles and starts a conversation by using the first name of the other person.
One of the first studies considering this phenomenon was made by Ebbinghaus (1913).
He learnt lists with nonsense syllables and tested himself at six different times ranging
between one hour and one month after the study phase. During the first tests he recorded
a swift drop-off, after nine hours he had forgotten nearly 60 percent of the list. However,
this rate of forgetting slowed down during the later tests and after a month the rate was by
75 percent. Presumably, Ebbinghaus has re-encoded the nonsense syllables during each
retrieval task. This would explain the smaller forgetting rate after the first nine hours.
This is also consistent with the assumption that forgetting is closely connected to the
usage of a memory. If information is not used over time by retrieving and rehearsing it, it
seemed to diminish more and more (Koutstaal, Schacter, Johnson, Angell, & Gross, 1998).
The sin of ‘absent-mindedness’ depends highly on the level of attention during the
encoding process, as well as during an attempted retrieval of information (Reason & My-
cielska, 1982). The level of encoding, shallow or deep, influences the likelihood of the
subject being aware of the encoded information or not. A famous example for this is the
phenomenon of ‘changed blindness’ (e.g. Levin & Simons, 1997; Levin, Drivdahl, Momen,
& Beck, 2002). Levin’s studies demonstrated that even huge changes went unrecognised
because the attention of the subjects was drawn to a specific task. For example, students
received the task to watch a film, in which some people played ball and they had to count
how often the ball was thrown from one to another. In the middle of the film a person
dressed as a gorilla walked through and was not noticed by most of the students. Simons
and Levin (1997) explained this phenomenon thus: information is normally encoded at a
shallow level, because only the general features of a scene are needed to behave appro-
priately. It is not important in everyday life to deeply encode, for example, the features
of a bus driver in the morning. Normally, we do not need this information at any sub-
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sequent time. This effect even grows when we go to work every day by bus. Then, we
have an image (or schema, see schema theory) of bus drivers in general and the knowl-
edge how to behave in such situations and that is all we need to reach our goal. When
absent-mindedness occurs during retrieval it is also interrelated with some kind of for-
getting what was supposed to be done. In this context the term of prospective memory
is often used. Failure in the prospective memory is, for example, when we forget to
tell a colleague about an article at the next meeting (event-based failure). A more se-
rious example is when patients forget to take their medicine regularly (time-based failure).
The sin of ‘blocking’ can occur even when the information was deeply encoded. The
information is not forever lost but cannot be reached in that moment. The tip-of-the-
tongue (TOT) state (Schwartz, 1999) is the most common example for an information
block and can occur for semantic as well as episodic information. Interestingly, it was
found that alternating words did not induce the tip-of-the-tongue state, which was as-
sumed earlier (Cross & Burke, 2004). Instead Cross and Burke found that answering
questions of famous person’s names and naming actors who played these famous persons
reduce incorrect answers but did not affect the tip-of-the-tongue state. They concluded
that alternate words emerge as a consequence of the tip-of-the-tongue state and were not
caused by it. In most cases, the memory comes back after some hours. Often, when we
are engaged with something completely different.
The sin of ‘misattribution’ envelops falsely connected memories. One type of mis-
attribution was explained earlier when a false source is attributed to an event, ‘source
monitoring framework’ (M. K. Johnson, 1988; M. K. Johnson et al., 1993). Another form
of misattribution is also interrelated with source confusion but results in different impli-
cations. Cryptomnesia, also known as unintentional plagiarism, occurs when a subject
claims an idea as self-made and forgets that the information was perceived from an exter-
nal source (Marsh & Bower, 1993; Bredart, Lampinen, & Defeldre, 2003). In a recognition
study using a list of famous and non-famous names it could be demonstrated that sub-
jects sometimes adopt the fame of a famous person (like Ronald Reagan) to a completely
unpopular person (‘false fame effect’) (Jacoby, Kelly, Brown, & Jaeschko, 1989). The
aforementioned word-list or DRM-paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger, H. L. III & McDer-
mott, 1995) demonstrated remarkably high levels of the third kind of misattributions,
false recognitions. By using this paradigm it was shown that even unintentional learning
can produce robust false recognitions (Dodd & MacLeod, 2004). A reduction of false
recognitions was found by changing the structure of the DRM-paradigm and encourag-
ing the subjects to use strategies during the study phase (Libby & Neisser, 2001). An
abutting paradigm is the picture paradigm developed by Miller and Gazzaniga (1998).
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The picture paradigm turned out to be nearly as effective in inducing false recognitions
as the word-list paradigm. It had the further advantage that only a few learning pictures
were needed to obtain a large sample of recognition pictures. A cause for the high rate of
false recognitions in these paradigms is that subjects relied mainly on general features (or
gist) of the studied stimuli (Brainerd, Payne, Wright, & Reyna, 2003; Brainerd & Reyna,
2005; Schacter et al., 1998). Misattributions are supported by the illusory-truth effect
(Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992; Begg, Robertson, Gruppuso, Anas, & Needham, 1996).
Begg reasoned that true recognitions based on correct source memory and familiarity
statement, while false recognitions have no source and thus base only on the familiarity
statement. They described two behavioural results, which confirm this effect. One was
that the mere exposure of information, even false one, leads to an increase of its truth
value. The second result was the tendency of the subjects to misjudge false stimuli as true.
The sin of ‘suggestibility’ describes the influence of misleading information that can
alter the recollection of an event (E. F. Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; E. F. Loftus &
Pickrell, 1995). This can happen by asking suggestive questions during an interrogation
or during a talk between two persons. Suggestibility is closely related to misattribution
but different in so far that misattribution can occur without any interference from an
external source (e.g. police). The best known work considering suggestibility was done
by Loftus and colleagues. They performed several studies on memory distortions initiated
by suggestive questions (E. F. Loftus, 1979; E. F. Loftus & Fathi, 1985; E. F. Loftus &
Pickrell, 1995). From their work, Loftus introduced the phrase ‘misinformation effect’.
Misinformation occurs when, for example, people who witnessed an incident (e.g. acci-
dent, robbery) listen to the report of another witness. Here, the different perception of
the incident from the second witness can be adopted by the first witness. Thus, the first
witness unconsciously changes his/her own memory of the event. Several researchers refer
to this important point, that interviewers of eyewitnesses have to keep the misinformation
effect in mind while they perform an interrogation (E. F. Loftus, 2002; Ihlebæk, Løve,
Eilertsen, & Magnussen, 2003; Lindsay et al., 2004). They further emphasise that it is
not important if the interview takes place directly after an incident, or later during a
hearing. That misinformation from outside sources can interfere with original memories
was investigated by several studies, but research considering internally produced misin-
formation is rare. Pickel (2004) performed a study where subjects watched a videotape
of a robbery. One group was interviewed afterwards. After a week all subject had to
describe the robbery. Subjects who were not interviewed after the presentation of the
videotape and subjects who mixed details up during the initial interview, created more
incorrect details than the subjects who performed well during the first interview. The
reason for internally fabricated misinformation could be that during encoding or retrieval,
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not only the actual information is manipulated. Prior memories may also be biased by the
new information and these two get connected by content or emotion (Buckner et al., 2001).
The sin of ‘bias’ is well-known since the influencing work of Bartlett (1932), which
was introduced at the beginning of this section. Older memories, beliefs, and prejudices
influence the encoding, as well as the retrieval, of memories. In this context, another con-
cept from social psychology, ‘cognitive dissonance’ (Festinger, 1957), shall be introduced
as an explanation of the development of bias. Cognitive dissonance describes the urge to
minimise the discrepancy between attitudes and actions. A good example is the dilemma,
with which a smoker lives. He or she knows that his or her habit is bad for their health
and that it could and probably will shorten his or her lifespan. The logical consequence
of this knowledge would be to stop smoking. Instead he or she devises arguments to
defend his or her habit before him- or herself and others. The mental mechanisms that
are used to balance our attitudes with our actions are very effective (Griffin, 1997). One
mechanism is to avoid information which could increase the dissonance (e.g. information
about negative consequence of smoking). Another one is to seek the confirmation of our
environment that the decision is correct. Processes of cognitive dissonance are likely to
be involved in the production of false memories. To reassure ourselves of doing the right
thing by changing memories and perhaps creating false memories is an easy and ensuring
way to live with conflicting information (Ross, Buehler, & Karr, 1998). The sin of bias
is differentiated into five major types (Schacter, 2001): consistency, change, hindsight,
egocentric, and stereotypical biases. Consistency and change biases are influencing the
view of our own past regarding the present situation, e.g. rating levels of pain (Gedney
& Logan, 2006) or long-term relationships (Karney & Coombs, 2000). These two forms
of bias are also the ones that help to reduce cognitive dissonance. Hindsight bias de-
scribes the often heard statement ‘I told you so’, which demonstrates the speaker’s feeling
of knowing all along what will happen. Hindsight bias is a very strong mechanism of
self-protection that can be found in several contexts, for example jurors in a courtroom
(A. C. Smith & Greene, 2005). Egocentric biases show how strong our view of ourselves
can influence past memories and current events, respectively. It changes effectively our
estimation of ourselves in the past (Ross & Wilson, 1999), for example, if we see ourselves
as narrow-minded in the past we can appear more open-minded today. An example for
stereotypical bias is when we act on the basis of prejudices. During our development we
learn the ways of our environment, e.g. how people look like, how they act in common
situations. We are culturally imprinted. Stereotypical bias leads to a wrong sight of other
people that can lead further to an inappropriate reaction, e.g. do not employ someone
because of the race or sex without acknowledging this reason (Uhlmann & Cohen, 2005).
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The sin of ‘persistence’ describes the inability to forget certain events. A benign
case is a song, heard on the radio in the morning, which unintentionally repeats itself in
the mind. This experience can be very annoying but has no severe consequences. The per-
sistence of memories depends strongly on the emotional state during the encoding. That
emotions have a powerful effect on the memorisation process was supported by several
studies (Rapaport, 1961; LeDoux, 1996; Cahill & McGaugh, 1998; Ochsner & Schacter,
2000). Depressed people and patients suffering of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
were found to be most susceptible to negative persistent memories. These people can
be literally stuck in their past (Holman & Silver, 1998). The sin of persistence forces us
to confront ourselves with stressful events. When we do this, we eventually are able to
integrate the event into our past. Thus we can learn to live with the memories without
suffering from them.
2.2.4 False memory paradigms
As the research of false memories increased, the methods for investigating them also im-
proved. In their recent book ‘The science of false memories’ Brainerd and Reyna (2005)
merged together the most common paradigms. Some of the paradigms, like the seman-
tic intrusions in list recall and semantic false alarms in list recognition, are only used in
the laboratory, often using the DRM-paradigm. It is important to study false memories
in controlled situations, but at the same time it has the disadvantage of testing a more
artificial form of our memory abilities. The occurrence of false memories in eyewitnesses
is very important, because the consequences are often serious. The different paradigms
also demonstrate the broad range of false memory occurrences. As most of the paradigms
were explained in detail earlier within this section only short definitions are given here.
- Semantic intrusions in list recall :
Subjects hear or see several word-lists. Some lists contain words that are seman-
tically related to each other whereas other lists consist of unrelated words. Afterwards
subjects recall as many words from the lists as they can remember.
- Semantic false alarms in list recognition:
Similar to the previous paradigm, only that subjects shall recognise studied words,
which are presented together with new and/or related words.
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- False memory in semantic inferences :
Subjects learn sentences with different meanings of the same content and with dif-
ferential length. During a recognition task they often falsely recognise sentences that sum
up information from several studied sentences, but which were nevertheless not learnt (see
also constructivism, section 2.2.2; Bransford & Franks, 1971).
- Suggestibility of eyewitness memory :
The memory of an eyewitness can be distorted during a questionnaire by the police,
or other authorities. Knowingly or unconsciously the inquirer can lead the answers of the
witness toward the desired direction and outcome.
- False identification of criminal suspects :
Investigated were line-ups (witnesses see four – six persons and shall identify the
culprit), show-ups (witnesses view a single person or a single picture and have to say if
this was the culprit or not), and photo spreads (witnesses see pictures of four – six persons
and have to identify the culprit).
- False memory for schema-consistent events :
The memory of subjects is tested for familiar events. Events for which it is assumed
that the subjects have developed a schema at an earlier time, e.g. going into a restaurant,
visiting the dentist. In both cases, subjects will have expectations (schemata) about how
the locality will look like and what will happen there.
- False memory in reality monitoring :
People can make failures when they remember something and have to decide which
part of a memory was truly experienced and which part was internally fabricated. This
can be tested, for example, when subjects hear or read stories. Later, they perform
a memory test examining their memory for the narrative contents. Reality monitoring
paradigms are often closely related to source-monitoring theory.
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- False memory from reasoning :
Reasoning about an event, a topic, or any other matter, to decide how to deal with
it (Shavir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993) can lead to false memories because of reasoning
errors. Conjunction problems and decision framing problems are two examples for rea-
soning errors (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1983).
- Autobiographical false memory :
One study investigated this paradigm by instructing subjects to write a daily diary
for five months with one true event, one true thought, and either an altered event and
a false thought or a false event and an altered thought (Conway, Collins, Gathercole,
& Anderson, 1996). The highest correct recognition rate was found for true events and
thoughts; false memories were found for thoughts, rather than for events.
2.2.5 Neural correlates
The last sections showed the complex nature of false memories and the difficulties to clas-
sify them. The presented overview was knowingly extensively construed to show these
difficulties as well as to clarify that false memories and true memories origin to the same
root. In both cases people remember events of their past, which truly happened for them.
The previous sections addressed false memories from the behavioural point of view. To
look more closely into the brain might be a more thoroughly solution to discriminate be-
tween true and false memories. During the last decades researchers investigated the neural
correlates of false memories. They used three different approaches for this: neuropsychol-
ogy, electrophysiology, and neuroimaging. The findings are sorted regarding encoding and
retrieval processes.
Encoding
One of the key structures to identify neural differences in activity during encoding processes,
which results later in false memories, is the left prefrontal cortex. Higher activation dur-
ing encoding processes in the parahippocampal region, the posterior temporal lobe, and
the left inferior frontal gyrus indicated which stimuli (e.g. words) were later remembered
(Wagner, Schacter, et al., 1998). Other studies showed that a lower level of neural activ-
ity in the left parahippocampal gyrus and the left inferior prefrontal cortex for semantic
stimuli during encoding was associated with a higher likeliness of absent-minded encoding
processes (Demb et al., 1995; Gabrieli et al., 1996; Wagner et al., 1997). The underlying
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process seems to be repetition priming, which results in a decrease of activation in the
left inferior prefrontal cortex. A study of Mitchell et al. investigated which brain regions
are involved in the successful avoidance of misattributions (Mitchell, Dodson, & Schacter,
2005). They found an increase in neural activity in the hippocampus and the ventrolat-
eral prefrontal cortex. Okado and Stark (2005) explored the misinformation effect during
encoding processes of pictorial and misinformation material. Their results revealed that
activation in the left hippocampus tail and the left perirhinal cortex indicate successful
encoding, independent of the information was studied during the original event phase or
the misinformation phase.
Retrieval
Cabeza et al. (2001) reported similar activation of the hippocampal region during true
and false recognitions while the parahippocampal region was differentially activated during
true but not false recognitions. The conclusion was that part of the hippocampal region
is involved in the recovery process of semantic information, which was equal for true and
false stimuli. The part of the parahippocampal region on the other hand was associated
with the recovery of sensory information. The latter refers to the sensory reactivation
hypothesis (Wheeler, Peterson, & Buckner, 2000; Okada et al., 2003). Wheeler et al.
(2000) refers to findings that during retrieval process of visual or auditory information a
subset of the same sensory regions are reactivated, which were activated during perception.
A similar finding was reported regarding early and late visual processing areas (Slotnick
& Schacter, 2004). These regions, namely middle occipital gyrus and fusiform/inferior
temporal gyrus in both hemispheres, were similarly activated during correct and false
recognitions.
A decreased activation in several left medial temporal regions is also assumed to
be responsible for the inability to retrieve specific semantic information (like names of
animals) at a certain time, meaning that this information is temporally blocked. This
conclusion can be drawn from studies investigating correct retrieval of names that resulted
in greater activation in the temporal pole (Grabowski et al., 2001). Source monitoring
failures are associated with information binding processes in the brain and damage in
medial temporal regions (mainly hippocampal formation), diencephalic regions or the
basal forebrain can result in a higher rate of these errors (Squire, 1995). Damage in
frontal regions can have a similar effect because the region is correlated with initiating
retrieval, monitoring processes, and inhibiting inappropriate memories as well as temporal
and source evaluations (e.g. Shallice & Evans, 1978; Shimamura, 1995). By using a reality
monitoring paradigm containing pictures of concrete objects, Okado and Stark (2003)
reported three main findings. The first was that activation in the left parietal cortex
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and the left frontal regions did not differ between true and false retrieval. However, a
correlation was found between the activity of the left parietal cortex and the subjects’
belief that the stimulus was studied regardless of the validity of it. The second finding
was that activity in occipital regions and the posterior right parahippocampal region
was greater for true than false memories. They assumed that these regions processes
perceived and imagined stimuli in a systematic fashion. The perceived stimuli contain
richer sensory details that result in the greater activation of the occipital region. Similar
results were reported by Slotnick and Schacter (2004), who found that the early visual
processing regions (lingual/fusiform gyri) are stronger activated for true compared with
false recognitions. True and false recognitions activated regions in the early and late visual
processing regions (middle occipital/inferior temporal gyri). These activations are also
assumed to be involved in giving a ‘known’ or ‘old’ response regardless of the correctness
of it. The third finding of Okado and Stark’s study was that greater activity in the
right anterior cingulate gyrus was associated with false recognitions, rather than true
recognitions. They suggested therefore that this region is strongly associated with retrieval
effort. The anterior cingulate cortex was further described in several studies to be involved
wit conflict monitoring processes (see Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004, for a recent
update).
In summary, the general finding of several studies was that true and false memories
are associated with similar brain regions. These are explicitly regions that are involved
in episodic retrieval tasks, like dorsolateral/anterior prefrontal, medial parietal, and me-
dial temporal areas. If differences were reported they showed that greater activations are
associated with true than false recognitions.
In summary, this section introduced the three common forms of false memories and
theoretical explanations of their appearances, respectively. Schacter’s seven sins illus-
trated not only the complex nature of false memories but also the relationships between
several research areas. It showed the difficulties to define the causes of false memories in
general and how important it is to imply findings of ‘normal’ memory in false memory
research. Furthermore, the included paradigms brought the aforementioned points in a
few words together. They demonstrated the closeness between research area and which
specific cause and form of false memories is investigated. This was further mirrored in the
results of the neuroimaging studies. Especially the latter point revealed that the knowl-
edge of false memories and their neural correlates is still incomplete. In the next section
(3), questions and hypotheses are given, which arose of the introduced information about
false memories.
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3 Questions and hypotheses
The aim of this study was the investigation of false memories, more specifically false
recognitions with regard to mistakes made by eyewitnesses.
• One of the starting questions was what kind of paradigm can be used to investigate
reasons of failures in eyewitness reports?
• How should a learning stimulus be created to investigate specifically the visual sense
but, nevertheless, still be close to our everyday life?
• Can false recognitions be divided regarding common situations?
• How can it be investigated if something is truly remembered or only imagined?
• In what way are response times effected, if a studied stimulus is truly accepted or
falsely rejected, and if an unstudied stimulus is correct rejected or falsely accepted,
respectively?
• Can neural correlates be distinguished for correct as well as false recognitions that
are caused by a complex visual stimulus?
In the following, the hypotheses that were developed out of these questions are introduced.
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Hypothesis I
A mute film, mirroring real life, provokes false recognitions reliable.
The most popular method to induce false recognitions is the word-list paradigm developed
by Deese (1959), later re-introduced and refined by Roediger and McDermott (1995) (see
also section 2.2). Though this paradigm is widely used to study different aspects of false
recognitions (e.g. Gallo et al., 1997; Marsh & Hicks, 2001; Neuschatz et al., 2001), it
has several disadvantages. A critical point of the word-list paradigm is that the used
word-lists are artificial stimuli. Except for learning of vocabularies, it is not common to
study word-lists in everyday life. Therefore, results have to be applied carefully to false
recognitions observed in real life incidents, for example, when an eyewitness identifies
a culprit (e.g. E. F. Loftus, 2003). Only one study is known, in which the word-list
paradigm was compared with a picture paradigm (M. B. Miller & Gazzaniga, 1998).
By using the picture paradigm the experimenters aimed to avoid two limitations of the
word-list paradigm: the particular small number of lures and the higher likelihood of
source confusion. They demonstrated that the picture paradigm was nearly as effective
in inducing false recognitions as the word-list paradigm. A positive side-effect of the
picture paradigm was that only a few pictures were needed as learning stimuli to create
a large sample of lures for the adjacent auditory recognition test. In this, Miller and
Gazzaniga followed the original word-list paradigm, in which subjects saw the words
during the learning phase and attended an auditory recognition test afterwards. More
recently further picture paradigms were developed to investigate false memories (e.g.
Wade, Garry, Read, & Lindsay, 2002), and their neural basis (e.g. Okado & Stark, 2003;
Slotnick & Schacter, 2004). The attempt of this study was to take one further step to
examine the memory abilities of healthy subjects and their proneness to failure, by using
a newly developed film paradigm. The paradigm should be close to everyday experiences,
without strong emotional values, testing explicitly the visual sense, and still be adaptable
to neuroimaging techniques.
The film should present several activities as they can occur every day, like getting
up in the morning or shopping. Earlier studies showed that the emotional value of the
used stimulus has a high impact on the memorisation processes (cf. Siebert, Markowitsch,
& Bartel, 2003; Kensinger & Schacter, 2005). Hence, the film should contain ordinary
everyday scenes, without strong affective material, like accidents or weddings. A further
requirement of the film paradigm was that the memory for visual information should be
explicitly investigated. The reason for this was that during interviews of eyewitnesses, a
lot of the revealed information is gained from what was actually seen. This fact is not only
mirrored in the term eyewitness but also in the amount of papers investigating the accu-
racy of visual recognition methods (for recent studies see among others Pryke, Lindsay,
Dysart, & Dupuis, 2004; Haw & Fisher, 2004; MacLin, Meissner, & Zimmermann, 2005).
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Furthermore, one study examined memory for staged crimes, either witnessed live or on
video (Ihlebæk et al., 2003). It showed that the subjects witnessing a crime on video had
better and more accurate memory for it than the ones who witnessed it in person. With
this study the advantage of a film for investigating memory abilities of witnesses under
controlled conditions was confirmed. Thus, it was decided to investigate the effect of an
unemotional, mute, complex visual stimulus, and its capacity to induce false memories in
healthy subjects.
Hypothesis II
False recognitions are caused by two different reasons.
When subjects identify an unstudied stimulus, for example a word or a picture, falsely as
a known one, they have made a false recognition (Schacter et al., 1998). Thinking about
witnessing an incident, two different forms of occurring memory failures can be assumed.
One is that the description of the appearance of an object or a suspect is changed. The
other one is that a described action was not truly witnessed.
An example for the first kind of memory failures was reported during the sniper
attacks that killed ten people in the area of Washington DC, 2002 (E. F. Loftus, 2003). It
was reported that after the attacks, a white van or truck was seen fleeing the crime scene.
However, the sniper subjects drove a blue car when they were caught. This memory dis-
tortion was supposedly effected by the media, which incorporated the information of the
colour from one of the first attacks and repeated the information constantly. Later wit-
nesses probably knew this information even before they witnessed an attack for themselves
and integrated the false information into their own experience.
The second assumed reason that results in false recognitions is defined by the process
when someone fills in gaps of a truly witnessed event. For example, if someone hears a
tale and is preoccupied with a phone-call for a couple of minutes, then rejoins the tale,
the person is mostly able to generate the missing parts of the story to understand its
content completely. Another example is, when someone observes a person walking to a
car. Because of a tree or a moment of inattention it is impossible to actually see how this
person opens the car and gets into it. What is witnessed is that this person drives away
with the car. Naturally, it can be assumed that the person has opened and entered the
car, but it is not possible to have a true visual memory of this exact action. Interestingly,
it seems that people often unconsciously connect those sequences to one consistent event.
The gap in memory is filled via imagination, which is assisted by the knowledge how a
certain action proceeds. The existing knowledge is often based on scripts or schemas,
which were introduced in the ‘schema theory’ (see section 2.2.2; Bartlett, 1932).
These two kinds of false recognitions should be caused by the recognition stimuli of
the film paradigm.
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Hypothesis III
Longer response times indicate false recognitions, while shorter response
times indicate correct recognitions.
The response time is a valuable indicator of the response behaviour of subjects. Differences
between response times for varying stimulus sets point out to a different handling of them.
Most of the studies investigating false memories also measured the response time, which
the subjects needed for correct and false responses. A common result was that subjects
responded faster when they made a correct response to a previously experienced stimulus,
than when they reject an unstudied, related stimulus (cf. von Zerssen et al., 2001; Conway,
Pleydell-Pearce, Whitecross, & Sharpe, 2003; Garoff-Eaton, Slotnick, & Schacter, 2005).
Interestingly, it was also found that when an imagined stimulus was falsely accepted, the
response time was even longer than for an imagined stimulus that were correctly rejected
(Okado & Stark, 2003). The response times illustrate that different processes underlie
the decision processes for studied and unstudied stimuli.
For the present film paradigm it is assumed that comparable response times will
be revealed. The fastest responses are expected for correct accepted studied stimuli, and
the longest response times for false accepted unstudied ones. Possible differences in the
response times of the two above described unstudied stimulus sets should show if one of
them is more difficultly to process for the subjects.
Hypothesis IV
There are distinguishable neural patterns for correct and false recognitions.
By using functional neuroimaging technique a more sophisticated view of the neural
processes of correct and false recognitions induced by the film paradigm are expected.
Several studies showed that true recognitions elicited a larger neural network than false
ones (e.g. Okado & Stark, 2003). In a recent review, Schacter and Slotnick (2004) con-
cluded that regions within the medial temporal lobe are associated with the generation
of false recognitions. Furthermore, monitoring processes, which are necessary during
recognition tasks, are related to regions within the prefrontal cortex. The film paradigm
tests explicitly visual memory. Thus, further activations in regions that are engaged in
the processing of visual material, namely the occipital lobe, should be found. Similar
to the previous hypotheses, the processing of studied and unstudied stimuli is expected
to differ not only at the behavioural level but also at the neural one. Previous studies
showed that, for example, hits (correct recognition of studied stimuli) are associated with
increased neural activity within early visual processing areas (Brodmann area (BA) 17,
BA 18) for abstract shapes (Slotnick & Schacter, 2004). While, true and false recogni-
tions of these stimuli activated the early and the late visual processing areas (BA 19, BA
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37). These results showed that false recognitions activated a subset of the brain regions
involved with correct recognitions.
Thus, distinguishable neural patterns are expected between correct and false recog-
nitions in general. Stronger and larger neural networks are anticipated for correct recog-
nitions of studied stimuli. Further differences are expected between the two unstudied
sets regarding correct and false recognitions because of the hypothesised different under-
lying causes of them. The neuroimaging technique is assumed to provide the results that
will possibly show if the different sets truly induce false recognitions because of different
reasons.
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4 Method
For this study ‘normal’, healthy subjects were tested with a newly developed film para-
digm to investigate failures in eyewitness reports in the context of false memories. The
recognition stimuli consisted of pictures, which were taken out of the film. The film para-
digm was first tested with a group of 25 subjects (pilot study). Then, twelve subjects were
examined during the recognition task with event-related functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI).
In the following section the development of the film paradigm is presented, the
demographical data of the subjects are introduced, and a description of the conducted
procedure of the pilot study and the fMRI study, respectively, is given. Furthermore, a
short overview of the used fMRI-technique and the statistical method ‘signal detection
theory’ is included.
4.1 Film paradigm
4.1.1 Development of the film material
The film material was produced by using a ‘Digital Video Camera DCR-PC9E, Sony’
and was edited with Adobe Premiere 6.5’ (Rockford, Adobe System, Inc.). The film was
developed with a close touch to everyday experiences. Half of the scenes were produced
with a man as main character and the other half with a woman. This was done to
prevent a possible gender specific memorisation effect of the material. The outcome was
a film containing scenes of common everyday activities without emotive actions. The
second scene of the film, for example, shows the woman walking into a perfumery, looking
around, walking to a shelf, and picking up a bottle. She opens the bottle and sprays some
perfume on her right wrist, sniffs the scent, puts the bottle back, and leaves the store.
The next scene shows the man, getting up in the morning, pulling up the roller blind,
and stretching his arms while standing. The final film lasts 19:44 minutes and consists
of 42 scenes, whereby each scene represents a self-contained activity. The scenes were
presented alternately, meaning that a scene with the man was followed by one with the
woman, followed by the next with the man, and so on. These alternations were made to
obtain an equal probability of memorisation for both films. The perpetuation of the two
stories was still preserved. The two characters did not meet in any of the scenes and also
no locations were used for both. The film was presented without sound to ensure that
only the visual memory ability was tested and thus no auditory information interfered
with the memorisation process.
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4.1.2 Development of the recognition material
The recognition material consists of three picture sets. Each set includes 42 pictures,
where each picture contains to one of the 42 scenes. Figure 10 exemplifies for each set
two pictures.
Figure 10: Examples for the three sets of recognition stimuli: left originals, middle similars
and right outtakes (see Appendix A for all used stimuli)
The pictures of one set show a part of each scene that was originally presented in the
film. For the scene, which was described above (cf. 4.1.1), the original picture shows the
woman sniffing on her right wrist, that is the action presented in the film. In the following
sections pictures of this set are referred to as originals. The second set comprises pictures
that show similar activities to the ones of the first set; however, one significant part is
changed. Again, for the sequence in the perfumery, the similar picture shows the woman
sniffing on her left wrist instead of her right one. In the following sections pictures of this
set are referred to as similars. It is important to state that only details that were supposed
to be in the focus of the observer whilst watching the film were changed. For example, in
the perfumery scene, the woman handles the bottle and shakes her hand before sniffing
the scent on the wrist. Therefore, it can be assumed that subjects had a good chance
to memorise which hand she uses and recognise it later. The third set includes pictures
that show a fragment of each scene that was not presented in the film. These fragments
belong to significant parts of each scene that were removed from the film. Therefore, the
pictures show an activity, which could not be observed during the film, but must have
taken place for the completeness of the action of the scene. In the case of the perfumery
scene, the woman can be observed while she takes the bottle from the shelf, opening it,
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sniffing at the bottle and then at her wrist. The part where she sprayed the perfume on
her wrist was removed, but for the consistency of the content of the scene she must have
done this. In the following sections pictures of this set are referred to as outtakes.
Altogether the recognition material includes 126 pictures from three different sets.
The pictures of the first and the last scene were presented as test stimuli at the beginning
of the recognition task. Thus, at the end 120 pictures, forty of each set, entered the
statistical analysis. The procedure of the recognition task will be explained later in this
section (4.3).
4.2 Subjects
4.2.1 Pilot study
A group of 25 students (15 male, 10 female) was tested for a first investigation of the
developed film paradigm. The subjects ranged in age from 24 to 36 years (M = 28.96, SD
= 2.793). All had completed 13 years of education. Two of the subjects were left-handed,
the rest were right-handed. The subjects were informed that they could terminate the
experiment any time. No psychiatric or neurological history was known for any of the
subjects. After the experiment, each subject was given information with regards to why
the study was conducted as well as information about the theoretical background of the
recognition task. If requested, they also got an informal verbal feedback concerning their
own performance in the recognition task. As far as possible, it was avoided that after
their participation the subjects communicated with each other about the experiment.
4.2.2 fMRI study
Twelve male, right-handed, native German speakers participated in this part of the study.
The subjects varied in age from 34 to 54 years (M = 42.75 years, SD = 6.21). Duration
of education varied from 9 to 13 years (M = 11.67 years, SD = 1.7). Subjects had no
known psychiatric or neurological history. At the beginning of the test procedure the
subjects were informed about participating in a memory study. The true nature of the
study was not mentioned at this time. Furthermore, they were informed about their right
to terminate the study at any time. All twelve subjects signed a letter of agreement for
their participation and gave consent that their data could be used later for publication.
After the fMRI study, subjects were rewarded for their participation with 40 Euro for the
inconvenience caused. The subjects were not given the possibility to talk with each other
about the test.
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4.3 Procedure of the film paradigm
First, the procedure for the film paradigm of the pilot study is introduced, followed by the
one of the fMRI study. Many parts of the procedure were identically preformed in both
studies. Thus, only the differences in the procedure during the fMRI study are described
in the second section. Afterwards, the details of the fMRI study are given with regard to
the hardware equipment and the image analysis.
4.3.1 Pilot study
The test procedure of the film paradigm consisted of two phases. First, the film was
presented during the learning phase. Then followed the recognition task, in which the
subjects had to categorise the stimuli pictures as ‘known’ or ‘unknown’. Before the test
started, the subjects were informed that they were going to watch a mute film of an
approximately duration of twenty minutes. Additionally, they were told that afterwards
they had to undertake a recognition task that is closely related to the film. Therefore,
the subjects were asked to pay close attention to the film. The film was presented on
a computer screen. The subjects saw the film on the same computer, on which the
recognition task was afterwards presented. When the film was finished the subjects were
given instructions for the recognition task. They were informed that they would see
several different pictures. They had to decide whether they had seen the pictures in the
film or not. A two-button mouse was used for responding in the pilot study. Subjects
were told to press the left button with the left thumb for a ‘known’ picture and the right
button with the right thumb for an ‘unknown’ picture. For this task, the subjects hold
the mouse in both hands and placed their thumbs on the respective buttons.
Furthermore, the subjects were informed that a picture was shown to them for
a maximum of 3 seconds before it vanished. If they made their decision during the
presentation time by pressing a button the picture vanishes instantaneously (response
connected). Between each picture the screen went black for 6 seconds. Without this
delay their was a risk that the response for one picture would be unwillingly shifted to
the next presented one when a response was not fast enough.
The pictures consisted of the recognition material described above (i.e. originals,
similars, and outtakes) as well as 42 reference pictures. The reference pictures showed a
train or a plane. The head of the train/plane points either to the left or the right. For
these pictures, the subjects were given the instruction to indicate the direction of the
head of the vehicle by pressing the respective button (e.g. front of the train points to
the left, press the left button). The subjects were informed that at the beginning of the
recognition task they would see three slides with instructions reminding them of which
button to press for which decision. Then, they would see six recognition pictures and
two reference pictures to familiarise them with the task procedure. The six recognition
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pictures were taken from the first and the last scene of the film. The instructions were
repeated before the beginning of the main recognition task. For every subject the order
of the pictures was randomized to avoid possible recency or position effects. The program
‘Presentation Version 081 Build 04.28.04’ (Neurobehavioral Systems) was used to present
the film and the recognition material as well.
4.3.2 fMRI study
The subjects of the fMRI study watched the film on a computer screen like the ones of the
pilot study. The difference was that the film was presented in a separate, shaded room.
This was necessary because the study took place in a hospital and it was important
that the subjects watched the film in a quiet atmosphere. Thus the results are better
comparable to the ones of the pilot study. Afterwards, the subjects attended the fMRI
study, which comprised of two parts. The first part was an anatomical scan of each
subject, which is explained later in section 4.4. For the second part, subjects were given
two response boxes, one for each hand. During the recognition task, they were instructed
to place their left thumb on the previously determined button on the left response box,
and their right thumb on the respective button on the right response box. Subjects were
additionally informed that the scanner was very loud during the scanning, and that they
should try to move their head as less as possible. Similar to the pilot study, further
instructions were given regarding the duration of the pictures. Subjects were told that
the intermediate pauses between each picture and the next are fixed. The main reason for
this was that during the fMRI study this duration was needed to keep two events apart,
here two pictures, regarding the subsequent analysis of the fMRI-data. The reference
pictures (train and plane) served an additional purpose in the fMRI study. They were
used as a control for the proper functioning of the response boxes during the scanning.
4.4 fMRI procedure
4.4.1 Hardware equipment
Whole brain, event-related fMRI was conducted on a 1.5 T scanner (Siemens Magnetom
Symphony, Erlangen, Germany), which was equipped with a standard head coil and was
capable of echoplanar imaging. First, to position the axial T2*-weighted images along the
anterior-posterior commissure (AC-PC), line scout and sagittal T1-weighted images were
acquired from each subject. To ensure anatomical reference data and to exclude brain
anomalies, structural brain images were obtained from each subject using a T1-weighted
3DMP-RAGE pulse sequence (TR = 11.1 ms, TE = 4.3 ms, slice thickness = 1.5 mm,
field of view (FOV) 201x230 mm, matrix 224x256). A mirror was installed at the head
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coil, over which the subjects could see a screen. On this screen the stimuli were presented.
Every third second a volume scan was done using a standard EPI sequence (TR = 3000
ms, TE = 50 ms, flip angle 90◦, FOV 192 mm, matrix 64x64). Each volume scan covered
the whole brain and consisted of 16 axial T2*-weighted MR-slices with a slice thickness
of 7 mm. The stimuli were presented using the program ‘Presentation Version 081 Build
04.28.04’ (‘Neurobehavioral Systems’) over a beamer on the screen.
4.4.2 Image analysis
All data analysis was done using MATLAB (The Mathworks Inc., Natick, MA, USA)
and SPM 99 (Statistical Parametric Mapping software, SPM99; Wellcome Department
of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk). For each session, the
first two images were discarded to facilitate the T1 saturation during the first scans.
To compensate for head movements, images were realigned using the SPM99 default
algorithm. In order to achieve spatial smoothing and group comparisons of the images,
anatomical differences were compensated by spatial normalisation and resclicing using
the SPM99 default settings and the standard stereotactic space, which is known as the
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) brain.
With a Gaussian kernel of 10 mm full-width at half-maximum (FWHM) the spatial
smoothing was performed, which allows for signal increase and anatomical conformity
across the subjects. A fixed-effects statistical analysis was done on a voxel-by-voxel ba-
sis using the General Linear Model (GLM). For the final analysis of the data, maps of
t-statistics were corrected for multiple comparisons at p < .05. Furthermore, a restriction
was made with a minimum size of the displayed cluster beginning with 10 voxels. As a last
step of the image analysis, the MNI-coordinates were transformed into the Talairach and
Tournoux (1988) space using a correction procedure developed by Brett (1999) and finally
fed into the Talairach Daemon (Lancaster et al., 2000) to obtain anatomical projections
of maximum activation cluster.
4.5 Signal detection theory
The interpretation of data gathered during a paradigm that allows only two possible re-
sponses (e.g. yes - no) forces subjects to make a decision. Responses given under pressure
involve some uncertainty of the subjects during the process of their decision making. The
signal detection theory was developed by Green and Swets (1966) to calculate this uncer-
tainty during the decision process. In each experiment, where two possible stimuli have
to be discriminated, subjects have also to discriminate between a ‘signal’ and a ‘noise’.
The signal stands for a previously studied and therefore known word or picture, whereas
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the noise represents a new and therefore unknown word or picture. Noise and signal dis-
tribution can be estimated as a Gaussian distribution (Fig. 11), and depending on the
subject’s responses, the graphs are separated or overlap.
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Internal response
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
misses
correct rejected
noise
criterion (c)
signal
hits
false alarms
unknown known
d’ 
Figure 11: Signal and noise distributions generating variables d’ and c, and the constituted
intersections for hits, false alarms, misses, and correct rejected
Two variables are shown in Figure 11. One is the discriminability index, d’, and
the other is the response bias, c. The response bias describes the criterion, on which a
response decision is made by a subject. The criterion is located on the internal response
axis of a subject. The response bias indicates that when the internal response is above the
criterion the subject responds with a verifying response that is a ‘known’ one. When it is
lower than the criterion, the subject reacts with a refusing response that is an ‘unknown’
one. The discriminability index is defined by the separation and spread between signal
and noise curves.
The discriminability index and the response bias have to be interpreted in conjunc-
tion with each other and not separately. Both variables are highly dependent on each
other during the calculation. If the discriminability index of signal and noise produces a
positive value, it represents that the maxima of the two graphs are separated. This fur-
ther indicates that the subjects can discriminate between signal and noise (q.v. the two
graphs in Fig. 11). However, when the value of the discriminability index is negative, the
two graphs strongly overlap, which indicates that signal and noise are handled identically.
Considering the response bias, a negative value indicates that the material induced a high
false alarms rate, whereas a positive value demonstrates a high misses with a small false
alarms rate.
In the case of the film paradigm, the originals constitute the signal, as these pic-
tures belonged to the scenes presented in the film. The outtakes and similars represent
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the noise, as they were related to the studied material but differed from them. That
means that positive (‘known’) responses to originals lead to hits. However, for unstudied
stimuli of the sets similars and outtakes ‘known’ responses result in false alarms. Negative
(‘unknown’) responses to originals, however, constitute misses, whereas for similars and
outtakes these responses result in correct rejections. In Figure 12 these relations between
the stimuli and the response modi are presented with the resulting sets.
hitsoriginals
known
misses
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outtakes
false
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rejected
Figure 12: Classification of possible responses to the different stimuli categories following
signal detection theory
For this study the group of originals, presenting the signal, consisted of 40 pictures.
The group of the similars and outtakes (noise) comprised 80 pictures. Taken together,
120 pictures were analysed for this study. If the film paradigm provoked the expected false
recognitions, most of the responses for the unstudied stimuli are expected to be ‘known’
ones. Because the unstudied stimuli represent the noise and they comprise twice as many
stimuli as the signal, the estimated result should lie within the left Gaussian distribution.
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5 Results
In the following chapter, first the behavioural data are reported separately for the pilot
and for the fMRI study. Afterwards the results of the neuroimaging are presented. All
statistical analyses were performed with the program SPSS (‘Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences’, Version 12.0 for Windows).
Before the results of the recognition task are presented, it is necessary to clarify the
used terms below. During the recognition task subjects responded either with a ‘known’
or an ‘unknown’ response. It depended on the set affiliation of the picture, which response
was correct or false. Known response for originals were correct and produced originals-
correct, equal to hits. Unknown responses resulted in originals-false, equal to misses.
A contrary correlation resulted of these response possibilities for the unstudied stimulus
sets similars and outtakes. Here, an unknown response was the correct rejection of these
unstudied stimuli and resulted in similars-correct and outtakes-correct, respectively. A
known response was a false recognition. Hence, similars-false and outtakes-false are the
corresponding terms. Combining these two groups, the group false alarms is generated.
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5.1 Behavioural data
5.1.1 Pilot study
The data of 25 subjects were analysed within the pilot study. The demographical data
are described in section 4.2.1. The recognition data and the response times are normally
distributed across the group.
5.1.1.1 Recognition rate
Descriptive analysis revealed that, independent of their affiliation to one of the three sets,
subjects falsely responded, on average, to 49.9 pictures (SD = 8.2, minimum = 32, max-
imum = 64) or 41.6% of the 120 presented pictures. An integration of similars-false and
outtakes-false to false alarms showed that, on average, 42 out of 80 unstudied pictures
(SD = 7.8, minimum = 23, maximum = 57) or 52.5% were falsely recognised. The results
of the descriptive analysis for each set regarding the recognition mode are listed in Table 3.
Table 3: Descriptive statistic of correct and false recognition rates of the three stimulus
sets (40 pictures per set) across the 25 subjects
mean SD range
originals-correct 32.1 4.43 17 – 39
originals-false 7.9 4.42 1 – 23
similars-correct 21.5 4.88 11 – 34
similars-false 18.5 4.88 6 – 29
outtakes-correct 16.4 4.44 8 – 26
outtakes-false 23.5 4.46 14 – 32
Especially the pictures of the set outtakes were falsely recognised with a percentage of
19.6%, followed by the set similars with 15.4%. The least failures were found for the set
originals with 6.6%.
The results were further investigated regarding the signal detection theory. Thus,
the response bias, c, and the discriminability index, d’, were evaluated. The response
bias revealed for hits and false alarms a negative mean value of -0.42 (SD = 0.22). The
discriminability index resulted in a positive value (mean = 0.98, SD = 0.51) for hits and
false alarms.
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5.1.1.2 Two unstudied stimulus sets
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with repeated measures with sets-false
(i.e. originals-false, similars-false, and outtakes-false) as within-subjects factor was used
to explore if subjects handled the three sets equally. Figure 13 shows the mean false
recognition rates of the three sets.
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Figure 13: Mean false recognition rates for the three stimuli sets. Maximum recognition
rate for each set was 40
The main effect of sets-false was highly significant (F = 77.66, df = 2, p < .001).
Single comparisons between the sets were corrected after Bonferroni and revealed further
significant differences between the three pairs:
originals-false – similars-false: mean difference = 10.6, standard failure = 1.36,
p < .001,
originals-false – outtakes-false: mean difference = 15.7, standard failure = 1.40,
p < .001,
similars-false – outtakes-false: mean difference = 5.12, standard failure = 1.02,
p < .001.
The results of sets-false showed that the three sets were differentiated on a behavioural
level by the subjects.
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Since it was possible, that either the set of the similars or of the outtakes had a
bigger impact within the false alarms, the discriminability index and the response bias
were evaluated separately for hits and similars-false, and hits and outtakes-false. These
calculations resulted for both pairs in a positive value for the discriminability index.
The response bias, on the other hand, revealed for both pairs negative values. Table 4
presents these results together with the previous results of the discriminability index and
the response bias of the pair hits and false alarms.
Table 4: Descriptive statistic of the discriminability indices, d’, and the response biases,
c, of the pairs hits – false alarms, hits – similars-false, and hits – outtakes-false
mean SD range
d’ (hits & false alarms) 0.98 0.51 -0.12 – 2.02
d’ (hits & similars-false) 0.81 0.53 -0.28 – 1.77
d’ (hits & outtakes-false) 1.15 0.56 0.01 – 2.28
c (hits & false alarms) -0.42 0.22 -0.95 – 0.13
c (hits & similars-false) -0.51 0.25 -1.07 – 0.06
c (hits & outtakes-false) -0.34 0.21 -0.82 – 0.19
A paired t-test revealed highly significant differences between the discriminability
indices of hits and false alarms with hits and similars-false (t(24) = 4.852, p < .001)
as well as hits and outtakes-false (t(24) = -4.780, p < .001). This demonstrated that
the subjects were able to discriminate not only between studied and unstudied stimuli
but also between the two unstudied sets. The negative response bias showed that the
unstudied stimulus sets provoked false recognitions.
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5.1.1.3 Response time
The response time (RT) was investigated for each set regarding correct and false recogni-
tions. The descriptive statistic for each set is given in Table 5.
Table 5: Descriptive statistic of the response times (RT) of correct and false recognitions
of the three sets
mean SD range
RT originals-correct 2.200 s 0.632 s 1.32 s – 4.38 s
RT originals-false 2.882 s 0.602 s 1.91 s – 4.28 s
RT similars-correct 2.443 s 0.551 s 1.68 s – 4.13 s
RT similars-false 2.408 s 0.676 s 1.40 s – 4.36 s
RT outtakes-correct 2.821 s 0.598 s 1.94 s – 4.04 s
RT outtakes-false 2.501 s 0.672 s 1.59 s – 4.38 s
The results of the descriptive analysis in Table 5 indicated that the subjects reacted
faster when they made a correct response than when they made a false one. A paired
t-test showed that RT for correct and false recognitions of the set originals differed to
a highly significant degree (t(24) = -6.12, p < .001), opposite to the set similars (t(24)
= 0.5, p = .62). For the set outtakes, a paired t-test again showed significant difference
between correct and false recognitions (t(24) = 3.32, p < .05).
A MANOVA with repeated measures was calculated with RT of sets-correct and sets-
false, respectively, as within-subjects factor. It revealed highly significant main effects of
response times of sets-correct (F = 35.01, df = 2, p < .001) as well as of sets-false (F =
17.9, df = 2, p < .001).
Single comparisons between response times of each set were corrected after Bonfer-
roni:
RT originals-correct – RT similars-correct : mean difference = .243, standard failure =
0.05, p < .001,
RT originals-correct – RT outtakes-correct : mean difference = .62, standard failure =
0.09, p < .001,
RT similars-correct – RT outtakes-correct : mean difference = .38, standard failure =
0.08, p < .001,
RT originals-false – RT similars-false: mean difference = .47, standard failure =
0.09, p < .001,
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RT originals-false – RT outtakes-false: mean difference = .38, standard failure =
0.1, p < .002,
RT similars-false – RT outtakes-false: mean difference = .09, standard failure =
0.05, p < .22.
Only the comparison of the RTs of the sets similars-correct with outtakes-correct
differed not significantly. All other pairs revealed highly significant differences. Figure
14 summarises these results. It presents not only the RTs together for correct and false
recognitions (a), only for false recognitions (b), and only for correct recognitions (c), but
also the calculated significant differences.
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Figure 14: Mean response times with the standard deviations for the three sets across all
25 subjects. a) correct and false recognitions for all sets, b) only the false recognitions,
and c) only the correct recognitions for the three sets. Located significant differences
highlighted with asterisks (** = p < .001, * = p < .05)
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In the next step, the response times were examined regarding the duration of the
recognition task. This was done in order to see if subjects increased or decreased their
decision process along the task. Thus, three parts of the presented 120 stimuli were
generated. The response times of the first forty, the second forty, and the last forty
pictures were calculated together, respectively. Table 6 presents the descriptive statistic
for each part of the recognition task, regarding correct and false recognitions.
Table 6: Descriptive statistic of the response times of the three parts – each containing
40 pictures – of the recognition task
mean SD range
1. third-correct 2.398 s 0.577 s 1.71 s – 4.28 s
1. third-false 2.515 s 0.598 s 1.57 s – 3.94 s
2. third-correct 2.378 s 0.568 s 1.61 s – 4.19 s
2. third-false 2.463 s 0.697 s 1.38 s – 4.16 s
3. third-correct 2.433 s 0.626 s 1.59 s – 4.09 s
3. third-false 2.583 s 0.766 s 1.53 s – 4.58 s
A MANOVA with repeated measures was calculated with response times of the
thirds-correct and thirds-false, respectively, as within-subjects factor. The analysis re-
vealed neither for correct recognitions (F = .229, df = 1, p = .637) nor for false recogni-
tions (F = .490, df = 1, p = .491) any influence of the duration of the task on the decision
behaviour of the subjects.
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5.1.2 fMRI study
The behavioural data of the fMRI study were analysed in the same way as the results
of the pilot study regarding the formulated hypotheses. The demographical data of the
twelve subjects, who participated in this study, were described in section 4.2.2.
5.1.2.1 Recognition rate
The false recognition rate revealed, on average, a mean of 53 pictures (44.2%, SD =
7.7, range = 47 – 73) of the presented 120 stimuli across all 12 subjects. This rate is
independent of the affiliations of the stimuli to one of the three sets. Combining the false
recognitions of outtakes and similars to false alarms, a mean of 47 pictures (58.8%, SD
= 9.7, range: 38 – 73) was calculated. These two sets together consisted of 80 presented
unstudied stimuli. In Table 7 an overview of the descriptive analysis is given for each set.
Table 7: Descriptive statistic of correct and false recognition rates of the three stimulus
sets (40 pictures per set) across the 12 subjects
mean SD range
originals-correct 33.8 3.79 26 – 40
originals-false 6.1 3.78 0 – 14
similars-correct 18.2 6.29 2 – 24
similars-false 21.8 6.25 16 – 38
outtakes-correct 14.5 5.13 5 – 22
outtakes-false 25.3 5.42 16 – 35
Table 7 shows that one subject has made a ‘known’ response to most of the presented
pictures. Thus, he has correctly accepted all pictures of the set originals, but has only
rejected a few of the unstudied stimuli correctly. Taken together, the subject responded
to 113 pictures with a ‘known’ response. After the recognition task he was questioned,
how he estimated his own performance. He answered that he memorised the stories of
the film and that nearly all pictures were part of them. His data remained, nevertheless,
in the analysis because the underlying processes of his decisions did not differ from the
other subjects. For each picture he decided if he had seen it during the learning phase
or not. The same decision process was made by all the other subjects, and therefore his
data were considered comparable.
5.1 Behavioural data 61
Most of the false responses were made for the pictures of the set outtakes with a
percentage of 21.1%, followed by the set similars with 18.2%, and originals with 5.1%.
The false alarms rate showed a mean value of 47.1 (SD = 9.70, minimum = 38, maximum
= 73) or 58.9% of overall 80 unstudied pictures.
Likewise to the results of the pilot study, the discriminability index, d’, revealed for
hits and false alarms a positive value (mean = 1.41, SD = 0.87). The response bias, c,
showed a negative value across the group of -0.45 (SD = 0.19). That is also comparable
to the negative value calculated with the data of the pilot study.
5.1 Behavioural data 62
5.1.2.2 Two unstudied stimulus sets
A MANOVA with repeated measures with sets-false (i.e. originals-false, similars-false,
and outtakes-false) as within-subjects factor was used to evaluate if the three sets were
handled equally by the subjects or not. Figure 15 presents the mean false recognition
rates of the three sets. The recognition rates of this group did not significantly differ to
the ones of the pilot study (see Appendix B).
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Figure 15: Mean false recognition rates the three stimuli sets. Maximum recognition rate
for each set was 40
The main effect of sets-false was highly significant (F = 39.83, df = 2, p < .001). Sin-
gle comparisons between the sets were corrected after Bonferroni and revealed significant
differences between two pairs:
originals-false – similars-false: mean difference = -15.7, standard failure = 2.51,
p < .001,
originals-false – outtakes-false: mean difference = -19.3, standard failure = 2.42,
p < .001.
The comparison between similars-false and outtakes-false resulted in no significant
difference (mean difference = -3.6, standard failure = 1.9, p < .258).
These results showed that the subjects handled the items of the set originals differ-
ently from the ones of the unstudied sets, similars and outtakes. However, the stimuli of
the two unstudied sets were handled alike.
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Nevertheless, the discriminability index, d’, and the response bias, c, were evaluated
across the 12 subjects. Similar to the pilot study, the pairs hits – similars-false, and hits
– outtakes-false, respectively, were calculated. Table 8 presents the results including the
ones of the pair hits and false alarms, calculated regarding the first hypothesis.
Table 8: Descriptive statistic for the discriminability indices, d’, and the response biases,
c, of the pairs hits – false alarms, hits – similars-false, and hits – outtakes-false.
mean SD range
d’ (hits & false alarms) 1.41 0.87 0.32 – 3.68
d’ (hits & similars-false) 1.31 0.96 0.26 – 3.97
d’ (hits & outtakes-false) 1.52 0.88 0.39 – 3.48
c (hits & false alarms) -0.45 0.19 -0.89 – -0.22
c (hits & similars-false) -0.50 0.24 -0.95 – -0.21
c (hits & outtakes-false) -0.39 0.20 -0.82 – -0.17
The analysis revealed for the three pairs positive values of the discriminability index.
The descriptive statistic of the discriminability indices showed higher values than the one
calculated for the pilot study. However, besides of the comparison between the indices
of hits and similars-false, no significant differences were found (see Appendix B). The
response bias showed for all comparisons negative values, which did not significantly differ
to the ones of the pilot study (see Appendix B). A paired t-test showed no significant
differences between the discriminability indices ((hits & false alarms) – (hits & similars-
false): t(11) = 1.460, p = .172; (hits & false alarms) – (hits & outtakes-false): t(11) =
-1.690, p = .119). This is contrary to the revealed significant differences of the pilot study.
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5.1.2.3 Response time
The final calculation of the behavioural data for the fMRI-group was the investigation of
the response time (RT), likewise to the pilot study. The descriptive statistic for each set
is given in Table 9. Comparisons between response times of the pilot and the fMRI study
revealed no significant differences (see Appendix B).
Table 9: Descriptive statistic for the response times (RT) of correct and false recognitions
of the three sets
mean SD range
RT originals-correct 1.896 s 0.410 s 1.19 s – 3.64 s
RT originals-false 2.286 s 0.626 s 1.10 s – 3.22 s
RT similars-correct 2.123 s 0.448 s 1.23 s – 2.67 s
RT similars-false 2.075 s 0.509 s 1.04 s – 2.77 s
RT outtakes-correct 2.493 s 0.483 s 1.56 s – 4.18 s
RT outtakes-false 2.102 s 0.469 s 1.18 s – 2.69 s
Paired t-tests revealed only significant difference between correct and false recog-
nitions of the set outtakes : t(10) = 3.289, p < .008. For the other two sets, originals
and similars, no significant differences were detected with paired t-tests (originals : t(9)
= -1.831, p = .100; similars : t(10) = 847, p = .417.
A MANOVA with repeated measures was calculated with RTs of sets-correct and
sets-false, respectively, as within-subjects factor. It revealed a highly significant main
effect of the response times of sets-correct (F = 15.570, df = 2, p < .001) but not of
sets-false (F = .375, df = 2, p = .692).
Single comparisons between RTs of each set were corrected after Bonferroni and
revealed significant differences between the six pairs:
RT originals-correct – RT similars-correct : mean difference = .239, standard failure =
0.077, p = .033,
RT originals-correct – RT outtakes-correct : mean difference = .624, standard failure =
0.117, p = .001,
RT similars-correct – RT outtakes-correct : mean difference = .385, standard failure =
0.136, p = .054,
The comparisons showed that only the one between similars-correct and outtakes-
correct revealed no significant difference. Figure 16 summarises the mean response times of
each set regarding correct and false recognitions. Additionally, the significant differences
are plotted.
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Figure 16: Mean response time for the 12 subjects of the fMRI study in seconds for correct
and false recognitions across the three sets. Located significant differences highlighted
with asterisks (** = p < .001, * = p < .05)
Similar to the calculation of the results of the pilot study, an investigation was conducted
considering the recognition data along the time of the recognition task. Therefore, three
parts were generated of the 120 presented pictures, each including 40 pictures. Thus,
it was possible to investigate if the response behaviour of the subjects changed over the
time of the recognition task. Table 10 presents the descriptive statistic for each of the
generated three parts of the recognition task, regarding correct and false recognitions.
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Table 10: Descriptive statistic of the response times of the three parts – each containing
40 pictures – of the recognition task
mean SD range
1. third-correct 2.078 s 0.389 s 1.46 s – 2.57 s
1. third-false 2.135 s 0.595 s 1.12 s – 3.22 s
2. third-correct 2.089 s 0.456 s 1.24 s – 2.72 s
2. third-false 2.236 s 0.593 s 1.13 s – 3.06 s
3. third-correct 2.171 s 0.487 s 1.35 s – 2.83 s
3. third-false 2.265 s 0.629 s 1.07 s – 3.15 s
A MANOVA with repeated measures analysed with the response times of thirds-
correct and thirds-false, respectively, as within-subjects factor. The analysis revealed
neither for correct recognitions (F = 1.171, df = 1, p = .302) nor for false recognitions
(F = .828, df = 1, p = .382) a significant difference. These results did not differ from the
ones of the pilot study (see Appendix B). These results demonstrated that the subjects
did not change in their response behaviour over the time.
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5.2 Neuroimaging data
The functional magnetic resonance imaging data were analysed across all 12 subjects.
Only statistically significant increases in neural activity with a cluster-size above 10 vox-
els entered the analysis.
5.2.1 Neural correlates
The neuroimaging results were analysed in four steps. First, all correct and all false recog-
nitions across the three sets were analysed versus baseline. Then, all correct recognitions
were compared with all false recognitions, and vice versa, to detect differences of the
involved neural correlates. In the second step, studied and unstudied stimuli were con-
trasted against each other. In the third analysis step were single sets contrasted against
each other, and at last each set was contrasted with baseline with respect to correct and
false recognitions.
In the following sections these contrasts are presented successively. Tables show the
coordinates, cluster-size, Z-scores, Brodmann areas (BA), and the regions. The x-, y-,
and z-coordinates are standardised Talairach coordinates. They refer to the local maxima
within an area of activation. In addition, these maxima are indicated by the highest
Z-score of each cluster. Some of the revealed areas of activation are very big and cover
several regions. Therefore, the voxels of each cluster are included in the tables.
For all contrasts the so-called “glass brains” are presented. These are projections
of significant activations onto representations of the standard stereotaxic space, which
was defined by Talairach and Tournoux (1988). Additionally, for the first two analysis
steps images were included that show the local maxima of areas of significant relative
increase in neural activity, which were displayed superimposed on MRI sections to detail
the functional anatomy of the activations and their relationship to underlying structural
anatomy.
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5.2.1.1 Correct/false recognitions across all sets
The contrasts all correct recognitions and all false recognitions, respectively, versus base-
line revealed significant increases in neural activity with a p-value corrected for multiple
comparisons (p < .001). The activated regions are presented in Table 11.
Table 11: Activated regions and the significant local maxima of all correct recognitions and
all false recognitions versus baseline. First sorted by pattern, then by level of significance
(Z-score)
Side Region BA Voxels in cluster Z x y z
all correct recognitions
L middle temporal gyrus 19 4818 Inf. -36 -81 21
L middle frontal gyrus 9 375 7.22 -48 8 36
L anterior cingulate gyrus 32/6 453 7.06 -6 25 35
L inferior frontal gyrus 47 81 6.53 -33 23 -1
R inferior frontal gyrus 45/46 288 6.84 56 27 18
R inferior frontal gyrus 47 91 6.80 36 26 -6
R brainstem, pons 121 5.20 0 -24 -19
all false recognitions
L middle occipital gyrus 19 773 7.30 -36 -81 18
L posterior cingulate gyrus 31 86 6.40 -18 -60 22
L middle frontal gyrus 9 17 5.22 -45 7 33
R middle temporal gyrus 19 457 7.67 45 -78 12
R fusiform gyrus 37 100 6.92 42 -50 -15
R inferior frontal gyrus 45/46 83 6.19 54 27 21
R posterior cingulate gyrus 23/30 128 6.11 15 -52 14
Threshold: T = 4.53, pcorrected < .001. ‘Side’ defines the hemisphere, in which the activation was
found, L = left, R = right. BA is the respective Brodmann area of each activated cluster.
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The contrast all correct recognitions versus baseline revealed local maxima in the left
hemisphere in the middle temporal gyrus, the middle frontal gyrus, the anterior cingulate
gyrus, and the inferior frontal gyrus. In the right hemisphere two local maxima are found
within the inferior frontal gyrus, and one within the pons (Fig. 17).
An interesting finding is the big cluster in the occipital lobe found for the contrast all
correct recognitions versus baseline. Its local maxima lies within the left middle temporal
gyrus. However, as it is pictured in Figure 17, the cluster itself also covers big parts of
the right hemispheric middle occipital gyrus, and presumably parts of the left and right
posterior cingulate gyri.
all correct recognitions versus baseline
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Figure 17: Relative increases in neural activity associated with all correct false recog-
nitions across all sets analysed versus baseline. Areas of significant relative increase in
neural activity are shown as through-projection onto representations of standard stereo-
taxic space (“glass brains”) as defined by Talairach and Tournoux (1988). Statistically
significant increases (p < .05, corrected for multiple comparisons) in neural activity are
superimposed in terms of colour on MRI sections. The Talairach coordinates of the sig-
nificant maximum for each activated cluster are presented in Table 11.
The order of the brain images in Figure 17 is exemplary for all following images. At the
left is the sagittal slice (posterior = left, anterior = right), in the middle is the coronal
one (left = left hemisphere, right = right hemisphere), and at the right is the horizontal
slice (top = left hemisphere, bottom = right hemisphere).
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All false recognitions contrasted versus baseline revealed local maxima within the
left middle occipital gyrus, the left posterior cingulate gyrus, and the middle frontal gyrus.
Within the right hemisphere local maxima of cluster are found in the middle temporal
gyrus, the fusiform gyrus, the inferior frontal gyrus, and the posterior cingulate gyrus
(Fig. 18).
all false recognitions versus baseline
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Figure 18: Relative increases in neural activity associated with all false recognitions across
all sets analysed versus baseline. Areas of significant relative increase in neural activity
are shown as through-projection onto representations of standard stereotaxic space (“glass
brains”) as defined by Talairach and Tournoux (1988). Statistically significant increases
(p < .05, corrected for multiple comparisons) in neural activity are superimposed in terms
of colour on MRI sections. The Talairach coordinates of the significant maximum for each
activated cluster are presented in Table 11.
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The contrast between all correct recognitions versus all false recognitions showed
mainly neural activations in the left hemisphere, while the reverse contrast only revealed
one activation in the right hemisphere (Tab. 12).
Table 12: Local maxima of significantly activated regions associated with all correct versus
all false recognitions and vice versa across the three sets. First sorted by pattern, then
by level of significance (Z-score)
Side Region BA Voxels in cluster Z x y z
all correct recognitions >
all false recognitions
L insula 291 5.19 -45 -17 15
L postcentral gyrus 3 291 4.86 -42 -26 57
L insula/claustrum 89 4.13 -33 12 5
L anterior cingulate gyrus 10/32 22 3.77 -12 44 -2
L posterior cingulate gyrus 31 20 3.35 -3 -45 35
R lateral/medial globus pallidus 33 3.55 15 3 0
all false recognitions >
all correct recognitions
R precentral gyrus 4 116 3.61 36 -18 48
Threshold: T = 3.09, puncorrected < .001. ‘Side’ defines the hemisphere, in which the activation was
found, L = left, R = right. BA is the respective Brodmann area of each activated cluster.
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Comparison between all correct versus all false recognitions showed significant left
hemispheric activations in the insula, the postcentral gyrus, the medial frontal gyrus, the
anterior cingulate, the posterior cingulate gyrus, and the precuneus. Additionally, one
cluster within the right hemispheric lateral globus pallidus was detected (Fig. 19a). The
left hemispheric activations in the insula and the medial frontal/anterior cingulate gyrus
are also presented with coloured brain images in Figure 19a.
The reverse comparison, all false versus all correct recognitions, revealed significant
activation in the right precentral gyrus (Fig. 19b).
(a) all correct recognitions versus all false recognitions
x = -45 mm y = -17 mm z = 15 mm
0
1
2
3
4
5
—————————————————————————————————————
(b) all false recognitions versus all correct recognitions
Figure 19: Relative increases in neural activity associated with the comparison all correct
versus all false recognitions (a) and all false versus all correct recognitions (b) across the
three sets. Areas of significant relative increase in neural activity are shown as through-
projection onto representations of standard stereotaxic space (“glass brains”) as defined
by Talairach and Tournoux (1988). Statistically significant increases (p < .05, corrected
for multiple comparisons) in neural activity are superimposed in terms of colour on MRI
sections. The Talairach coordinates of the significant maximum for each activated cluster
are presented in Table 12.
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5.2.1.2 Contrasts between studied and unstudied sets
For this analysis originals-correct are redefined to hits and originals-false to misses. The
data of the falsely recognised pictures of similars and outtakes are combined to false
alarms and the correct recognised ones to correct rejected. Thus, the following pairs are
analysed: hits – false alarms, misses – false alarms, correct rejected – misses, and correct
rejected – hits. Table 13 summarises the results of these contrasts.
Table 13: Local maxima of significantly activated regions associated with comparisons
between (hits, false alarms, misses, and correct rejected). First sorted by pattern, then
by level of significance (Z-score)
Side Region BA Voxels in cluster Z x y z
hits > false alarms
L anterior cingulate gyrus 24/32 207 4.83 0 38 1
L claustrum 36 4.09 -30 3 8
L superior temporal gyrus 22 34 3.78 -42 -20 9
false alarms > hits
L middle occipital gyrus 19/18 1525 5.65 -36 -84 13
L middle frontal gyrus 46 192 4.12 -39 30 18
R middle occipital gyrus 19 947 5.52 42 -78 12
R retrosplenial cortex 30 244 4.99 15 -52 14
R inferior frontal gyrus 45/46 125 4.44 53 27 21
R nucleus ruber 86 4.20 6 -21 -4
R superior frontal gyrus 8 106 4.02 6 20 49
R middle frontal gyrus 6 59 3.75 39 0 55
misses > correct rejected
R middle temporal gyrus 21 10 3.72 53 -27 -11
correct rejected > misses
L restrosplenial cortex 29 1822 5.04 -6 -52 11
L insula 236 4.33 -33 23 2
L thalamus/lateral globus pallidus 139 4.23 -18 -11 9
L inferior frontal gyrus 9 70 4.00 -42 -2 22
L insula 38 4.00 -45 -17 15
L postcentral gyrus 2 97 3.88 -42 -29 54
L posterior cingulate gyrus 31 33 3.60 -12 -45 41
R middle occipital gyrus 19 995 5.18 36 -84 18
R anterior cingulate gyrus 32 402 4.35 6 28 29
R precentral gyrus 3/4 21 3.78 24 -26 67
R lateral globus pallidus 28 3.44 15 0 3
hits > correct rejected
R precentral gyrus 4 246 5.61 36 -18 51
Continued on next page
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Table 13 – continued from previous page
Side Region BA Voxels in cluster Z x y z
correct rejected > hits
L precentral gyrus 4 1214 Inf. -39 -15 53
L middle occipital gyrus 19 2313 7.17 -36 -84 18
L inferior frontal gyrus 47 138 5.11 -33 23 -1
L midbrain/subthalamic nucleus 93 4.02 -12 -15 -4
L insula 21 3.64 -45 -17 15
R middle occipital gyrus 18 1517 6.67 27 -90 5
R anterior cingulate gyrus 32 1132 5.79 6 31 29
R inferior frontal gyrus 47 627 5.75 39 23 -6
R brainstem, pons 98 5.21 3 -22 -24
R subcallosal gyrus 47 29 4.62 15 11 -11
R lingual gyrus 18 13 3.38 6 -78 4
misses > false alarms
L precentral gyrus 4 161 4.51 -39 -15 56
false alarms > misses
L middle frontal gyrus 46 148 4.88 -36 30 18
L cerebellum, posterior lobe 393 4.04 -30 -65 -14
L superior parietal lobule 7 91 3.88 -30 -65 47
L lateral parietal gyrus 39 56 3.67 -39 -66 28
L middle frontal gyrus 6 13 3.63 -30 14 46
R inferior temporal gyrus 37 123 4.48 56 -59 -7
R middle frontal gyrus 6 233 4.42 33 -6 61
R retrosplenial cortex 30 292 4.00 9 -49 14
R middle occipital gyrus 19 30 3.96 36 -84 18
R anterior cingulate gyrus 32/24 10 3.72 18 5 41
Threshold for uncorrected: T = 3.09, puncorrected < .001. ‘Side’ defines the hemisphere, in which the
activation was found, L = left, R = right. BA is the respective Brodmann area of each activated cluster.
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The comparison hits versus false alarms is associated with three smaller left hemi-
spheric activations in the anterior cingulate gyrus, the claustrum, and the superior tem-
poral gyrus (Fig. 20).
hits versus false alarms
x = 0 mm y = 0 mm z = 0 mm
0
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Figure 20: Relative increases in neural activity associated with hits versus false alarms.
Areas of significant relative increase in neural activity are shown as through-projection
onto representations of standard stereotaxic space (“glass brains”) as defined by Talairach
and Tournoux (1988). Statistically significant increases (p < .05, corrected for multiple
comparisons) in neural activity are superimposed in terms of colour on MRI sections. The
Talairach coordinates of the significant maximum for each activated cluster are presented
in Table 13.
5.2 Neuroimaging data 76
The reverse comparison false alarms versus hits revealed activations mainly in the
left but also in the right middle occipital gyrus. Furthermore, a cluster in the left middle
frontal gyrus was exposed. However, increases in neural activity are predominately re-
vealed in the right hemisphere within the posterior cingulate gyrus, the inferior and the
middle frontal gyrus, and the nucleus ruber (Fig. 21).
false alarms versus hits
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Figure 21: Relative increases in neural activity associated with false alarms versus hits.
Areas of significant relative increase in neural activity are shown as through-projection
onto representations of standard stereotaxic space (“glass brains”) as defined by Talairach
and Tournoux (1988). Statistically significant increases (p < .05, corrected for multiple
comparisons) in neural activity are superimposed in terms of colour on MRI sections. The
Talairach coordinates of the significant maximum for each activated cluster are presented
in Table 13.
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The contrast between misses versus correct rejected revealed one activation in the
right middle temporal gyrus (Fig. 22).
misses versus correct rejected
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Figure 22: Relative increases in neural activity associated with misses versus correct
rejected. Areas of significant relative increase in neural activity are shown as through-
projection onto representations of standard stereotaxic space (“glass brains”) as defined
by Talairach and Tournoux (1988). Statistically significant increases (p < .05, corrected
for multiple comparisons) in neural activity are superimposed in terms of colour on MRI
sections. The Talairach coordinates of the significant maximum for each activated cluster
are presented in Table 13.
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The reverse comparison correct rejected versus misses showed a preferentially left
hemispheric activity within the retrosplenial cortex, the insula, the thalamus, the inferior
frontal gyrus, the postcentral gyrus, and the posterior cingulate gyrus. Furthermore, two
activations are found in the right hemisphere within the middle occipital gyrus, and the
anterior cingulate gyrus (Fig. 23).
correct rejected versus misses
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Figure 23: Relative increases in neural activity associated with correct rejected versus
misses. Areas of significant relative increase in neural activity are shown as through-
projection onto representations of standard stereotaxic space (“glass brains”) as defined
by Talairach and Tournoux (1988). Statistically significant increases (p < .05, corrected
for multiple comparisons) in neural activity are superimposed in terms of colour on MRI
sections. The Talairach coordinates of the significant maximum for each activated cluster
are presented in Table 13.
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The comparison between hits and correct rejected revealed one cluster in the right
precentral gyrus (Fig. 24).
hits versus correct rejected
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Figure 24: Relative increases in neural activity associated with hits versus correct rejected.
Areas of significant relative increase in neural activity are shown as through-projection
onto representations of standard stereotaxic space (“glass brains”) as defined by Talairach
and Tournoux (1988). Statistically significant increases (p < .05, corrected for multiple
comparisons) in neural activity are superimposed in terms of colour on MRI sections. The
Talairach coordinates of the significant maximum for each activated cluster are presented
in Table 13.
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For the reverse contrast significant increases in neural activity are revealed within
the left precentral gyrus, bilateral in the occipital gyri, and the right anterior cingulate
gyrus. Furthermore, activations in the right hemispheric inferior frontal gyrus, the pons,
the subcallosal gyrus, the lingual gyrus, and in the left hemispheric inferior frontal gyrus,
the subthalamic nucleus, and the insula are associated with this comparison (Fig. 25).
correct rejected versus hits
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Figure 25: Relative increases in neural activity associated with correct rejected versus hits.
Areas of significant relative increase in neural activity are shown as through-projection
onto representations of standard stereotaxic space (“glass brains”) as defined by Talairach
and Tournoux (1988). Statistically significant increases (p < .05, corrected for multiple
comparisons) in neural activity are superimposed in terms of colour on MRI sections. The
Talairach coordinates of the significant maximum for each activated cluster are presented
in Table 13.
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The comparison misses versus false alarms showed one significant activation within
the left precentral gyrus (Fig. 26).
misses versus false alarms
x = -39 y = -18 mm z = 60 mm
0
1
2
3
4
Figure 26: Relative increases in neural activity associated with misses versus false alarms.
Areas of significant relative increase in neural activity are shown as through-projection
onto representations of standard stereotaxic space (“glass brains”) as defined by Talairach
and Tournoux (1988). Statistically significant increases (p < .05, corrected for multiple
comparisons) in neural activity are superimposed in terms of colour on MRI sections. The
Talairach coordinates of the significant maximum for each activated cluster are presented
in Table 13.
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The reverse contrast false alarms versus misses showed increase in neural activity in
the left hemisphere within the middle frontal gyrus, the cerebellum, the superior parietal
lobule, the lateral parietal gyrus, and middle frontal gyrus. Furthermore, activations are
revealed in the right hemisphere within the inferior temporal gyrus, the middle frontal
gyrus, the retrosplenial cortex, the middle occipital gyrus, and the anterior cingulate gyrus
(Fig. 27).
false alarms versus misses
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Figure 27: Relative increases in neural activity associated with false alarms versus misses.
Areas of significant relative increase in neural activity are shown as through-projection
onto representations of standard stereotaxic space (“glass brains”) as defined by Talairach
and Tournoux (1988). Statistically significant increases (p < .05, corrected for multiple
comparisons) in neural activity are superimposed in terms of colour on MRI sections. The
Talairach coordinates of the significant maximum for each activated cluster are presented
in Table 13.
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5.2.1.3 Contrasts between the sets
Following pairs of the sets are analysed: originals-correct – similars-correct, originals-
correct – outtakes-correct, similars-correct – outtakes-correct, originals-false – similars-
false, originals-false – outtakes-false, similars-false – outtakes-false. The results of these
contrasts are presented in Table 14.
Table 14: Local maxima of significantly activated regions associated with the comparisons
of the three sets with respect to recognition mode. First sorted by pattern, then by level
of significance (Z-score)
Side Region BA Voxels in cluster Z x y z
originals-correct >
similars-correct
R precentral gyrus 4 238 5.02 36 -18 56
similars-correct >
originals-correct
L precentral gyrus 4 563 6.63 -36 -18 56
L putamen, claustrum 208 4.56 -33 -12 1
L middle occipital gyrus 18/19 12 3.62 -36 -87 10
L lingual gyrus 18 10 3.57 -21 -93 -3
L inferior frontal gyrus 47 22 3.56 -30 20 -4
L anterior cingulate gyrus 32 27 3.51 -6 33 26
L anterior cingulate gyrus 24 12 3.42 -9 -13 39
L superior frontal gyrus 6 10 3.37 -9 11 49
L inferior frontal gyrus 47 21 3.34 -56 15 -1
R inferior frontal gyrus 47 100 4.18 39 23 -6
R superior frontal gyrus 8 27 3.66 12 23 49
R middle occipital gyrus 18 13 3.52 27 -90 2
originals-correct >
outtakes-correct
L anterior cingulate gyrus 24 21 3.56 -6 32 -2
R precentral gyrus 4 139 4.67 36 -15 51
outtakes-correct >
originals-correct
L precentral gyrus 4 597 7.84 -33 15 53
L anterior cingulate gyrus 32 274 4.45 -9 24 26
L superior frontal gyrus 9 71 4.39 -33 37 31
L anterior cingulate gyrus 24 162 4.35 -6 -4 47
L middle occipital gyrus 19 177 4.21 -36 -87 15
L retrosplenial cortex 30 135 3.88 -6 -55 8
L brainstem, pons 17 3.76 0 -23 -24
L postcentral gyrus 3 12 3.43 -15 -38 63
Continued on next page
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Table 14 – continued from previous page
Side Region BA Voxels in cluster Z x y z
R middle occipital gyrus 18/19 186 4.12 27 -90 7
R cerebellum 96 4.10 24 -47 -15
R superior frontal gyrus 10 83 3.97 27 54 22
R inferior frontal gyrus 45/46 35 3.90 56 24 18
R parahippocampal gyrus 32 3.84 21 -52 5
similars-correct >
outtakes-correct
L insula 55 4.09 -36 -8 6
outtakes-correct >
similars-correct
no suprathreshold clusters
originals-false >
similars-false
L precentral gyrus 4 51 4.07 -36 -12 56
similars-false >
originals-false
L middle frontal gyrus 46 43 4.01 -36 33 15
R postcentral gyrus 3 99 4.61 27 -29 67
originals-false >
outtakes-false
L precentral gyrus 4 14 3.65 -39 -12 56
outtakes-false >
originals-false
L middle frontal gyrus 46 34 3.89 -36 30 18
L medial frontal gyrus 10 21 3.67 -9 49 -5
R postcentral gyrus 3 152 4.58 27 -29 68
R retrosplenial cortex 29 23 3.82 3 -34 21
R posterior cingulate gyrus 31 67 3.63 3 -54 28
R superior frontal gyrus 10 11 3.43 27 58 0
similars-false >
outtakes-false
no suprathreshold clusters
outtakes-false >
similars-false
L anterior cingulate gyrus 32 132 4.14 -6 22 27
R posterior cingulate gyrus 31 13 3.37 9 -36 38
Threshold for uncorrected: T = 3.09, puncorrected < .001. ‘Side’ defines the hemisphere, in which the
activation was found, L = left, R = right. BA is the respective Brodmann area of each activated cluster.
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The comparison between originals-correct and similars-correct revealed one signifi-
cant increase in neural activity in the right precentral gyrus (Fig. 28a).
The reverse comparison showed a wider network of neural activations comprising
in the left hemisphere the precentral gyrus, the claustrum, the middle occipital gyrus,
the lingual gyrus, the inferior frontal gyrus, the anterior cingulate gyrus, the super and
inferior frontal gyri. In the right hemisphere the inferior and superior frontal gyri, the
dentate nucleus, and middle occipital gyrus are associated with this contrast (Fig. 28b).
(a) originals-correct versus similars-correct
————————————————————————–
(b) similars-correct versus originals-correct
Figure 28: Relative increases in neural activity associated with originals-correct versus
similars-correct (a) and vice versa (b). Areas of significant relative increase in neural ac-
tivity are shown as through-projection onto representations of standard stereotaxic space
(“glass brains”) as defined by Talairach and Tournoux (1988). The Talairach coordinates
of the significant maximum for each activated cluster are presented in Table 14.
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The comparison between originals-correct versus outtakes-correct revealed two sig-
nificant activations, one in the right precentral gyrus and one in the left anterior cingulate
gyrus (Fig. 29a).
The contrariwise comparison between outtakes-correct and originals-correct is as-
sociated with activations in the left hemisphere in the precentral gyrus, the anterior
cingulate gyrus, the retrosplenial cortex, the pons, and the postcentral gyrus. In the right
hemisphere increase in neural activity was revealed in the cerebellum, the inferior frontal
gyrus, and the parahippocampal gyrus. Further bilateral activations are found in the
superior frontal gyrus, and the middle occipital gyrus (Fig. 29b).
(a) originals-correct versus outtakes-correct
————————————————————————–
(b) outtakes-correct versus originals-correct
Figure 29: Relative increases in neural activity associated with originals-correct versus
outtakes-correct (a) and vice versa (b). Areas of significant relative increase in neural ac-
tivity are shown as through-projection onto representations of standard stereotaxic space
(“glass brains”) as defined by Talairach and Tournoux (1988). The Talairach coordinates
of the significant maximum for each activated cluster are presented in Table 14.
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The comparisons between the correct rejected pictures of the set similars versus the
ones of the set outtakes revealed only one cluster in the left insula (Fig. 30).
The reverse comparison resulted in no suprathreshold clusters.
similars-correct versus outtakes-correct
Figure 30: Relative increases in neural activity associated with outtakes-correct versus
similars-correct. Areas of significant relative increase in neural activity are shown as
through-projection onto representations of standard stereotaxic space (“glass brains”) as
defined by Talairach and Tournoux (1988). The Talairach coordinates of the significant
maximum for each activated cluster are presented in Table 14.
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The contrast originals-false versus similars-false revealed one cluster in the left
precentral gyrus (Fig. 31a).
The inverse comparison showed one significant increase in neural activity in the right
postcentral gyrus, and in the left middle frontal gyrus (Fig. 31b).
(a) originals-false versus similars-false
————————————————————————–
(b) similars-false versus originals-false
Figure 31: Relative increases in neural activity associated with originals-false versus
similars-false (a) and vice versa (b). Areas of significant relative increase in neural activity
are shown as through-projection onto representations of standard stereotaxic space (“glass
brains”) as defined by Talairach and Tournoux (1988). The Talairach coordinates of the
significant maximum for each activated cluster are presented in Table 14.
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One cluster in the left precentral gyrus is associated with the contrast originals-false
versus outtakes-false (Fig. 32a).
The reverse comparison showed significant activations in the right hemisphere within
the postcentral gyrus, the retrosplenial cortex, the posterior cingulate gyrus, and the su-
perior frontal gyrus. In the left hemisphere increase in neural activity are revealed within
the middle and medial frontal gyri (Fig. 32b).
(a) originals-false versus outtakes-false
————————————————————————–
(b) outtakes-false versus originals-false
Figure 32: Relative increases in neural activity associated with originals-false versus
outtakes-false (a) and vice versa (b). Areas of significant relative increase in neural activity
are shown as through-projection onto representations of standard stereotaxic space (“glass
brains”) as defined by Talairach and Tournoux (1988). The Talairach coordinates of the
significant maximum for each activated cluster are presented in Table 14.
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Comparison between similars-false versus outtakes-false showed no suprathreshold
activation (Tab. 14).
The contrariwise comparison revealed one significant activation in the left anterior
cingulate gyrus, and one in the right posterior cingulate gyrus (Fig. 33).
outtakes-false versus similars-false
Figure 33: Relative increases in neural activity associated with outtakes-false versus
similars-false. Areas of significant relative increase in neural activity are shown as
through-projection onto representations of standard stereotaxic space (“glass brains”) as
defined by Talairach and Tournoux (1988). The Talairach coordinates of the significant
maximum for each activated cluster are presented in Table 14.
In general, the comparisons between the falsely recognised stimulus sets revealed
activations with smaller cluster-sizes and lesser Z-values than the ones containing the
correct recognised stimuli. While, on the other hand the biggest activation was revealed
for outtakes-false, followed by outtakes-correct, and similars-correct (Tab. 14).
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5.2.1.4 Contrasts sets versus baseline
The activations of each set,originals, similars, and outtakes versus baseline are associated
with significant increase in neural activity with an uncorrected p-value (p < .001). The
results are summarised in Table 15.
Table 15: Local maxima of significantly activated regions associated with comparisons
between the three sets with respect to the recognition mode. First sorted by pattern,
then by level of significance (Z-score)
Side Region BA Voxels in cluster Z x y z
originals correct
L middle frontal gyrus 9 241 4.45 -48 8 36
L middle frontal gyrus 6 29 3.80 -30 11 46
R middle occipital gyrus 19 4701 7.35 50 -69 9
R inferior frontal gyrus 45/46 159 5.19 42 16 19
R precentral gyrus 4 43 3.92 36 -12 48
R medial frontal gyrus 6 35 3.59 3 28 37
originals false
L middle occipital gyrus 19 24 3.89 -39 -87 7
L precentral gyrus 6 10 3.60 -39 -6 56
R middle frontal gyrus 46 13 3.40 56 30 18
R middle occipital gyrus 19 16 3.33 48 -73 6
similars correct
L middle temporal gyrus 19 4122 6.86 -36 -81 21
L inferior frontal gyrus 47 204 5.43 -33 23 -1
L middle frontal gyrus 9 408 5.18 -48 8 36
L subthalamic nucleus 81 3.84 -12 -15 -4
R inferior frontal gyrus 47 346 5.77 36 26 -4
R middle frontal gyrus 9 490 4.96 6 31 32
R middle frontal gyrus 9 39 4.60 59 16 30
R brainstem, pons 63 4.28 0 -24 -19
similars false
L middle temporal gyrus 19 1956 6.76 -36 -78 20
L middle frontal gyrus 6 359 5.13 -30 11 46
R middle occipital gyrus 19 978 6.04 45 -78 12
R posterior cingulate gyrus 29 245 5.43 15 -46 11
R inferior frontal gyrus 45/46 173 4.65 54 24 15
R middle inferior frontal gyrus 6 78 3.95 36 5 47
outtakes correct
L middle occipital gyrus 19 5421 Inf. -36 -84 18
L precentral gyrus 4 879 6.34 -36 -12 53
Continued on next page
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Table 15 – continued from previous page
Side Region BA Voxels in cluster Z x y z
L anterior cingulate gyrus 32 932 5.89 -9 22 32
L inferior frontal gyrus 46 83 4.16 -45 24 15
L insula 57 4.11 -30 21 5
L precuneus 7 18 3.40 0 -49 61
R inferior frontal gyrus 45/46 431 6.66 56 24 18
R brainstem, pons 52 4.48 0 -21 -22
R inferior frontal gyrus 47 62 4.30 33 23 -4
R middle frontal gyrus 6 29 4.01 42 2 47
R inferior parietal gyrus 40 12 3.58 33 -47 47
outtakes false
L medial frontal gyrus 8 341 5.57 -3 23 46
L middle frontal gyrus 46/45 459 5.49 -42 24 15
L superior frontal gyrus 10 25 4.09 -27 62 11
L hypothalamus 34 3.66 -9 -3 -7
R middle occipital gyrus 19 6665 Inf. 45 -78 9
R inferior frontal gyrus 45/46 336 5.44 54 24 21
R precentral gyrus 6 355 4.95 33 -15 56
R midbrain 24 4.05 9 -21 -12
R middle frontal gyrus 8/6 15 3.69 33 17 43
R posterior cingulate gyrus 31 15 3.68 12 -39 38
R inferior parietal gyrus 40 17 3.66 36 -44 44
Threshold: T = 3.09, puncorrected < .001. ‘Side’ defines the hemisphere, in which the activation was
found, L = left, R = right. BA is the respective Brodmann area of each activated cluster.
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Correct recognition of originals versus baseline revealed significant increases bilat-
erally in the middle frontal gyrus. Only in the right hemisphere activations are found in
the middle occipital gyrus, the inferior frontal gyrus, the medial frontal gyrus, and the
precentral gyrus (Fig. 34a).
False recognitions of originals versus baseline are associated with activations in the
left and right middle occipital gyrus, left precentral gyrus, and right middle frontal gyrus
(Fig. 34b).
(a) originals-correct versus baseline
————————————————————————–
(b) originals-false versus baseline
Figure 34: Relative increases in neural activity associated with correct as well as false
recognitions for originals versus baseline. Areas of significant relative increase in neural ac-
tivity are shown as through-projection onto representations of standard stereotaxic space
(“glass brains”) as defined by Talairach and Tournoux (1988). The Talairach coordinates
of the significant maximum for each activated cluster are presented in Table 15.
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Correct rejection of similars versus baseline showed significant activations in the left
hemisphere in the middle temporal/occipital gyrus, the inferior and the middle frontal
gyrus, and the subthalamic nucleus. In the right hemisphere clusters in the inferior and
the middle frontal gyrus, and in the pons are also associated with correct rejection of this
set (Fig. 35a).
The false recognised similars are associated with activations mainly in the left but
also in the right occipital/temporal gyri. In the left hemisphere additionally the middle
frontal gyrus was activated, in the right hemisphere further activations are revealed within
the middle frontal gyrus, the inferior frontal gyrus, and the posterior cingulate gyrus (Fig.
35b).
(a) similars-correct versus baseline
————————————————————————–
(b) similars-false versus baseline
Figure 35: Relative increases in neural activity associated with correct as well as false
recognitions for similars versus baseline. Areas of significant relative increase in neural ac-
tivity are shown as through-projection onto representations of standard stereotaxic space
(“glass brains”) as defined by Talairach and Tournoux (1988). The Talairach coordinates
of the significant maximum for each activated cluster are presented in Table 15.
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Correct rejection of outtakes showed significant activation in the left middle occipital
gyrus and bilaterally in the inferior frontal gyrus. Additionally, in the left hemisphere
the precentral gyrus, the anterior cingulate gyrus, the insula, the precuneus, and in the
right hemisphere the middle frontal gyrus, the inferior parietal gyrus, and the pons are
activated (Fig 36a).
The biggest cluster within this analysis was found for falsely accepted outtakes
within the right middle occipital gyrus. Beside of that, further significant increases of
neural activity are revealed in left hemisphere within the medial, middle, and superior
frontal gyri, and in the hypothalamus. Right hemispheric are the inferior, and mid-
dle frontal gyri, the precentral gyrus, the posterior cingulate gyrus, the inferior parietal
gyrus, and the midbrain associated with outtakes-false (Fig. 36b).
(a) outtakes-correct versus baseline
————————————————————————–
(b) outtakes-false versus baseline
Figure 36: Relative increases in neural activity associated with correct as well as false
recognitions for outtakes versus baseline. Areas of significant relative increase in neural ac-
tivity are shown as through-projection onto representations of standard stereotaxic space
(“glass brains”) as defined by Talairach and Tournoux (1988). The Talairach coordinates
of the significant maximum for each activated cluster are presented in Table 15.
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6 Discussion
In this chapter, the results of the study are discussed in the context of previous research
carried out on false memories. For the first three hypotheses the behavioural data of the
pilot and the fMRI study is interpreted together. The neuroimaging results of the fMRI
study are presented in the last section.
6.1 Recognition rate
The first question raised in this study asked whether a new developed film paradigm can
induce efficiently false recognitions. The behavioural data of the pilot study, and the later
fMRI study, demonstrated that the film paradigm provoked false recognitions. The high
rates of false recognitions, which were revealed for this study, are comparable to results
of previous investigations that used word-lists and pictures (M. B. Miller & Gazzaniga,
1998) and abstract shapes (Slotnick & Schacter, 2004) as stimulus material. To evaluate
the accuracy and the false memory rates of the subjects, overall discriminability indices
were calculated. For both studies, the pilot and the fMRI study, the discriminability
indices revealed a positive value. This result proved that the subjects responded not
by chance, but rather that they made their decisions deliberately. Furthermore, the
response bias was calculated to control if the film paradigm induced false recognitions
of the unstudied stimuli as it should do. This resulted in a negative value for both
studies, which confirmed that the film paradigm provoked reliable false recognitions of
unstudied stimuli. The calculation according to signal detection theory verified that
the film paradigm is a suitable method to investigate false recognitions. Even though
the presented film was not emotionally laden (see Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessy, 2004, for
possible effects in memory abilities of traumatic films), it caused reliable false recognitions.
At first glance, the film paradigm of this study appears similar to test designs
examining the phenomenon of change blindness with a film (Levin & Simons, 1997).
Changed blindness is not a form of false recognitions but is defined as a result of being
absent-minded (see Schacter’s seven sins, section 2.2.3). One of the differences between
the procedure of the film paradigm of this study and of the films investigating changed
blindness is that for the latter the attention of the subjects was actively focussed by
specific instructions. For example, subjects were told to count how often a ball was thrown
between several people. Thus engaged, subjects missed that one person, costumed like
a gorilla, walked through the group (D. J. Simons & Chabris, 1999). Change blindness
research expanded over the last years (D. J. Simons & Rensink, 2005) showing that it is a
common phenomenon. It was not only found in experimental but also in real-life settings
(Levin, Simons, Angelone, & Chabris, 2002). A comparison between change blindness
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paradigms and the film paradigm shows important differences. The film paradigm was
not developed to investigate change detection abilities like change blindness paradigms.
This becomes apparent when the procedure of this study is compared with another one
which investigated changed blindness (Ma¨ntyla¨ & Sundstro¨m, 2004). The subjects of
Ma¨ntyla¨’s and Sundstro¨m’s study watched a naturalistic film, presenting realistic scenes
like being in an office and answering the phone. After a movie cut, the colour of the
phone was changed and was again used by the actor. In the following recall questionnaire,
subjects often did not recall change in colour of the phone. Thus, they made mistakes in
change detection. The difference between their study and this one is that neither objects
nor persons were changed in the film. Even though several movie cuts were made in the
film, the aim was not to examine the subjects’ ability to detect changes whilst watching
the film. The close comparability of the two stimuli made it necessary to expose the
differences between them and emphasised again that the film paradigm truly provoked
false recognitions. One further study shows the difference between change blindness and
the film paradigm. Varakin and Levin (2006) found that even when the ability to detect
changes is poor, the recognition abilities are above that of mere chance. This suggests that
when the film paradigm is comparable to change blindness paradigms the recognition rate
should be above that of chance as well. The data showed that this was not the case. To
sum up, the film paradigm has some superficial parallels to change blindness paradigms,
but the main focus of this study was the investigation of recognition abilities and not of
change detection.
There are further relevant differences between the film paradigm and previous false
memories paradigms. Subjects of this study were not urged to focus at a specific part
or action of the film. During the recognition task the subjects were neither influenced
nor distracted in any way. This was important because other studies showed that the
memory of subjects can be easily changed, for example by suggestive questions during
an interview (E. F. Loftus, 2000, 2004; Bernstein, Laney, Morris, & Loftus, 2005). The
aim of the film paradigm was to investigate false recognitions without any additional
external influence. The subjects were only told to watch the entire film closely because
of a subsequent memory task. It was not explained to them what kind of memory task
they would participate in or what the main focus of the study was.
One of the new aspects of this study was that a naturalistic, not emotive, film was
used. Furthermore, one studied and two different unstudied stimulus sets were tested. In
addition and of utmost importance, the subjects were never influenced during the whole
procedure. The recognition results clearly demonstrate that the combination of these
factors in the film paradigm was successful and that false recognitions can be caused and
investigated with this paradigm.
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6.2 Two unstudied stimulus sets
Two unstudied stimulus sets which should cause false recognitions were investigated in
this study: similars and outtakes. The assumption was that significant differences can
be found between false recognitions of changed studied scenes and false recognitions of
parts of events which were not perceived. The pilot study and the fMRI study showed
that the subjects were able to discriminate between the three sets. The response bias
demonstrated that both unstudied stimulus sets provoked reliable false recognitions. The
hypothesis that two different reasons might cause false recognitions was supported by the
results. It was also demonstrated that similars and outtakes were handled differently by
the subjects, indicating that they provoke false recognitions in different ways.
The stimulus set similars tested the ability of the subjects to retrieve details of
a witnessed event. Considering normal everyday situations, it seems unimportant to
remember correctly whether a tea cup was red or yellow. However, these details can be
very important if it comes to eyewitnesses. When a witness reports that the car of a
bank robber is blue, it can be assumed that the police will only look for a blue car. If the
description of the witness was wrong, the tracing might be based on this false information.
In a recent study, Silvia et al. (2006) investigated the importance of attention for schema-
consistent and schema-inconsistent objects in everyday scenes. Their results showed that
it mostly depends on the instruction, whether details of objects (schema-consistent as well
as schema-inconsistent) are correctly recognised or not. In this study, the set similars
presented schema-consistent objects or actions, because they pictured perceived scenes
with changes. Schema-consistent objects are memorised regarding their gist information,
irrespective of the attentional focus. This suggests that most parts of the film were
only memorised with respect to their general content, which further resulted in confusion
during the recognition task when originals and similars were presented. Considering
the fuzzy-trace theory, gist and verbatim information are stored in parallel but retrieved
separately from each other (see section 2.2.2, Brainerd & Reyna, 2001). Only about half
of the presented stimuli of the set similars were correctly rejected by the subjects. This
suggests that the similars induced the retrieval of the gist of the film scenes, rather than
the detailed verbatim information. A way to further examine this particular point would
be to show subjects originals and similars in parallel during the recognition task. The
assumption is that the false recognition rate for similars would drop significantly, because
seeing these two stimuli in parallel, gist and verbatim traces should be reactivated. This
reactivation would result in correct decisions for originals as well as similars. This outlines
the problem of the form of false recognition stimuli, which are depicted in this study by
the similars. When subjects need to focus their attention on specific objects or actions in
order to fully recognise them later, behavioural data alone is not enough to analyse this
phenomenon.
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The stimulus set outtakes was designed to provoke false recognitions from scene
parts that were not presented in the film. The results revealed that subjects felt confi-
dent that they had actually seen more than half of the parts that were not presented.
The mechanisms of ‘cognitive dissonance’ (introduced in section 2.2.3) may provide an
explanation for the underlying processes of this finding (Festinger, 1957). Cognitive dis-
sonance describes the urge to avoid conflicts between knowledge and behaviour. In the
experimental setting of the film paradigm, it can be assumed that the subjects responded
under the pressure to perform as well as possible. This might conflict with what one
is actually capable of memorising. One way to solve this discrepancy is to fill in the
gaps unconsciously, and thus create a consistent course of events. This process was also
described by Schacter (1999; 2001) as the sin of bias, which is one of the seven sins of
memory (see also section 2.2.3). He explained that consistency and change biases, two
of the major types of biases, may help to reduce cognitive dissonance (Schacter, 2001).
The fragmented film scenes of this study, which resulted from the creation of the stim-
uli outtakes, disrupted the consistency of the perceived content of the film. Moreover, a
study of Lyle and Johnson (2006) revealed that perceived information can be imported
into false memories. The imported, truly perceived, information can be used to fill in the
gaps, achieve the consistency of the events, and avoid cognitive dissonance. The process of
‘filling the gaps’ is only possible via the imagination. If something is repeatedly imagined,
it can result in a powerful false recollection, which can lead to the belief that an imagined
event was actually experienced (Goff & Roediger, H. L. III, 1998). Other studies came to
the conclusion that scene perception and imaginations activate similar mental images or
schematic representations (Intraub, Gottesman, & Bills, 1998). The visual perception of
an event is not continuous. The most obvious indicator for this is the necessary blinking
of the eye. Among others, Hochberg (1986) proposed that instead of a multitude of single
detailed images, abstract mental schemata of visual scenes are memorised. Schemata can
evolve for every common situation, i.e. like going to the cinema (see section 2.2.2, schema
theory). It is reasonable and economically sensible that the mind connects perceived with
imagined information to receive a complete representation of an event. When perceived
information is embedded in the imagined parts, the end results will be consistent. These
processes are very expedient in normal life, but not when a crime is witnessed. It can
be very important to recognise the face of a culprit or to report the details of the crime
correctly. False recollection and false recognition in this scenario are the results of source
monitoring error (see also section 2.2.2, Lindsay & Johnson, 2000). Thus, false recog-
nitions of outtakes are not the same as false recognitions in the original meaning, which
describe a false positive response to an unknown stimulus, but rather a product of uncon-
sciously used schemata followed by a source monitoring error during the recognition task.
Nevertheless, they are still false recognitions because the subjects have to recognise the
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stimuli. Therefore, they have to synchronise the previously studied material (i.e. film,
pictures, word-lists) with the presented recognition stimuli (i.e. pictures, words).
In conclusion, it was satisfactorily shown that two different causes, represented by
the unstudied stimulus sets similars and outtakes, resulted in false recognitions. Moreover,
the data suggests that both forms of false recognitions might commonly occur in everyday
life.
6.3 Response time
The hypothesis concerning the response time as a valid measure to differentiate between
correct and false recognitions was partially confirmed by the results. Subjects of both
studies responded to the stimulus set originals as predicted. Fast responses are associated
with correct recognitions of these stimuli, whereas falsely rejected ones are connected to
longer response times. Results of the two unstudied sets revealed a different picture. For
both studies, and both sets, correct rejections of the stimuli are associated with longer
response times, while faster decisions are found for false recognitions. Though the response
behaviour of the subjects for these two unstudied stimulus sets seemed to be comparable,
there is one difference. The response times of outtakes-correct and outtakes-false showed
a bigger difference between them than the results of the set similars for correct and false
recognitions. After the separate discussions of the three stimulus sets and the revealed
response times, conclusions are drawn for the response times regarding the hypothesis.
The results of the set originals comprise the fastest response times for correct recog-
nitions in both studies. This is in line with previous studies, which showed that correct
responses of studied stimuli are associated with the fastest responses (e.g. Nessler, Meck-
linger, & Penney, 2001; Okado & Stark, 2003). The results for the set originals confirm
the intuitive expectation of how someone should respond regarding studied material. It
seems plausible that a studied stimulus can be correctly recognised within a shorter time,
and that longer time to make a decision leads to a false response. The longer we think
about something, the more information can interfere with our first intuitive thought.
Thus, reasoning can lead to false recognitions (Shavir et al., 1993) of studied stimuli.
Following the dual-process model, which refers to two components (familiarity and
recollection) during the retrieval process (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1994), the response times
of the unstudied stimuli revealed the expected result. The general assumption of the dual-
process model is that the familiarity process is an automatic, fast process, followed by a
slower and more accurate recollection process (Atkinson & Juola, 1974; Mandler, 1980;
Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1994). Several studies investigated this with the speed-accuracy
trade-off (SAT) paradigm, developed by Dosher (1984a, 1984b). Here, subjects receive
a response signal at variable times after the stimulus is presented. They are forced to
respond more quickly with less accuracy. Results revealed an inverted-U relation between
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response time and false recognition rate (Rotello & Heit, 2000). Thus, initial increase in re-
sponse times is associated with increases in false recognition rates, but subsequent increase
in response times leads to reductions of false response rates. Importantly, the inverted-U
relation is between the response times and false recognitions of meaning-preserving new
stimuli (see section 2.2.2). Considering the picture sets used in this study, only the set
outtakes follows this assumption. These stimuli did not violate the presented content of
the film scenes by changing it, they completed the events of the film by representing the
parts that were not presented. Compared with the results of the similars, the set outtakes
caused response times for correct and false recognitions that differed significantly. The
data for this set is in line with the dual-process model.
The pictures of the set similars can be classified as meaning-violating new stimuli,
because they represent changed scenes. For example, in one scene of the film the man
takes a small white letter out of a mail box. The picture of the set similars shows the man
taking a big brown letter out of the mail box. Only a small object was changed in this
scene but the content is, nevertheless, different. The work of Bransford (1971) showed
that subjects were good at correctly classifying meaning-violating new stimuli. This is
also mirrored in the recognition rates of both unstudied sets, which showed that subjects
performed better for the set similars than for outtakes. The response times of correct and
false recognitions of similars are very close to each other, even though correct responses
were associated with slightly longer response times.
In summary, the hypothesis was only supported by the results of the set originals.
The set outtakes showed a contrary course of the response times as it was described in
previous studies regarding related but unstudied stimuli. The results for the set similars
differed only slightly between correct and false recognitions. Nevertheless, the response
times for this set showed a similar development to the set outtakes. The results of the
unstudied stimulus sets suggest that for correct recognitions of these stimuli more time is
needed, probably reflecting an accurate processing of these stimuli which leads to correct
rejections. This interpretation challenges the assumption of the hypothesis that fast,
intuitive responses lead to correct responses in general. The data showed that it might be
very difficulty to distinguish between correct and false recognitions in real life situations.
In those cases, it might not be known whether a spontaneous response is correct or not.
The results of this study indicate that fast decisions lead to correct responses for studied
material, but to false responses for unstudied material. Hence, the response time can be
used as an additional measure to distinguish between correct and false recognitions, but
it should not be used as a single or main factor for this kind of recognition task.
6.4 Neural correlates 102
6.4 Neural correlates
The intention of the analysis of the neuroimaging data was to reveal brain regions that
are associated with correct and false recognitions. The results given in section 5.2 are
now discussed. Firstly, the neural activity findings regarding all correct and all false
recognitions are interpreted (results of section 5.2.1.1). All correct recognitions included
correct responses (‘known’) to originals and correct rejections (‘unknown’) to similars
and outtakes. All false recognitions on the other hand included false ‘unknown’ responses
to originals and ‘known’ ones to similars and outtakes. However, the analysis of this
data should reveal brain regions, which are involved in correct and false recognitions,
independent of the content of the stimuli and the given response (‘known/unknown’). In
the next analysis steps, studied and unstudied stimuli were contrasted against each other
as well as against baseline. The large amount of activations revealed for these contrasts
are not interpreted with regard to single contrasts but to their anatomical affiliation.
Thus, the activations displayed in the sections 5.2.1.2, 5.1.2.3 and 5.1.2.4 are discussed
regarding the frontal cortex, parietal cortex, temporal cortex, occipital cortex, subcortical
nuclei, cerebellum, and pons.
As supplementary material, a map of the human Brodmann areas (BA) is included
in Appendix C. The classification of the revealed activations of this study within the
frontal cortex was made as follows: inferior and superior frontal gyrus (BA 47/10) equal
orbitofrontal cortex; superior, middle, and inferior frontal gyrus (BA 8/9/46) equal dor-
solateral frontal cortex; inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45) equal ventrolateral frontal cortex;
middle frontal gyrus (BA 6) equal supplementary motor area (cf. Fletcher & Henson,
2001; Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004).
6.4.1 Correct/false recognitions across all sets
The first contrasts were made to see if specific brain regions are activated regarding cor-
rect recognitions as well as false recognitions. As expected the increase in neural activity
was larger for all correct recognitions than for all false recognitions.
The contrast all correct recognitions against baseline displayed significant activa-
tions within the frontal lobes, specifically the bilateral orbitofrontal cortex (BA 47), the
right ventrolateral/dorsolateral frontal cortex (BA 45/46), the left dorsolateral cortex (BA
9), and the left anterior cingulate cortex/supplementary motor area (BA 32/6). Further-
more, an increase in neural activity was revealed in the left middle temporal gyrus (BA
19) and the right pons. The findings demonstrated that bilateral orbitofrontal cortex
activations are more involved in the processing of false (new related) and old stimuli than
in new (not related) stimuli, which suggests that this region reflects verification processes
6.4 Neural correlates 103
at retrieval (Cabeza et al., 2001). For this study, these verification processes should be
very important, especially regarding unstudied stimuli. Contrary to studied stimuli, which
present truly perceived information from the film, unstudied stimuli might induce a famil-
iar feeling, but without truly perceived information. Although verification processes are
needed to correctly discriminate between the truly perceived information of the film and
information, which is only associated with a familiar feeling. This interpretation is further
supported by results of studies examining patients with lesions in the orbitofrontal cortex,
or connected areas, who spontaneously confabulate (Schnider, von Daniken, & Gutbrod,
1996; Schnider & Ptak, 1999). These patients showed higher false response rates for un-
studied stimuli together with constant hit rates. This was interpreted as an inability to
suppress unimportant stimuli. Further studies showed that lesions in the orbitofrontal
cortex cause deficits during retrieval processes because of the patient’s inability to inhibit
irrelevant information (Schnider, Treyer, & Buck, 2000). This might result in discrimi-
nation deficits to distinguish between old and new stimuli (Curran, Schacter, Norman, &
Galluccio, 1997). A study on primates further supported the function of the orbitofrontal
cortex to discriminate between truly perceived information and new information (Rolls,
Browning, Inoue, & Hernadi, 2005), which showed that neurons in this area specifically
respond to novel visual stimuli. Thus, the involvement of the bilateral orbitofrontal cortex
in this study, for correct recognitions in general, demonstrates its function as a mediator
between memories and current demand. Bilateral activation of the dorsolateral frontal
cortex is thought to be more involved in performance monitoring processes than the ven-
trolateral frontal cortex (Stern et al., 2000). The recognition task of this study demanded
high monitoring effort because the viewed film had to be evaluated together with the
recognition pictures, and the resultant response was also monitored. Thus, activations in
these regions (BA 9/46) supposedly mirror the initiation of retrieving old visual informa-
tion from the film, as well as performance monitoring processes (cf. Nieuwenhuis, Yeung,
Holroyd, Schurger, & Cohen, 2004; Grady, McIntosh, & Craik, 2005). This interpretation
is supported by findings that the right ventrolateral/dorsolateral frontal cortex seems to
be specifically associated with active retrieval processes of the visual studied material
(Petrides, Alivisatos, & Evans, 1995; E. E. Smith, Jonides, & Koeppe, 1996; Henson,
2001; Owen, 2000; Stern et al., 2000). This indicates that in this study the right ven-
trolateral frontal cortex performs the initiation of retrieving the visual information of the
film, whereas the dorsolateral frontal cortex is more involved in monitoring processes of
this operation. Moreover, the anterior cingulate cortex is assumed, along with an increase
in neural activity in the orbitofrontal cortex, to be associated with response conflict and
inhibition of inadequate responses (cf. Aron, Fletcher, Bullmore, Sahakian, & Robbins,
2003; Aron, Monsell, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2004; Kemmotsu, Villalobos, Gaffrey, Courch-
esne, & Muller, 2005). The engagement of this region in conflicts at the level of response
6.4 Neural correlates 104
decisions, is anatomically supported by its connection with structures, which control the
actual motor response (Hazeltine, Poldrack, & Gabrieli, 2000). These are premotor, sup-
plementary motor, and primary motor areas. For the contrast, all correct recognitions
versus baseline, the activation of the left hemispheric anterior cingulate cortex lies in the
border region to the supplementary motor cortex (BA 6). This area is supposedly engaged
in the preparation of required motor responses (Cavina-Pratesi et al., 2006). Thus, the
left anterior cingulate cortex can be considered across all correct recognitions to be asso-
ciated with response conflict and the initiation of motor responses. The latter one further
indicates a stronger influence of the sets similars and outtakes within the group of all cor-
rect recognitions. Correct responses to these unstudied stimuli were made with the right
hand, which was initiated by the left motor cortex. The strongest and largest activation
of this contrast was found in the occipital lobes. The maximum increase of neural activity
lies in the left middle temporal gyrus (BA 19), but the cluster extends from the left into
the right hemisphere (see also Fig. 17, 5.2.1.1). In this study, the occipital region is
assumed to play a key role not only in the perception but also in the. evaluation of visual
information (Grill-Spector, 2003). The ‘Sensory Reactivation Hypothesis’ postulates that
during the retrieval of information sensory imprints of the encoded stimuli are reactivated
(K. A. Norman & Schacter, 1997). In order to make a ‘known’ or an ‘unknown’ decision,
the perceived information of the film has to be reactivated, so that it can be evaluated
together with the recognition stimuli. The large and strong activation revealed for this
contrast within the occipital lobe presumably mirrors the effort to retrieve the old visual
information from the film as well as the processing of the perceived recognition stimuli.
The activation in the right pons might reflect activation of the sixth cranial nerve (Nervus
abducens), which is responsible for eye movements (cf. Komisaruk et al., 2002). Lesion
of this nerve results in paralysis of conjugate lateral eye movements (Pierrot-Deseilligny,
2004). Thus, the activation in the pons can be interpreted in this study as being associ-
ated with an increase of eye movements during the watching of the recognition pictures.
The more intensive a picture is scanned the better the resolution (Underwood, Crundall,
& Hodson, 2005). It can be assumed that when a recognition stimulus is more precisely
watched, the details of it are better perceived and processed. Thus, the increase in eye
movements enhances that the subjects correctly discriminate the stimulus as a studied or
an unstudied one.
All false recognitions versus baseline displayed smaller clusters than all correct recog-
nitions versus baseline. In the frontal lobe left hemispheric activation was revealed in
the dorsolateral frontal cortex (BA 9) and right hemispheric activation in the ventrolat-
eral/dorsolateral frontal cortex (BA 45/46). Parietal activations are displayed in the left
posterior cingulate cortex (BA 31) and in the right posterior cingulate cortex/retrosplenial
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cortex (BA 23/30). Additionally, the right fusiform gyrus (BA 37) is activated as well
as bilaterally the middle occipital-temporal gyri (BA 19). The activations within the left
dorsolateral frontal cortex (BA 9) and the right ventrolateral/dorsolateral frontal cortex
(BA 45/46) are similar to the ones discussed above. Thus, it can be assumed that these
frontal regions are involved in performance monitoring processes in general. Contrary to
the earlier assumption, this suggests that they are not specifically associated with correct
or false responses or with the processing of studied or unstudied stimuli. The assumption
that the bilateral middle occipital-temporal region is related to the processing of the stim-
uli and reactivation of the information of the film can also be assumed for this contrast.
The posterior cingulate cortex (left BA 31) is assumed in this study to demonstrate a
general monitoring of the recognition stimuli and their current relevance. This area is
reported to be part of a “default mode” network, which is active till attention is focussed
(Raichle et al., 2001). This indicates that one reason for false recognitions might be a
shallow or superficial processing of the stimuli. A further explanation would be that be-
cause of the closeness of this activation to the left motor cortex (BA 4), it is related to
the movement of the right hand, which corresponds to false responses to originals. The
right hemispheric activation of the posterior cingulate cortex (BA 23/30) is surprising be-
cause this region is often reported to be associated with correct responses and successful
retrieval (von Zerssen et al., 2001; Herron, Henson, & Rugg, 2004; Ranganath, Heller,
Cohen, Brozinsky, & Rissman, 2005). Other studies have described how this region is
involved in ecphory processes of affective autobiographical memories (Fink et al., 1996),
and familiarity checking of faces and voices (Shah et al., 2001). For the purpose of this
study, it can be assumed that this region is associated with monitoring and evaluation of
familiarity caused by the recognition stimuli. In particular, the sets similars and outtakes
might induce a familiar feeling, which results in false recognitions. Additionally, the ac-
tivation might reflect a positive internally feedback to support the decision made, even
if it turned out to be false. Activation of the right fusiform gyrus (BA 37) is associated
with the perception of visual information, as well as the processing of specific information
about the form of presented objects (J. S. Simons, Koutstaal, Prince, Wagner, & Schacter,
2003; Garoff-Eaton et al., 2005). In this study, a possible explanation for this activation
is that during the processing of the recognition stimuli, the fusiform gyrus might discrimi-
nate details of the presented scenes. This further indicates that even though an unstudied
picture is recognised as unknown, subjects are oblivious to this realisation. Other factors,
like familiarity, might outweigh the perceived difference and result in false recognitions.
Importantly, this interpretation might be true for the processing of the unstudied stimuli
but not for the studied ones, which represent presented film scenes. Thus, the studied
stimuli should be associated with a familiar feeling that further should result in correct
recognitions.
6.4 Neural correlates 106
The contrast all correct versus all false recognitions displayed a mainly left hemi-
spherical neural network in the insula, the postcentral gyrus (BA 3), the orbitofrontal
cortex/anterior cingulate cortex (BA 10/32), and the posterior cingulate cortex (BA 31).
In the right hemisphere the lateral globus pallidus was activated. There were two ac-
tivations in the left insula, one at the boundary to the postcentral gyrus (BA 3) and
one near the claustrum. The left insula and the medial posterior cingulate cortex (BA
31) are presumably involved in self-monitoring processes emerging from willed action and
predictability of the recognition stimuli (Blakemore, Rees, & Frith, 1998). Predictability
of sensory stimuli implies the detection of their spatial-temporal patterns. Thus, stimulus
predictability is easily estimated for self-generated actions because for them the spatial-
temporal pattern is known. It seems that these two regions reflect the successful evalua-
tion of the recognition stimuli and the resulting self-generated response performance (cf.
Konishi, Wheeler, Donaldson, & Buckner, 2000). Additionally, together with the claus-
trum, the insula is assumed to be associated with the integration of sensory, motivational,
emotional, and mnemonic information via reciprocal claustro-neocortical and its claustro-
limbic connections (Guldin & Markowitsch, 1983, 1984; Markowitsch, Irle, Bang-Olsen, &
Flindt-Egebak, 1984). Thus, the activation in the insula supposedly mirrors the process-
ing and integration of the recognition stimuli and the perceived information of the film.
Thus, the stimuli became better predictable that further resulted in correct responses
of studied as well as unstudied stimuli. The small cluster activated within the left or-
bitofrontal cortex/anterior cingulate cortex (BA 10/32) possibly demonstrates a positive
feedback for giving the correct response. The orbitofrontal cortex was reported to be in-
volved in the representation of abstract reward situations (O’Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls,
Hornak, & Andrews, 2002). Even though activation in the anterior cingulate cortex was
found during false responses it is also associated with correct responses, which were made
under conditions of increased response competition (Carter et al., 1998). These results
indicate for this study that the orbitofrontal cortex/anterior cingulate cortex activation
demonstrates successful monitoring during difficult decision processes (cf. Ullsperger &
von Cramon, 2004). An interesting finding is the cluster within the left postcentral gyrus
(BA 3). The left postcentral gyrus receives somatosensory information from the right
side of the body. This indicates that in the group, all correct recognitions, the neces-
sary mental processes to handle unstudied stimuli outweigh the ones for the studied ones,
because to give a correct response to an unstudied picture, subjects had to press the
right button with their right thumb. The left activation in the postcentral gyrus might
demonstrate the sensorimotor process of their decision to reject unstudied stimuli. The
only activation within the right hemisphere lies in the lateral globus pallidus, a structure,
which is involved in initiating a selected motor program and inhibiting other competing
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programs (cf. ‘cortico-subthalamo-pallidal ‘hyperdirect’ pathway’, Nambu, Tokuno, &
Takada, 2002; Nambu, 2004). Thus, there are two possible explanations for this activa-
tion. One is that it is related to correct recognitions of originals, which were given with
the left hand. The other one indicates that this region is mainly associated with the
suppression of moving the left hand. This would indicate that the revealed activation in
the right lateral globus pallidus for all correct versus all false recognitions are predomi-
nantly related to the correct response of similars and outtakes (‘unknown’ – left hand,
suppressing ‘known’ – right hand). In conclusion, the neural network, which was revealed
to be activated for all correct recognitions, displayed regions that were mainly associated
with successful recognition processes, self-monitoring processes of self-generated actions,
and the execution of the respective motor responses.
The contrast between all false and all correct recognitions revealed activation within
the right precentral gyrus (BA 4). This result supports the interpretation for the above
described left postcentral gyrus activation. For studied stimuli, false recognitions mirror
‘unknown’ responses, which were given with the right hand, and correspond to the acti-
vation within the left hemisphere. For unstudied stimuli, false recognitions are associated
with activation within the right motor cortex, which initiates the movement of the left
hand for ‘known’ responses. It seems that the responses for similars and outtakes are
related to stronger activation in the respective brain region, which outweighed the ones
for originals.
The above discussed contrasts mostly displayed similar neural activities regarding
correct and false recognitions across all sets. Thus, more interesting are the regions that
are distinctively involved in giving correct and false responses. For correct recognitions
these are the anterior cingulate cortex and the insula. The posterior cingulate cortex (BA
23/30) might be of specific relevance regarding false recognitions, as well as the fusiform
cortex. Furthermore, the contrasts showed the expected results, stronger and larger acti-
vations for correct than for false recognitions.
The following results will not be discussed on the basis of the individual contrasts
but on the basis of the anatomical affiliation of the revealed activations. The reason for
that was that each contrast displayed several activations, from which some were displayed
for several contrasts. This would entail repetitive interpretations of some regions. To
avoid this it was decided to discuss the activations with regard to their affiliation. First,
activations within the frontal cortex will be interpreted, followed by the ones within the
parietal cortex, the temporal cortex, the occipital cortex, subcortical nuclei, cerebellum,
and pons.
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6.4.2 Frontal cortex
Activation within the frontal cortex was revealed in the orbitofrontal cortex (BA 10/47,
inferior frontal gyrus, superior frontal gyrus), the dorsolateral frontal cortex (BA 8/9/47,
medial frontal gyrus, middle frontal gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus), ventrolateral frontal
cortex (BA 45, inferior frontal gyrus), insula, anterior cingulate cortex (BA 32/24), sup-
plementary motor area (BA 6, medial frontal gyrus), and the precentral gyrus (BA 4).
In this study, the activations displayed in the orbitofrontal cortex were located in
two areas, one was in the frontopolar area 10 and dorsal to that the other was found in
the orbital area 47.
The frontopolar area 10 was activated in the right hemisphere for outtakes-correct
versus originals-correct, bilaterally for outtakes-false versus originals-false, and left hemi-
spherical for outtakes-false versus baseline.
The activation in the frontopolar area demonstrates that the decision making for
outtakes might be harder than for the other sets (Cohen, Heller, & Ranganath, 2005). This
region was associated with high-risk versus low-risk decisions (Rolls, 2004) and therefore
its involvement in correct and false responses for outtakes might mainly indicate the degree
of complexity of this set.
Similar to the first discussed contrast (all correct recognitions versus baseline) the
orbital area 47 was bilaterally activated for three contrasts correct rejected versus hits,
similars-correct versus originals-correct, and similars-correct versus baseline. For the
contrast outtakes-correct versus baseline only the right orbital area 47 was displayed.
The previous interpretation that the orbitofrontal cortex is associated with verifica-
tion processes of the recognition stimuli is supported by these findings. The activation in
this region mirrors the successful distinction between perceived and not perceived informa-
tion (Rolls et al., 2005), which is essential for decision making (Harrington et al., 2004).
Furthermore, the orbital area 47 is exclusively activated for correct rejected unstudied
stimuli. Thus, it can be assumed that this area mirrors the successful discrimination of
similars and outtakes.
The dorsolateral frontal cortex (BA 8/9/46) is associated with several contrasts. Bi-
lateral activations were found for false alarms versus hits, outtakes-correct versus originals-
correct, originals-correct versus baseline, similars-correct versus baseline, outtakes-correct
versus baseline, and outtakes-false versus baseline. Only the left hemispheric region was
revealed for correct rejected versus misses, false alarms versus misses, similars-false ver-
sus originals-false, and outtakes-false versus originals-false. Activation only in the right
hemisphere was displayed for similars-correct versus originals-correct, originals-false ver-
sus baseline, and similars-false versus baseline.
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The dorsolateral frontal cortex mirrors the effort to evaluate the recognition stimuli
appropriately (Rahm et al., 2006). This includes that active information of the recogni-
tion stimuli and of the film is selected, manipulated and the performance is monitored
(Fletcher & Henson, 2001). Especially during complex recognition operations, which in
this study were needed for the unstudied stimulus sets similars and outtakes, activation in
the dorsolateral frontal cortex might reflect monitoring of the present stimulus together
with information of the studied film, previous seen stimuli, and previous decisions (cf.
Owen, 2000). The recognition stimuli in this study were presented randomly. Thus,
subjects needed to monitor if they have seen of one specific scene, for example, first the
stimulus of the set originals or of the set similars and what their response for it was. That
the dorsolateral frontal cortex is mainly associated bilaterally with correct responses, ex-
cept for the set outtakes, suggests that higher processing effort is needed to successfully
evaluate the recognition stimuli and to respond correctly. Additionally, hemispherical
differences of this region were reported, which suggests that the right dorsolateral frontal
cortex is mainly associated with task planning and the corresponding left region with ex-
ecutive functions (cf. Newman, Carpenter, Varma, & Just, 2003). It can be assumed that
for correct responses of the recognition stimuli of this study the dorsolateral frontal cortex
has to be activated bilaterally so that both processes, task planning and their execution,
can be executed. This interpretation is further supported by patients with lesions in the
dorsolateral frontal cortex, three in right and three in left hemisphere, who showed higher
false alarms rates Budson et al., 2005. Furthermore, the set outtakes was the only one,
for which this region was found bilaterally activated for false recognitions. This might
demonstrate that this set was more difficult to be correctly discriminated as unstudied.
Thus, it is assumed that the stimulus set outtakes is more prone to false recognitions than
stimuli of the sets similars and originals.
Activation in the ventrolateral frontal cortex (BA 45) was revealed only for some
of the contrasts. Right hemispherical activation was found for the comparison false
alarms versus hits, outtakes-correct versus originals-correct, originals-correct versus base-
line, similars-false versus baseline, outtakes-correct versus baseline, and bilaterally for
outtakes-false versus baseline.
The ventrolateral frontal cortex supposedly mirrors the mental comparison of the
recognition stimuli with the information from the film by detecting elements in the pic-
tures, which equal the film (cf. Rahm et al., 2006). This would mean that it strongly
depends on the focus of the subjects’ attention if a picture is correctly recognised or not.
Supported is this interpretation by a study that investigated a verbal working memory
task and related the left ventrolateral frontal cortex to decision interferences when con-
flicting attributes of a stimulus have to be correlated to the currently important situation
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(Nelson, Reuter-Lorenz, Sylvester, Jonides, & Smith, 2003). That Nelson et al. (2003)
referred to the left ventrolateral frontal cortex whereas in this study the right hemispheric
one was activated might be explained with the different stimulus material. In this study
visual stimulus material was investigated and not a verbal working memory task. Fur-
thermore, other studies showed a bilateral involvement of this region for verbal as well as
visual spatial tasks (e.g. Owen, 2000). Thus, the involvement of the ventrolateral frontal
cortex presumably accentuates the complexity of the recognition stimuli.
Across all analysed contrasts the insula was displayed within the left hemisphere for
correct rejected versus misses, correct rejected versus hits, similars-correct versus outtakes-
correct, and outtakes-correct versus baseline.
The activation revealed in the left insula is similar to the one found for the con-
trast all correct versus all false recognitions. The previous assumption that the left insula
is strongly involved in monitoring processes, which result from the predictability of the
stimulus and the required willed action, is still acceptable. It was claimed that the pre-
dictability of a stimulus contains the detection of the specific spatial-temporal pattern of
it (Blakemore et al., 1998). The spatial-temporal pattern of a stimulus can be equated
with the source of it. This indicates that stronger activation in the insula reflects higher
monitoring processes whilst the pattern of the unstudied stimuli is compared with the in-
formation of the film. This operation results then in the correct rejection of the unstudied
stimuli.
The left anterior cingulate cortex (BA 32/24) was associated with the contrasts
hits versus false alarms, similars-correct versus originals-correct, outtakes-correct versus
originals-correct, outtakes-false versus similars-false, and outtakes-correct versus baseline.
Activation in the right anterior cingulate cortex was found for correct rejected versus
misses, correct rejected versus hits, and false alarms versus misses.
Except for the involvement of the left anterior cingulate cortex with hits versus false
alarms this region can be mainly associated with the processing of unstudied stimuli. The
activation in the left dorsal anterior cingulate cortex is similar to the one discussed for
all correct recognitions versus baseline. The involvement of the anterior cingulate cortex
might be mainly associated with the detection of situations, in which response conflict,
and furthermore errors, might occur (Magno, Foxe, Molholm, Robertson, & Garavan,
2006). One assumed function of the anterior cingulate cortex is the monitoring of infor-
mation processing and if necessary the initiation of adequate changes in cognitive control
processes (Botvinick et al., 2004). This function is also described in the conflict moni-
toring hypothesis (Carter et al., 1998; Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001).
This hypothesis further assumes that activation in the anterior cingulate cortex reflects
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error sensitivity and response inhibition (Braver, Barch, Gray, Molfese, & Snyder, 2001).
Thus, it is not surprising that anterior cingulate cortex activation was further reported
for correct responses that were associated with response conflict (Nieuwenhuis, Yeung,
van den Wildenberg, & Ridderinkhof, 2003). This indicates that for this study the ante-
rior cingulate cortex can be related to the effort to distinguish the recognition pictures.
Furthermore, it can be assumed that the pictures of the set outtakes were often related
to a strong familiar feeling. The false recognitions of this set are the only ones, which
are associated with activation in the anterior cingulate cortex. Maybe this activation also
demonstrates a positive feedback that the decision was correct, even though it was not
necessarily true for outtakes. Thus, the internal conflict between information of the film
and willed action would be minimised (cf. cognitive dissonance theory, 2.2.3).
The supplementary motor area (BA 6) and the precentral gyrus (BA 4) are assumed
to be involved in the motor responses. Thus, they are discussed together in this section.
Activation of the supplementary motor area (BA 6) was revealed in the left hemi-
sphere for false alarms versus misses, originals-correct versus baseline, originals-false ver-
sus baseline, similars-false versus baseline, and in the right hemisphere for false alarms
versus hits, false alarms versus misses, originals-correct versus baseline, similars-false
versus baseline, outtakes-correct versus baseline, and outtakes-false versus baseline. The
left precentral gyrus (BA 4) was activated for correct rejected versus hits, misses versus
false alarms, similars-correct versus originals-correct, outtakes-correct versus originals-
correct, originals-false versus similars-false, and originals-false versus outtakes-false. The
right precentral gyrus (BA 4) was found for the contrasts correct rejected versus misses,
hits versus correct rejected, originals-correct versus similars-correct, and originals-correct
versus outtakes-correct.
A ‘known’ response was given with the left hand and though it was expected that
correct responses to originals and false responses to similars and outtakes are associated
with activations in the right supplementary motor area and precentral gyrus. Regarding
to ‘unknown’ responses activation in the respective left regions was estimated. For this
study, the left insula and the adjacent supplementary motor cortex was earlier assumed
to be responsible for the active preparation of the motor response. In a recent study,
subjects were instructed to respond with the index or middle finger of their right hand
and activation in the left supplementary motor area was revealed (Cavina-Pratesi et al.,
2006). In this study subjects used response-dependent their left or right thumb to re-
spond. Though it is traceable that when a ‘known’ response is given with the right hand
the left supplementary motor area is activated and the respective right area is activated
for an ‘unknown’ response. Unexpected were the bilateral activations of these regions
for some of the contrasts. These results suggest that, for example, a left hemispherical
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activation, which is not related to the active motor response for an ‘unknown’ decision
(left hand), can be associated with the active inhibition of the right hand. The actual
motor response is initiated in the precentral gyrus. ‘Known’ responses given with the left
hand are associated with activation in the right precentral gyrus. For ‘unknown’ responses
the right hand was used and was associated with the left precentral gyrus. Most of the
results represent this expected activation aside from the right precentral gyrus activation
revealed for the contrast correct rejected versus misses. The activated cluster for this
contrast is small and lies adjacent to the postcentral gyrus (BA 3). Thus, this activation
might also be related to the willed inhibition to move the left hand. Other studies also
found activations in both hemispheres of the motor cortex, though the one contralateral
to the used hand was stronger, but they did not discuss these findings (cf. Habib, McIn-
tosh, Wheeler, & Tulving, 2003; Ruff, Knauff, Fangmeier, & Spreer, 2003; Christensen,
Ramsoy, Lund, Madsen, & Rowe, 2006).
Besides of the dorsolateral frontal cortex, the frontal regions were mainly involved
in processing outtakes and similars. The frontopolar area 10, which was interpreted to
be associated with high risk decisions, was specifically related to outtakes. A frontal
network was revealed, including primarily the orbital area 47, the left insula, but also
the ventrolateral frontal cortex, the dorsolateral frontal cortex, and the anterior cingulate
cortex that seemed to be correlated to difficult decision processes, which mostly resulted
in correct responses. Outstanding were the orbital area 47 and the left insula, which were
explicitly associated with correct rejections of unstudied stimuli, supposedly mirroring
successful source discrimination.
6.4.3 Parietal cortex
In the parietal cortex was mainly the posterior cingulate cortex (BA 31) and the retro-
splenial cortex (BA 30/29) activated. Furthermore, the postcentral gyrus (BA 3), the
inferior parietal gyrus (BA 40), the superior parietal lobule (BA 7), and the precuneus
were revealed.
The left posterior cingulate cortex (BA 31) was displayed for the contrast correct
rejected versus misses, whereas the right hemispheric region was activated for the contrasts
outtakes-false versus originals-false, outtakes-false versus similars-false, and outtakes-false
versus baseline.
The posterior cingulate cortex might reflect focussed attention to detect similarities
and differences between seen film scenes and recognition stimuli. The right posterior cin-
gulate cortex, which is associated with attentional control during target detection, seems
to act as an mediator between motivational bias and attention (cf. Small et al., 2003).
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Furthermore, the medial posterior cingulate cortex was reported together with the left
insula to be involved in the estimation of the predictability of stimuli (Blakemore et al.,
1998). It seems that this area is one of the key regions, with which correct and false recog-
nitions can be distinguished, presumably especially of the unstudied stimulus set outtakes.
The left hemispheric posterior cingulate cortex is suggested for this study, together with
the left insula activation, to be associated with successful detection of the unstudied stim-
uli. The right posterior cingulate cortex might demonstrate the unintentional integration
of the outtakes in the context of the film. The activation of this region is assumed to
mirror the false recognitions of these pictures as a result of the internal motivation to
memorise and handle the film as a complete whole. Therefore, the missing parts of the
film are presumably internally produced, and the respective recognition stimuli, outtakes,
caused false recognitions.
The retrosplenial cortex was displayed either in the right or in the left hemisphere
and was across all contrasts associated with processing of unstudied stimuli. The right
retrosplenial cortex (BA 29/30) was found in this study to be associated with false alarms
contrasted with hits, false alarms versus misses, and outtakes-false versus originals-false.
Activation in the left retrosplenial cortex was revealed for the contrasts correct rejected
versus misses and outtakes-correct versus originals-correct.
The right retrosplenial cortex was described to be involved with the retrieval of re-
cent and autobiographical memories (Piefke et al., 2003; Bernard et al., 2004; Steinvorth
et al., 2006). A recent study also associated the retrosplenial cortex with self-referential
decision processes (S. C. Johnson et al., 2005). Furthermore, it is one of the structures in-
volved in integration processes of self-referential stimuli in the context of oneself (Northoff
& Bermpohl, 2004). This suggests for this study that the subjects integrated the unstud-
ied stimuli, or at least parts of them, in their memory of the film. This interpretation is
supported by strong interconnections between the retrosplenial cortex with brain regions,
which are involved in encoding or/and retrieval processes (mainly the medial temporal
lobe (in particular the hippocampus), the posterior cingulate cortex, and the (anterior)
thalamus nuclei) (cf. Ranganath et al., 2005). Additionally, it was reported that pa-
tients suffering from prodomal Alzheimer’s disease demonstrate hypometabolism in the
retrosplenial cortex (BA 29/30) (Nestor, Fryer, Ikeda, & Hodges, 2003) and that am-
nesia can follow from damage in this region (e.g Yasuda, Watanabe, Tanaka, Tadashi,
& Akiguchi, 1997). These studies indicate that the retrosplenial cortex is an important
relay station between new and old visual information. The integration processes might
result in familiarity for unstudied stimuli that further induces false responses during the
recognition task. This would explain the high false alarms rate (cf. section 6.1). The
activations within the left retrosplenial cortex for correct rejected and correct responses to
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outtakes are larger and stronger than the ones revealed in the right hemisphere for false
recognitions. This indicates that higher processing effort is needed to correctly reject the
unstudied pictures. Furthermore, that the left retrosplenial cortex is associated only with
correct recognitions of outtakes and the right retrosplenial cortex with false recognitions
of the same set indicates that the set outtakes might prevail in the group of unstudied
stimuli. Thus, the retrosplenial cortex is assumed to be an indicator for correct and false
recognitions specifically for the stimuli of the set outtakes.
The postcentral gyrus (BA 2/3) was revealed in the right hemisphere for the contrast
between similars-false and originals-false and in the left hemisphere for the contrast
correct rejected versus misses.
The activation is related to the neural network that is responsible for the motor
responses. False recognitions of similars were given with the left hand (‘known’ response)
that was initiated by the right motor cortex. Correct rejections (‘unknown’ responses)
to unstudied stimuli were made with the right hand that was initiated by the left motor
cortex. Thus, similar to the activation in the precentral gyrus, which is mainly asso-
ciated with initiating the motor response, the postcentral gyrus is supposedly receiving
somatosensory information of the moving hand.
Activation in the left lateral parietal gyrus (BA 39) and the left superior parietal
lobule (BA 7) was revealed for the contrast false alarms versus misses.
These activations indicate that the subjects thought that they truly made correct
responses to the unstudied stimuli of the sets similars and outtakes. The left parietal
cortex was reported to reflect the generation of giving a ‘known’ response to studied and
unstudied stimuli (Okado & Stark, 2003; Wheeler & Buckner, 2003). Furthermore, the
left parietal cortex was found to be activated for retrieval success (Henson, Rugg, Shallice,
Josephs, & Dolan, 1999; Konishi et al., 2000). Though, these activations in this study
might demonstrate the support of a ‘known’ response to unstudied pictures. Addition-
ally, the left superior parietal lobule was revealed to be involved in processing of mental
images (Ishai, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 2000), which supports the assumption that the not
presented film parts were imagined and integrated in the memory of the film. This further
resulted in false recognitions of unstudied stimuli of the set outtakes.
Activation in the right inferior parietal gyrus (BA 40) was displayed for the con-
trasts outtakes-correct versus baseline and outtakes-false versus baseline. Additionally,
activation in the left precuneus was only revealed for the contrast outtakes-correct versus
baseline.
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These activations are suggested to demonstrate in this study that for the set out-
takes visual imagination have taken place. Both regions are associated with strong visual
imagination, which represent similar perceptual complexity as memories for experienced
events (Ishai et al., 2000; Suchan et al., 2002; Gonzalez, Dana, Koshino, & Just, 2005).
That means for this study that the missed parts of the film induced strong imaginations,
which were represented in the recognition task by the stimuli of the set outtakes. Further-
more, it showed that the right inferior parietal gyrus and the precuneus might be involved
in imagining these missed parts, but they did not explicitly differentiate between them
and truly perceived information from the film.
In summary, the most interesting activations in the parietal cortex were found in the
posterior cingulate cortex and the retrosplenial cortex. Both regions seem to be explicitly
involved in processing the pictures of the set outtakes. Thus, they demonstrate that this
set demanded higher processing effort than originals and similars. Additionally, it can
be concluded that the left brain regions were associated with correct rejections, whereas
the right hemispheric regions were related to false recognitions of outtakes.
6.4.4 Temporal cortex
In the temporal cortex the superior temporal gyrus (BA 22), the middle temporal gyrus
(BA 21), the inferior temporal gyrus (BA 37), and the parahippocampal gyrus were re-
vealed. The posterior activation in the middle temporal gyrus (BA 19) is discussed in the
next section (6.4.5) together with the middle occipital gyrus (BA 19).
The left superior temporal gyrus, activated for the contrast hits versus correct re-
jected, is suggested to be involved in integration processes of form, colour, and motion
information (Beauchamp, Lee, Haxby, & Martin, 2003). The activated cluster found
here lies at the direct border to the posterior insula, which was interpreted earlier to be
involved in performance monitoring processes. Thus, it can be assumed that the left su-
perior temporal gyrus activation is associated with the integration of old and new visual
information and decision processes regarding studied stimuli. This evaluation of originals
might further confirm their affiliation to the studied film and results in correct responses.
The right middle temporal gyrus (BA 21) was displayed with a small cluster for
the contrast misses versus correct rejected. This region was found to be associated with
negative, rather than positive memories (Piefke et al., 2003). Accurate recognitions of
negative facial expressions are also related to activation in the right middle temporal
gyrus (Rosen et al., 2006). The interpretation in this study for the activation in the right
middle temporal gyrus is that false responses to originals induced a negative feedback.
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Then, the right middle temporal gyrus would not only reflect negative emotions, but also
negative feedback for false rejections of studied stimuli.
The right inferior temporal gyrus (BA 37) belongs to the neural network that was
reported to be activated regarding interaction processes of predictability of stimuli and
willed actions (see discussion of left insula (6.4.1, 6.4.2, and of posterior cingulate cortex
6.4.1, 6.4.3, Blakemore et al., 1998). This right hemispheric activation in the inferior
temporal gyrus was found for the contrast false alarms versus misses. This further sup-
ports the previous interpretation that the false recognitions of the unstudied stimuli are
at least in part caused by failures of the estimated spatial-temporal pattern.
The maximum of neural increase in the right parahippocampal gyrus for the con-
trast outtakes-correct versus originals-correct was found adjacent to the lingual gyrus
(BA 18). The bilateral parahippocampal gyrus is associated with processing of visual
stimuli (J. B. Brewer, Zhao, Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 1998; Bar & Aminoff, 2003).
Furthermore, Okado and Stark (2003) found the parahippocampal gyrus to be stronger
activated for true than for false memories. It was assumed that the parahippocampal
gyrus is specifically related to sensory details, which allows this region to discriminate
between truly perceived and mentally imagined information (Cabeza et al., 2001). Thus,
the involvement of this region can be suggested to reflect the processing of more detailed
information of the outtakes that further leads to correct rejections of them.
In summary, activation within the temporal cortex was displayed sporadic for some
of the contrasts. This indicates that these regions are mainly engaged in retrieval processes
in general across all three sets.
6.4.5 Occipital cortex
The middle occipital gyrus (BA 18/19) was revealed for most of the contrasts, for correct
and false recognitions and for studied as well as unstudied stimuli. Nearly all of these
contrasts displayed bilateral activation in the middle occipital-temporal region. It is
important not only to look at the tables but also at the “glass brains” of the contrasts. As
it was noted for the first discussed contrast, all correct recognitions versus baseline, some
of the clusters only displayed a maximum in the left or the right hemisphere. However,
the “glass brains” showed that the activation covered the middle occipital-temporal region
of both hemispheres. Furthermore, the large and strong results of similars and outtakes
versus baseline suggest that this area is more involved in recognition processes of unstudied
than of studied stimuli.
The results of this study did not confirm the ones of the study of Slotnick and
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Schacter (2004) who found that late visual processing areas (BA 19/37) are associated
with ‘old/known’ responses in general. In this study, the middle occipital-temporal region
was involved in ‘known’ as well as in ‘unknown’ responses. The previous interpretation
of these activations for the contrasts all correct and all false recognitions versus baseline
was that it demonstrates the reactivation of the perceived visual information of the film
as well as processing of the recognition stimuli. It is noticeable, that originals-false versus
baseline is only associated with small bilateral clusters in this region. This indicates that
these pictures were not closely examined and thus falsely rejected. Following this train of
thoughts the large activation of similars-correct and outtakes-correct demonstrates that
when these pictures are closely examined the differences between them and the originally
perceived film became clear. These unstudied stimuli were then correctly rejected. This
interpretation is also supported by the large activation found for originals-correct and the
smaller one for similars-false, even though the latter one is still larger than the one for
originals-false. The large cluster, which was revealed for outtakes-false, suggests that a
further process might be reflected in the middle occipital-temporal region beyond reac-
tivation and perception. Earlier, it was assumed that the higher failure rate for the set
outtakes is due to imaginations for the parts of the film, which were not presented. These
gaps seemed to be filled by imagining what might be happened. In the recognition task
subjects saw pictures representing these not perceived but probably imagined parts of the
scenes and falsely recognised more than half of them. Lesion in bilateral medial occipital
lobe can result in visual object agnosia and prosopagnosia, which can further elicit the
inability to imagine visual scenarios (Ogden, 1993). The patient, described in the study
by Ogden (1993), was incapable to describe a experienced event with the witnessed visual
richness or to retrieve the episode at all. A related result was reported from a study inves-
tigating visual perception and imagery. Ganis et al. (2004) demonstrated that these two
processes are associated with overlapping brain areas, even though activation was larger
for perception than for imagery. The activation in the middle occipital-temporal region
might demonstrate the effort to process the unstudied stimuli with regards to reactivated
old information of the film and imagined parts, respectively. This would explain why this
region is more involved with outtakes-false than with the other two sets.
In conclusion, in this study it can be assumed that the occipital-temporal activation
is mainly related to processing of perceived recognition stimuli, reactivation of visual
information of the film, and to a smaller amount to imaginations, which completed the
film by filling in the gaps.
6.4.6 Subcortical nuclei
The activations of subcortical nuclei, including nucleus ruber, lateral globus pallidus,
thalamus, subthalamic nucleus, claustrum, and hypothalamus, are mainly associated with
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unstudied stimuli. Most of these nuclei are involved with initiating or inhibition of the
motor response.
The nucleus ruber (contrast false alarms versus hits) is important for willed actions
of limbs (Pritzel et al., 2003). Thus, the activation in the right hemisphere can be as-
sumed to be involved, together with the right supplementary motor area (BA 6) and the
precentral gyrus (BA 4), in processing of the actual motor response.
The right hemispheric activation in the lateral globus pallidus was revealed together
with activation in the left thalamus, more specifically in the ventral/lateral nucleus of the
thalamus (contrast correct rejected versus misses). The complex globus pallidus/thalamus
is associated with voluntary limb movements whereas other possible actions are actively
suppressed (cf. Nambu et al., 2002; Nambu, 2004).
The activation in the left subthalamic nucleus was displayed for the contrast correct
rejected versus hits. This activation was revealed adjacent to the substantia nigra, which
indicates control of the movement of the right hand that made the ‘unknown’ responses.
The subthalamic nucleus is part of the basal ganglia, to which also belong the globus
pallidus, the substantia nigra, the caudate nuclei, and the putamen. The basal ganglia
circuit is associated to different motor activities (cf. Lehericy et al., 2006) and is closely
controlled by the frontal lobes (cf. Cavedini, Gorini, & Bellodi, 2006). Within this circuit
the subthalamic nucleus plays a key role at coordinating motor behaviour (Yasoshima et
al., 2005; Aron & Poldrack, 2006). Thus, the involvement of the subthalamic nucleus in
this contrast and the activation of the globus pallidus points out the greater demand of
response control for unstudied stimuli.
The interpretation above for the basal ganglia is also assumed for the cluster revealed
between hypothalamus and putamen for the contrast outtakes-false versus baseline. Even
though the maximum of this cluster lies nearer to the hypothalamus, this activation is
suggested to be more related to the putamen and thus be involved in response control
processes.
The claustrum was displayed in the left hemisphere for hits versus false alarms. This
region was earlier discussed together with activation in the left insula and is suggested to
be involved in integration processes of old and new visual information. It might be that
the claustrum is more associated with the successful comparison of old information of the
film with originals because it was specifically revealed for this set.
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6.4.7 Cerebellum
Activation in the cerebellum was revealed in the left hemisphere for the contrast false
alarms versus misses and in the right hemisphere for outtakes-correct versus originals-
correct.
The cerebellum is strongly associated with integration processes of sensory per-
ceived information and motor output. Furthermore, it was reported to be involved in
visual perception and in visual imagery processes (Ganis et al., 2004). Lesion in the
left cerebellum results in deficits in visuospatial functions (Hokkanen, Kauranen, Roine,
Salonen, & Kotila, 2006). This indicates an involvement of the cerebellum in process-
ing the unstudied stimuli, presumably specifically outtakes, perhaps with reference to the
perceived information of the film.
6.4.8 Pons
In the right hemisphere the pons was activated for the contrasts correct rejected versus
hits and similars-correct versus baseline.
This activation presumably reflects increase in activity in the Nervus abducens (sixth
brain nerve). A similar activation was discussed earlier for the contrast all correct recog-
nitions versus baseline (6.4.1). That this cluster seems to be associated with the set
similars supports the previous explanation that it mirrors the increase in eye movement
during scanning unstudied pictures. The enhanced scanning of these stimuli might lead to
an exacting resolution of them that further supports the detection of differences between
them and the perceived scenes of the film. Thus, the pictures of the unstudied stimulus
set similars, which were more precisely examined, were correctly rejected.
6.4.9 Summary neural correlates
In summary, the neuroimaging results revealed different neural activations for correct
and false recognitions. It was hypothesised that correct recognitions of studied stimuli
would be associated with stronger and larger neural networks. The first discussed results,
all correct and all false recognitions across all sets, seemed to support this hypothesis.
However, the results of the following contrasts did not verify the assumption. On the
contrary, correct responses to originals appear to engage smaller neural network than
the unstudied stimulus sets similars and outtakes. In general, unstudied stimuli are
associated with stronger and larger activations than studied ones. This indicates that
the processing and evaluation of similars and outtakes requires wider neural resources.
This was supported by the revealed frontal activations, which are mainly involved in
monitoring and response conflict processes of unstudied stimuli. It was demonstrated that
the dorsolateral frontal cortex is more involved in monitoring processes during recognition
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processes and might be associated with correct recognitions when it is bilateral activated.
The involvement of the ventrolateral frontal cortex and the frontopolar area 10 presumably
mirrors the complexity of the recognition stimuli. A key region might be the orbital
area 47, which is assumed to verify correct recognitions especially of unstudied stimuli.
Furthermore, the left insula and claustrum are supposedly involved in identifying the
source of a stimulus and thus support correct recognitions of studied and of unstudied
stimuli.
The involvement of the occipital region is not entirely clear because this region
is associated with processing of perceived and reactivated visual information as well as
imaginations. Presumably, it is engaged in all three of these processes. The increase in
activity in the occipital-temporal region seems to depend on initiation and monitoring
processes of the frontal regions that support activations in the occipital region. The
more and stronger frontal regions are activated the larger and stronger is supposedly the
occipital region involved.
It seems that correct recognitions of originals and similars are mainly depending on
careful processing of the recognition stimuli. False responses to originals are associated
only with small activations, which are involved in visual perception, motor response,
and task planning. A possible key region that discriminates between correct and false
recognitions of studied stimuli was not revealed. The results for correct responses of
similars showed that apparently increase in eye movements are responsible for higher
resolution of the pictures and thus for correct rejections of them.
The set outtakes seems to engage an exceptional position. This set is associated
with the strongest and largest activations across all sets. It confirms the assumption
that subjects imagined parts of the film, which they had not perceived. Especially the
parietal cortex, and here explicitly the retrosplenial and posterior cingulate cortex, might
be engaged in processing of the unstudied stimuli of the set outtakes. Left hemispheric
activations are revealed for correct rejections and right hemispheric ones for false recog-
nitions.
Finally, the neuroimaging data showed similar results like the earlier discussed be-
havioural ones. The film paradigm induced false recognitions and the stimulus sets en-
gaged different neural networks. Especially, the differences in the neural activations of
the similars and the outtakes supposedly resulted from the different causes of false recog-
nitions that they represent.
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7 Conclusion
The phenomenon of false memories is an active area of research, which has seen increased
interest lately. False recognitions are a form of false memories that can be investigated
under controlled laboratory conditions. The main aim of this study was to investigate
false recognitions on the basis of a complex visual stimulus. The newly developed film
paradigm was shown to be useful in causing false recognitions.
Furthermore, it was able to distinguish between two different causes of false recogni-
tions. These two causes were represented by the stimuli of the sets: similars and outtakes.
It was shown that the set outtakes is associated with the highest false recognition rate,
followed by the set similars and then the set originals. These results verified the assump-
tion that false recognitions are not only provoked by stimuli, which are similar to the
original studied film material but also by stimuli showing parts of the film that were not
presented. These results demonstrated clearly that events are memorised as a complete
whole, rather than in bits and pieces. As such, events are remembered without truly
perceiving each and every part.
In order to distinguish between these two different causes of false recognitions, fur-
ther studies should produce two separate films. The stimulus material for the set similars
should be extracted from one film, and the stimulus material of the set outtakes should
be extracted from the other film. Both films and their recognition material might be
tested with two different groups of subjects. For the third set, new pictures should be
used, which should be independent of the films. The results of these recognition tasks
should clarify how similar or different these two causes provoke false recognitions. Fur-
thermore, a known/remember paradigm or a rating on how certain the subjects may be
with their responses, would further help to deepen the knowledge of these two causes of
false recognitions.
Moreover, it was shown that the response time analysis should only be used as an
additional tool to examine false recognitions. The results showed that longer response
times were related to correct responses of unstudied stimuli and to false responses of
studied ones. It was shown that these results were generally in line with previous studies.
Additionally, the assumption that the two unstudied stimulus sets were handled differently
from the originals was supported by the response times, but the data did not demonstrate
a difference between the unstudied stimulus sets similars and outtakes. Nevertheless,
response times should always be integrated in an investigation with a false recognition
paradigm, because it was shown that the long duration of the recognition task did not
influence the response behaviour of the subjects as it might be assumed.
Of special interest were the results of the neuroimaging investigation, which revealed
different neural activation for the three sets. Further studies with the presented film par-
adigm should explicitly look for activations within the frontal and parietal cortex. These
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regions showed specific involvement in the recognition process of the stimuli. Additionally,
the paradigm described above, which assumes two separate films to create the unstudied
stimulus sets similars and outtakes, could be used to discriminate between the associated
neural networks.
As far as it is known, no previous study investigated a comparable recognition set
like the set outtakes. This set had specific parietal activations, and induced larger and
stronger activations than the other two sets. It seems that the pictures in this set mirror
a cognitive process, which had not been sufficiently investigated in previous research
projects. In this study, the subjects did not confuse details of an event or associate some
related information with a perceived event. The outtakes presumably represent a mainly
unconscious process of imagining these parts of an event that were not perceived. It
would be interesting to investigate if different circumstances are distinguishable for the
set outtakes. For example, if emotive material reduces the false recognitions effect, or,
if films showing specific topics (e.g. documentation, movie, animated film) reduce or
increase the false recognitions effect. Moreover, further work could look at whether the
same brain regions are activated by this new material, or whether the increase in neural
activity only depends on the used stimulus material.
Altogether, there are several interesting differences between the discussed neuroimag-
ing results and previous studies (e.g. Cabeza et al., 2001; Okado & Stark, 2003; Slotnick
& Schacter, 2004 ). The latter ones often described specific activation in the medial
temporal lobe (specifically the parahippocampal gyrus) for correct recognitions and fur-
ther showed that the correct recognitions of previous studied material were associated
with larger and stronger activations. In this study, activation in the parahippocampal
gyrus was only found for correct recognitions of outtakes and this set was related to the
largest and strongest activations. Future research should be carried out in order to inves-
tigate these differences, which could help to gain a deeper insight in the neural processes
underlying false recognitions.
Finally, further work should address the film paradigm in combination with picture-
or word-list paradigms as well as real-world episodes in order to demonstrate more clearly
differences and similarities between these paradigms and the investigated phenomenon of
false recognitions.
However, it is reasonable to conclude that the here revealed results can be applied,
at least in part, to memory abilities in general. Memories can deviate from perceived
reality without our knowledge. Even with respect to recent experiences, the results of
this study show that memories can be changed and thus modify perceived information.
This study also questions, once again, the reliability of eyewitness reports and suggests
that these reports should be handled very carefully.
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Appendix B
Additional statistic: Comparison pilot and fMRI study
Comparison of recognition rates
A t-test for independent samples revealed neither for all correct (F = .302, p = .586) nor
for all false (F = .321, p= .574) recognition rates significant differences between the two
studies. Although, single comparisons are calculated with a oneway ANOVA.
originals-correct : F = 1.386, df = 1, p = .247
similars-correct : F = 3.091, df = 1, p = .087
outtakes-correct : F = 1.287, df = 1, p = .264
originals-false: F = 1.464, df = 1, p = .234
similars-false: F = 2.953, df = 1, p = .095
outtakes-false: F = 1.168, df = 1, p = .287
Comparison of discriminability indices and response biases
T-tests for independent samples revealed no significant differences between discriminabil-
ity indices, d’, and response biases, c, between hits and false alarms. Single comparisons
showed only for the comparison between the indices of hits and similars-false significant
difference.
d’ (hits & false alarms): F = 2.325, df = 35, p = .067
d’ (hits & similars-false): F = 2.139, df = 35, p = .049
d’ (hits & outtakes-false): F = 1.747, df = 35, p = .119
c (hits & false alarms): F = 0.519, df = 35, p = .722
c (hits & similars-false): F = 0.395, df = 35, p = .920
c (hits & outtakes-false): F = 0.001, df = 35, p = .470
Appendix B Additional statistic: Comparison pilot and fMRI study VIII
Comparison of response times (RT)
Single comparisons are calculated with a oneway ANOVA. The comparison of originals-
false significantly differed. The mean values showed that the response time of the subjects
of the pilot study was longer than the respective one of the fMRI study.
RT originals-correct : F = 2.128, df = 1, p = .154
RT similars-correct : F = 3.079, df = 1, p = .088
RT outtakes-correct : F = 2.739, df = 1, p = .107
RT originals-false: F = 2.719, df = 1, p = .011
RT similars-false: F = 0.848, df = 1, p = .154
RT outtakes-false: F = 1.211, df = 1, p = .084
T-tests for independent samples revealed no significant differences between the response
times of first, second, and third part of the recognition task.
1. third-correct: F = ,0.031, df = 35, p = .236
1. third-false: F = 0.042, df = 35, p = .231
2. third-correct: F = 1.251, df = 35, p = .437
2. third-false: F = 0.927, df = 35, p = .485
3. third-correct: F = 0.091, df = 35, p = .482
3. third-false: F = 0.113, df = 35, p = .496
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